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Abstract 
 
 The evolution of British airborne warfare cannot be fully appreciated without 
reference to the technological development required to convert the detail contained in the 
doctrine and concept into operational reality. My original contribution to knowledge is the 
detailed investigation of the British technological investment in an airborne capability in order 
to determine whether the development of new technology was justifiable, or indeed, entirely 
achievable. 
 
   The thesis combines the detail contained in the original policy for airborne warfare 
and the subsequent technological investigations to determine whether sufficient strategic 
requirement had been demonstrated and how policy impacted upon the research 
programme. Without clear research parameters technological investment could not achieve 
maximum efficiency and consequent military effectiveness. The allocation of resources was 
a crucial factor in the technological development and the fact that aircraft suitability and 
availability remained unresolved throughout the duration of the war would suggest that the 
development of airborne forces was much less of a strategic priority for the British than has 
previously been suggested.   
 
Ultimately, despite the creation of a dedicated research institution in 1942 (Airborne 
Forces Experimental Establishment), and the development of specialist hardware such as 
the assault glider, the British did not possess the material resources required for the large-
scale deployment of airborne troops. Analysis of the technology has revealed that the 
development of airborne warfare was as much for the purpose of psychological warfare and 
British morale as it was for offensive operations.   
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Introduction 
 
One could be forgiven for considering the development of an airborne capability to be 
an outstanding example of British wartime determination and technological creativity. 
Certainly those men who volunteered for airborne forces were of the highest calibre and their 
bravery and courage could never be questioned. However, despite the creation of two entire 
airborne divisions examination of the technology suggests that the airborne method of 
deployment lacked both the strategic direction and dedicated materiel resources required to 
achieve military effectiveness and, ultimately, operational success. Such deficiencies only 
become evident through detailed analysis of the technological investment.    
 
Unfortunately, the origins and subsequent technological development of British 
airborne forces have remained largely neglected by contemporary military historians. 
Consequently, the failure to engage with the technological and scientific investment has 
resulted in over optimistic conclusions with regard to the military and strategic effectiveness 
of the airborne technique. John Greenacre argues that: 
 
The establishment of the British airborne force rates a few pages at best 
and a few lines at worst, even in the official and semi-official histories. This 
is understandable, for battlefield history appears to offer more dramatic 
reading than the minutiae of establishments and background 
developments. 1 
                                               
1
 J. Greenacre, Churchill’s Spearhead: The Development of Britain’s Airborne Forces during World 
War II (Barnsley, 2010), p. 8.  
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Three noticeable research exceptions have been conducted by Terrance Otway, 2  
William Buckingham 3 and John Greenacre 4 but their investigations fail to determine the 
extent to which airborne forces were dependent upon redundant technology and thus 
restricted by lack of suitable materiel resource. For example, Buckingham established a 
chronology of events culminating with the formation of the 1st Parachute Brigade in 
September 1941 and challenged the received wisdom that the formation of an airborne force 
was first considered in 1940 on the orders of Churchill. However, he has failed to extend his 
argument further and recognise that Churchill exercised considerable political influence in 
the creation of an airborne force despite the fact that it could not be technologically satisfied. 
Consequently, it was the substantial technological development required to turn the vision 
into reality that holds the key to understanding the limitations upon which the airborne 
capability was originally constructed.   
 
Barton Hacker believed that ‘technological innovation of almost every kind has 
historically answered more too military purposes than commonly allowed’ and consequently 
the contribution of military technology in the development of British post-war aviation will also 
be briefly examined, particularly in relation to rotary wing aircraft. 5 Without such a thorough 
understanding of the technological investment, the British airborne experience cannot be 
truly appreciated and analysis will remain restricted to the study of individual operations that 
fail to contextualise the development and subsequent application of new technology. 
 
                                               
2
 T.B.H. Otway, Airborne Forces (Imperial War Museum, 1990). 
3
 W. Buckingham, PARAS: The Birth of British Airborne Forces from Churchill’s Raiders to 1st 
Parachute Brigade (Stroud, 2005). 
4
 J. Greenacre, Churchill’s Spearhead: The Development of Britain’s Airborne Forces during World 
War II.  
5
 B. Hacker, ‘Military Technology and World History: A Reconnaissance’, The History Teacher, Vol.30, 
No.4, 1997,pp. 461-487, p. 461.  
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The thesis will challenge the established hypothesis and extend the argument further 
by demonstrating that, although the concept of airborne transportation had been previously 
explored by the British, significant technological development was nonetheless required in 
order to put the principle into practice. This will be explored through an analysis of the 
dedicated scientific and technological resources responsible for realising the operational 
requirements of the airborne force and demonstrate that its creation was far from 
technologically inevitable or achievable.  
 
In order to fully understand the level and capability of the technology then available 
the thesis will focus upon the technological realisation of the airborne concept in relation to 
the effectiveness of the strategic doctrine. This will form a framework within which the 
decision to invest in such technology can be comprehensively analysed. Greenacre defined 
‘concept’ in the following terms: 
 
A concept is a description of the way in which a military capability will be 
employed within a given environment. It describes the function or purpose 
of that capability in a manner that allows its development to be framed, and 
parameters set, for the procurement of equipment and training of 
personnel. 6  
  
Ultimately the level of detail contained in the concept became the cornerstone for all aspects 
of technological development. The doctrine was subsequently defined from the concept, 
summarised in the British Defence Doctrine as ‘the bedrock on which such decisions can be 
based’, 7 and provided adequate guidance for commanders to use in operational planning 
whilst not being too prescriptive as to become restrictive. Greenacre succinctly summarised 
the inter-relationship: 
                                               
6
 Greenacre, Churchill’s Spearhead, p. 172.  
7
 Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01: British Defence Doctrine, (M.O.D., 2008), p.iii. 
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A concept informs developers while doctrine guides practitioners. A 
concept prescribes where and when a capability will fight while doctrine 
advises how it should fight. The two together therefore are the catalyst 
through which physical resources under command are translated into 
military effectiveness. 8   
   
Clarity of both doctrine and concept were thus crucial in order to ensure that the 
technological and financial investments yielded maximum returns, particularly when such 
development was initiated within the limited resources of a wartime economy. Millett and 
Murray have argued that military activity consists of both vertical and horizontal dimensions 
and that without an appreciation of all of these factors the ‘military effectiveness’ of any 
particular nation, military organization or specific technological development cannot be 
thoroughly analysed. 9 In essence the military effectiveness of an organisation requires an 
analysis of political, strategic, operational and tactical influences. All of these factors will be 
examined in order to provide, for the first time, a comprehensive formula through which the 
technological investment in airborne warfare can be contextualised.  
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Terrance Otway  10 believed that the strategic necessity for the 
development of the British airborne capability was to produce a force which could ‘take 
advantage of the open flank to place themselves in such a position that they can strike a 
mortal blow in the most economical manner.’ 11 However, further analysis is required in order 
to ascertain if technological development was alone capable of satisfying the political 
                                               
8
 Ibid. 
9
 A. Millet, W. Murray & K. Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organizations’, in A. Millett & W. 
Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness: Volume One, The First World War (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 1-2.  
10
 Otway commanded the 9th Battalion Parachute Regiment and then served with the 15
th
 Parachute 
Battalion in Malaya.  
11
 Otway, Airborne Forces, p. 2.  
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aspiration and subsequent strategic policy. This will ultimately determine if such technology 
was worth the investment in the first place.  
Methodology & Synopsis 
 
The argument will be presented through an examination of the following research 
questions. Firstly, the decision to develop such a capability will be placed into the context of 
the British war-time economy and tested against the War Office policy that procurement was 
driven by strategic necessity. Consequently, the events leading up to the creation of a 
dedicated research institution, the Airborne Forces Experimental Establishment (A.F.E.E.), in 
February 1942 will be explored in order to determine if a strategic necessity had been 
reasonably demonstrated.  
 
Secondly, the technological developments of the A.F.E.E., and its predecessors, are 
examined to deduce whether the decision of the war-time government to invest in airborne 
warfare was both justified and technologically viable. 12 William Hancock, in the Official 
History of the British War Economy, argued that the British war-time economy of 1940 was 
not capable of withstanding the financial pressures of technological extravagance:  
 
Ever since the fall of France the British had been struggling desperately not 
to lose the war. But how did they propose to win it? The certainly could not 
win it by procuring new, astronomical programmes for the armed forces. 13 
 
However, it would appear that the development of airborne forces was conducted contrary to 
Hancock’s statement. This will be examined within the limitations of the available technology, 
                                               
12
 P. Howlett, ‘The Wartime Economy 1939-1945.’ In R. Floud & P. Johnson (ed.) The Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 1-26, p. 1. 
13
 W. Hancock & M. Gowing, British War Economy, (H.M.S.O., 1949), p. 213.  
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contemporary scientific opinion, and the personalities contained within the war-time 
administration and culminate with an analysis of whether the research undertaken by the 
A.F.E.E. was capable of satisfying the strategic requirement. 
 
The thesis utilises the Millett and Murray devised methodology for examination of 
military effectiveness across the vertical and horizontal dimensions of military activity. The 
vertical dimension consists of the ‘preparation for and conduct of war at the political, 
strategic, operational and tactical levels.’ 14 Ultimately, these factors form the backbone of the 
process by which a political decision is translated into a means of execution on the 
battlefield. Paradoxically the horizontal dimension contains the multitude of activities that 
must be conducted and executed at each hierarchical level in order to ensure both efficiency 
and effectiveness. These include planning, technological development, procurement, 
training, and finally, combat. Millett and Murray argue that ‘an adequate definition of military 
effectiveness must include all these aspects of military activity. Similarly, the deterioration of 
overall military effectiveness requires assessments across the horizontal and vertical range 
of military activity.’ 15     
 
Consequently, the technological development of British airborne warfare requires a 
broad examination of all these factors in order to determine if the decision to invest in the 
technology was justified. Military activity consists of interdependent political, strategic, 
operational and tactical elements that must be explored in order to contextualise 
technological development.    
 
 The introduction contains a brief summary of British experimentation with the airborne 
technique prior to the outbreak of World War Two and provides the background to Churchill’s 
                                               
14
 Millet, Murray & Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organizations’, in Military Effectiveness: 
Volume One, p. 2.  
15
 Ibid.  
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minute of 22 June 1940 which requested further development. 16 The summary proves that 
the British association with airborne warfare was established in the inter-war period, although 
divergence of opinion over future policy remained unresolved. 17  
       
 Chapter one examines the influence of science and technology upon political and 
military thinking during the period immediately before the outbreak of the second world war 
and introduces the key personalities who influenced the development of the British airborne 
capability. The mechanics of the war-time economy are also established so that analyses 
can be conducted of the procurement and contractual frameworks that governed 
technological development.   
  
The foundation of the Central Landing Establishment and its successors are studied 
in chapter two and the extent of technological investigations are presented prior to the first 
British parachute assault, Operation Colossus. The policies associated with the development 
of airborne forces are also examined to determine their strategic effectiveness and influence 
on future technological development; particularly the decision to concentrate upon the 
development of the assault glider in preference to parachute forces which became central to 
the development programme. 18  
 
 Prior to April 1942 technological development and experimentation lacked both 
direction and central administration. The Air Ministry recognised that the roles and 
responsibilities for future investigation required clarification as demonstrated throughout the 
Operation Records Book (O.R.B.). 19 Between the professionalization of the research and the 
formation of the A.F.E.E. in February 1942, a system of monthly technical reports had been 
                                               
16
 T.N.A., CAB 120/262, Airborne Forces: Minute to War Cabinet, by Winston Churchill, 22 June 1940.   
17
 Buckingham, PARAS, pp. 11-14.  
18
 Greenacre, Churchill’s Spearhead, pp. 24-25.  
19
 T.N.A., AIR 29/512, Operation Records Book, Central Landing Establishment, 1940-1944. 
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devised so that all stakeholders could be regularly informed of developments and ensure 
that experimentation could be co-ordinated with War Office requirements. Chapter three will 
focus on the nature of the research and development programme and ascertain whether the 
allocation of resources was sufficient for developmental purposes and that the overall 
strategic policy was adequately defined. 
 
 In the final chapter the formation of the A.F.E.E. is examined to determine the 
contribution the research institution had upon the technological development of airborne 
forces. 20 Despite the creation of such an Establishment resource allocation, particularly in 
terms of aircraft, remained problematical and criticism concerning the effectiveness of the 
organisation will be explored to determine the cause. The procurement of resources and the 
technological innovation of the glider programme will be examined in detail to deduce the 
scale of resources required for the delivery of the airborne capability. The post-war work of 
the Establishment 21 is also scrutinised to determine whether continued experimentation with 
the airborne technique was ultimately justified following the development of the helicopter 
and its potential application for airborne deployment.                
Historiography & Sources 
 
A key factor in the failure to recognise the technological investment in the 
development of airborne forces has been that post-war historians have tended to focus 
specifically upon individual operations in reaction to the broad historiographical formulae 
employed in official British military histories. J.R.M. Butler summarised the single history 
approach in 1958 by stating: 
 
                                               
20
 Air Ministry, The Second World War 1939-1945, Royal Air Force, Airborne Forces (Air Ministry 
Official Monograph, 1951), pp. 54-55.  
21
 T.N.A., AVIA 15/2253: A.F.E.E. Future Technical Policy, by AD/RD Airborne, 22 September 1945. 
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British historians are not writing separate accounts of the parts played by 
the Navy, the Army, and the Royal Air Force, but are compiling a single 
integrated history of the war as a whole. To do so was part of their official 
instructions. 22 
 
Although Butler generally concluded that the practice was well received there can be no 
doubt that more detailed examination was required.  
 
Maury Feld considered the broad approach too constricted and argued that it failed to 
deliver a ‘historical and analytical treatment of the principles and the criteria of the 
organizations which directed these men, and of the tools which allowed or prevented them 
from attaining their goals’. 23 Consequently, the transition from broad historiography to 
detailed enquiry has resulted in the mechanics of the development of the British airborne 
capability being largely disregarded in favour of specific operations.  
 
David Edgerton has argued that academic studies of technology ‘succeed through 
substantive content’ 24 as much as methodology and the thesis will address this imbalance 
through a detailed analysis of the technological and scientific investment. Alex Roland 
succinctly clarified the situation concerning technological contributions to military 
development:  
     
The bad news is that military history has been studied often but not well; 
the history of science has been studied well but not often. Military histories 
are as old as the Iliad and the Old Testament, but as a genre they are 
                                               
22
 J.R.M. Butler, ‘The British Official Military History of the Second World’, Military Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 
3, 1958, pp.149-151, p. 150.
 
23
 M. Feld, ‘The Writing of Military History’, Military Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1958, pp. 38-39, p. 38. 
24
 D. Edgerton, ‘Innovation, Technology, or History: What is the Historiography of Technology About? 
, Technology and Culture, Vol.51, No.3, 2010, pp. 680-697, p. 680.  
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dominated by operational accounts of campaigns and battles and 
hagiography of the great captains. The history of science and technology 
tends to be more scholarly and critical, but hardly any was written before 
this century; most of the best work has been done since World War II. 25 
 
However, there are also other significant gaps in the broader historiography of the Second 
World War in relation to the development of British airborne forces.   
 
For example, in his seminal work Raising Churchill’s Army; 26 David French failed to 
examine the development of airborne forces at all. Nevertheless, French is not the only 
contemporary historian who has failed to recognise the existence of the airborne soldier in 
the British army structure. Timothy Harrison Place, in Military Training in the British Army, 
1940-1944, also neglected the contribution of airborne forces despite stating in the 
introduction that ‘the backdrop to this work is the highly successful campaign waged by 
British troops against Germany in North-West Europe.’ 27  
 
Such inconsistency in the historiography requires careful consideration as continued 
exclusion of the technological development in airborne forces from research into the wider 
history of the British army will ensure that airborne operations remain misunderstood. 
Although one appreciates the development of airborne forces was a particularly specialised 
aspect of the British military establishment the technological investment and training required 
were not inconsiderable and are worthy of further investigation in the context of the wartime 
economy.  
 
                                               
25
 A. Roland, ‘Science and War’, Osiris: Historical Writing on American Science, 2nd Series, Vol. 1, 
1985, pp. 247-272, p. 247.  
26
 D. French, Raising Churchill’s Army (Oxford, 2001). 
27
 T. Harrison-Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944 (London, 2000), p. 1. 
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The research utilises extensive primary sources from The National Archives, 
particularly in relation to technological development. Primary material pertaining to the 
research and development of airborne technology has been sourced from former Ministry of 
Aircraft Production files, which assumed responsibility for aircraft production and 
development from the Air Ministry in 1940.  
 
In particular, documents classified AVIA 21 have been examined as they contain 
technological reports of the A.F.E.E. and its predecessors. The reports contained in this 
series are essentially scientific but have been summarised accordingly in order to determine 
the extent of technological investigation undertaken. Although some copies of these reports 
are available at the Royal Air Force Museum 28 and the Museum of Army Flying 29 The 
National Archives documents have been used for consistency.  
 
The Air Ministry Official Monograph on Airborne Forces from the Royal Air Force 
Museum Collection and Otway’s official history of Airborne Forces, reprinted in 1990 from 
the original 1952 restricted War Office publication by the Imperial War Museum, have been 
utilised to contextualise the development. 30 Files from AVIA 15 series have also been 
examined to determine the strategic policy for airborne development immediately prior to 
when the Ministry of Aircraft Production (M.A.P.) assumed responsibility so that the impact of 
the restructure can be measured.  
  
Further research has also been conducted from Air Ministry documentation contained 
at The National Archives. The Operations Record Book contained in the AIR 29 series has 
been examined to provide chronology for the activities of various establishments involved in 
                                               
28
 Royal Air Force Museum: Department of Research & Information Services (Hendon).  
29
 Museum of Army Flying: Library & Archive (Middle Wallop). 
30
 Air Ministry, The Second World War 1939-1945, Royal Air Force, Airborne Forces (Air Ministry 
Official Monograph, 1951) 
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the development programme including those of R.A.F. Maintenance Units. Series AIR 2 
provided details of correspondence between the key stakeholders in order to better 
understand decisions of policy and their effect on the research programme.  
 
Cabinet records have been consulted to contextualise the war situation and the 
timing of decisions governing the development of the airborne capability. Similarly, the small 
amount of detail contained in Treasury files has been examined in order to ascertain the 
level of specialist technical expertise required for airborne development and understand the 
processes by which professional staff was procured. Archive material held at the Assault 
Glider Trust has been consulted, particularly in relation to the construction techniques 
employed in glider manufacture, to ensure that the technical information contained in the 
research is both accurate and presented in the most accessible format.  
 
Detailed records pertaining to the employment of specialist sub-contractors have 
been sought but few references to aviation contracts are contained in the archive material. 
Key war-time sub-contractors such as Austin Motors 31 and Harris Lebus 32 do not appear to 
have kept any detailed record of activity. Consequently, information regarding contractors 
has been researched from contemporary aviation journals. However, certain archive 
photographic material has been located relating to the Austin Motor Company and this has 
been incorporated to explain the manufacturing techniques and principles employed in glider 
production. 33          
 
The thesis utilises the official History of the Second World War Civil & Military Series 
(See Appendix 1) published from 1949 onwards. These sources provide details of the 
                                               
31
 University of Warwick, Modern Records Centre: MSS.226/AU/1/1/2-3, Austin Motor Company 
Board Minutes, 1943-1948.  
32
 London Metropolitan Archives: City of London Corporation.  
33
 British Motor Industry Heritage Trust: Heritage Motor Centre Archive (Gaydon).  
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mechanics of the war-time economy and its administration and also provide a framework 
within which technological investment can be examined. The production of these Official 
Histories was administered by the War Cabinet through a Historical Section, a system that 
had been instigated for the publication of official material following the Great War.  
 
Official Histories were not simply confined to the analysis of military operations and 
all government departments were requested to keep diaries for the purpose of historical 
research, similar to those retained by fighting units. Professor William Hancock, of 
Birmingham University, was appointed supervisor for civil histories and an Advisory 
Committee of university historians was established in order to ensure that all departments of 
the civil war-time administration were represented. On 26 November 1941 R.A. Butler, 
President of the Board of Education and Chairman of the Committee for the Control of the 
Official Histories, presented a paper to the War Cabinet which requested approval for 
historians to be given access to primary material for the purpose of research. 34 The 
suggestions were approved and the compilation of source material was instigated with 
professional historical support.         
 
The first of the Civil Series, published in 1949, was written by Hancock with the 
assistance of Mrs Gowing, who had served in the Board of Trade during the war. The 
volume was entitled British War Economy and provided a synoptic account of the 
mechanism by which the war-time economy was administered. Recognition of the economic 
and governmental systems are important; particularly when applied to the development of 
airborne forces, where the examination of the subject has been primarily focused upon the 
operational detail at the expense of those scientific and research staff who made the concept 
technologically possible. Mary Murphy argued that economic events needed to be linked 
with strategic events and that a ‘controlled economy cannot be understood without an over-
                                               
34
 T.N.A., CAB 67/9/140, The Official Histories of the Present War, by R.A. Butler, 26 November 1941.   
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all view of the controlling institutions, and that it would be insular and unrealistic to ignore the 
international environment which so powerfully governs a nation’s economic effort.’ 35 
Consequently, an analysis based solely upon the military application of any particular 
technology cannot be adequately contextualised without appreciation of the economic 
climate and wider influence of international affairs.  
 
However, although the works of the civil series provide a foundation for analysis of 
the influence that war-time controlling institutions possessed upon the technological 
development, imperfections are evident. For example, the fourth book of the series entitled 
British War Production by Professor M.M. Postan was unable to go into the specific and 
technological detail originally intended regarding the industrial experiences of ‘individual 
firms and the development of weapons as viewed from the factory floor.’ 36 The restriction 
was due to the fact that by the time the work was ready for publication in 1952 many of the 
firms employed on specific military programmes were once again developing and refining 
earlier designs to meet the changing strategic demands of the Cold War era. The 
technological experiences of the British aviation industry in particular were unfortunately 
disregarded. 
 
There was also one consistent failure throughout the entire Civil and Military series: 
documentation. The final volume of the Civil Affairs and Military Government sub-section of 
the Military series, entitled Central Organization and Planning, published in 1966, continued 
the disappointing trend of containing no references. The omission of these details, however, 
was probably due to classification clauses contained in British Government’s Public Records 
Act of 1958 which stated that documents transferred to the Public Record Office would ‘not 
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be available for public inspection until they have been in existence for fifty years.’ 37 The 
timescale was relaxed in an amendment to the Act on 14 July 1967 to thirty years ‘beginning 
with the first day in the next after that in which they were created’ 38 but by this time the Civil 
Series had already been published. 
  
The thesis also references a semi-official history entitled Science at War which was 
jointly devised by J.G. Crowther and R. Whiddington and published by H.M.S.O. in 1947 
following pressure from Clement Attlee. 39 The work references the development of airborne 
warfare and includes an analysis of Operational Research that can be applied directly to the 
technological development of the British airborne capability.  
  
References are made throughout the research to memoirs published by the key 
personalities involved in either the development of airborne forces or the direction of policy, 
such as Churchill 40 and Lord Ismay. 41  The accounts of personnel who had actual 
experience of the technology, such as Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Deane-Drummond, 42 
have also been consulted to allow technological development to be examined from the 
perspective of the end-user and contextualise the technological investment.        
 
 The principal secondary sources are those published by William Buckingham and 
John Greenacre who have successfully developed a chronological narrative of airborne 
forces development. These texts are examined throughout the thesis, in conjunction with 
primary source material, to explain the political and military environment that governed 
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technological investment. A variety of secondary academic sources have been consulted 
that provide details of the scientific and engineering personalities involved. The Biographical 
Memoirs of the Royal Society provide a wealth of information concerning individual scientists 
whilst the research of Professor David Edgerton provides background to the mechanism of 
the British war-time administration and its relationship with both technological and scientific 
innovation. 43  Finally, the three volume series by edited by Allan Millett and Williamson 
Murray entitled ‘Military Effectiveness’ provides a framework within which the multitude of 
spheres and influences involved in the creation of new technology can appropriately 
examined.      
The Origins of British Airborne Warfare  
 
British experimentation with the air transportation of military equipment and supplies 
was first conducted in 1916 during the relief of the Kut-al-Alamara garrison in Mesopotamia. 
David French argues that between 1916 and 1918 the British ‘developed a combined arms 
practice’ 44 which was dependent upon the close tactical collaboration of aircraft, artillery and 
infantry. Indeed, Buckingham believes that through close cooperation between the Army and 
R.A.F. the British established a world lead in the technique of air transportation and utilised 
the technique throughout the Empire. 45  
 
However, far more dedicated research was undertaken during the inter-war period 
than Buckingham identifies. On 19 February 1921 a report was issued to Cabinet by the 
Secretary of State for Air 46 which detailed the work of the R.A.F. in Mesopotamia and 
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included examples of experimentation with air transportation. 47 Although this report was by 
no means a unique reference to instances of air transportation during the inter-war period it 
is worthy of examination for two reasons. 
 
Firstly, the opinions expressed in the report are an early encapsulation of both inter-
service co-operation and fundamental strategic disagreements that continued throughout the 
subsequent development of British airborne forces. Secondly, the report is evidence that 
Churchill, who was later instrumental in the development of the British airborne capability, 
witnessed the use of aircraft for the transportation of troops by air as early as 1920. 48 The 
main body of the report was compiled by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Sir A. 
Haldane, and analysed operations in Mesopotamia conducted in response to numerous 
insurrections. The report concluded with notes from both representatives of the Imperial 
General Staff, Lieutenant-General P.W. Chetwode, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, and the Air Staff, Air Marshal H. Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff.  
 
Haldane listed numerous instances of aircraft used in collaboration with ground 
forces to achieve both tactical and operational success. The main functions the R.A.F. 
performed were reconnaissance, tactical co-operation with troops, and distant attacks. 
Haldane reported that at Samawah and Kufah ‘aeroplanes were of great use in conveying 
either food, supplies, spare parts of machine guns, wireless apparatus, and even on one 
occasion, the breech block of a 13-pounder gun.’ 49 In addition to the transportation of 
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supplies aircraft were also used to ferry officers and others, ‘carrying commanders rapidly to 
various parts of the areas under their control.’ 50 
 
However, Haldane was sceptical about the accuracy of re-supply when stores were 
dropped from aircraft. Naturally, Trenchard responded that the R.A.F. was entirely capable of 
re-supply and that it must be recognised that the aircraft in Mesopotamia were not of weight-
carrying type: 
 
There are in existence in the Air Force aeroplanes of such capacity that a 
mountain gun complete with crew and ammunition can be carried by two of 
them to reinforce a post, whilst a single machine can transport 2,000 lb. of 
food or ammunition to a distance of 200 miles and return without landing. 51 
 
Trenchard had effectively summarised the strategic blueprint upon which the glider-borne 
aspect of the British airborne capability was eventually created. But despite the apparent 
harmony between Army requirement and the capability of the R.A.F. to deliver there 
remained fundamental disagreement between senior strategists.  
 
The Army believed that its experience in Mesopotamia had proved that the aeroplane 
was a valuable auxiliary to orthodox troops whilst the Air Staff argued that a sufficient 
number of aeroplanes could effectively undertake a large proportion of Army functions. 
Trenchard concluded that: 
 
The Royal Air Force have shown in Mesopotamia that they are in a position 
without assistance from other arms to lend adequate support to local levies 
in the maintenance of order, and that a sufficient force of the Royal Air 
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Force, supported by a small first-class number of military units, primarily for 
garrison duties, would afford effective protection at less expense than any 
alternative scheme of defence. 52    
  
The opportunity for further co-operation was ultimately over shadowed by inter-service rivalry 
and the desire to maintain autonomy. 53 However, Trenchard later developed his argument 
further and advocated that aircraft, namely bombers, could provide offensive military success 
far more effectively than other forces.  
 
The British first experienced airborne forces en masse during Soviet tactical 
exercises in September 1936 but initially decided not to pursue such technology despite 
political pressure to examine future potential. 54 Interest in airborne forces was expressed on 
17 November 1936 by Lord Strabolgi 55 during a debate on government policy and defence 
services in the House of Lords. Strabolgi enquired whether the government was ‘developing 
the system of carrying military detachments by air and landing them by parachute?’ 56 before 
presenting an informed summary of airborne developments in the Soviet Union, Germany 
and France:   
 
I understand that it is being developed by other Armies—the Russian, the 
German and the French. I saw a film recently of the great Russian military 
manoeuvres round Kiev, and to my lay mind the carrying of a whole 
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division by air was most impressive. The advance guard of soldiers was 
dropped by parachute—the whole brigade were landed in that way—and 
then tanks and medium artillery were carried by air and landed by 
parachute on the ground held by the advanced brigade. This impressed me 
very seriously indeed. The fact that this system is being copied in the 
German and French Armies makes it worthy of attention by those 
responsible for the efficiency of His Majesty's Army. 57 
 
In 1938 Thomas Inskip, Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, referenced the Russian 
airborne capability in a Cabinet report that compared the relative strength of Britain to other 
nations. 58 Yet little action seems to have been taken in government circles. 
 
Although air transportation had previously been well practiced it was not until 1939 
that serious investigation into the deployment of parachutists was undertaken at the Inter-
Services Training and Development Centre. 59 The analysis concluded that the technique 
was feasible but doubted whether further investment in development could be justified as 
there was then no indication that such a weapon would ever be used. 60 However, following 
the successful German demonstration of the airborne technique during the invasion of 
Scandinavia and the Low Countries in 1940 the government were forced to seriously 
consider such a weapon in the face of mounting political criticism.  
 
Mr Garro-Jones, MP for Aberdeen North, opened a debate in the House of Commons 
on 4 June 1940 with an accusation that the government had failed to realise the potential of 
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airborne warfare which had placed the country at a technological disadvantage and 
immediate risk of airborne invasion. Garro-Jones questioned whether airborne warfare, 
‘which has been experimented upon by foreign armies over the last three years, has been 
equally studied by the British War Office.’ 61 Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for War, 
replied that such techniques were ‘now being studied.’ 62   
 
Consequently, in reaction to political pressure the Prime Minister issued a minute to 
Major-General Ismay on 22 June 1940 that demanded investigation into the feasibility of 
developing an airborne force.  The minute itself was primarily concerned with offensive 
action and called for a capability for the deployment of ‘at least 5,000 parachute troops’. 63  
The relationship between Churchill and Ismay requires clarification as it is referred to 
throughout the thesis. The association began in April 1940 when Churchill assumed the 
Chairmanship of the Military Co-ordination Committee on behalf of Neville Chamberlain. The 
Military Co-ordination Committee became responsible for giving guidance to the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee and Ismay was selected as the senior staff officer responsible for 
coordination and ultimately maintained the role when Churchill assumed office. 64 Ismay’s 
precise position, by his own admittance, was difficult to define but he did receive all 
Churchill’s direct instructions and was responsible for ensuring that they were transmitted 
onwards: 
 
 Perhaps my principal function was to be a two-way channel of 
communication on military matters between the Prime Minister and 
everyone in Whitehall who was concerned with military business. On the 
one hand, I was required to communicate, and if necessary, amplify and 
                                               
61
 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 361, cc, 750-1750, 4 June 1940.  
62
 Ibid.  
63
 T.N.A., CAB 120/262, Airborne Forces: Minute to War Cabinet, by Winston Churchill, 22 June 1940.  
64
 D. Dilks, ‘The Twilight War and the Fall of France’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 
Fifth Series, Vol. 28, 1978, pp. 61-86, pp. 77-78.      
22 
 
explain his views to those concerned, and on the other, to obtain for him all 
the manifold information which he needed. 65 
 
Consequently, he was crucial to the initiation of the development of the British airborne 
capability through the interpretation and implementation of Churchill’s instructions. Anthony 
King argues that Churchill ‘liked to have around him distinguished public men who were old 
friends, who had no previous connections with politics,’ 66 but in the case of Ismay he also 
found a respected military officer of sufficient rank and status capable of delivering his 
wishes.      
 
There can be little doubt that Churchill’s instruction for parachute forces was 
ambitious, particularly in light of the fragility of the country’s military and economic situation. 
The War Cabinet Weekly Résumé for the week ending 20 June 1940 confirmed that the 
evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force had been completed and that ‘German air 
attacks against industry’ 67 had been initiated. It was also recorded that ‘380 fighter sorties 
were flown over Britain’ 68 and that ‘Bomber Command carried out extensive attacks on 
communication and industrial targets in Germany.’ 69 The strategic requirement with regard 
to resource allocation would appear to have been clear.  
 
However, notwithstanding the timing of the request for an offensive capability beyond 
that of Bomber Command, Greenacre has argued that Churchill’s original minute failed to 
adequately express his vision and ‘fell far short of articulating an adequate concept of the 
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purpose that he expected his proposed airborne force to operate within.’ 70 Consequently, 
future technological development was inefficient and lacked clear research parameters, 
particularly regarding future deployment.  
 
The combination of ambiguity within the initial requirement, military priorities, 
notwithstanding political and economic pressures, was not the most solid foundation upon 
which to develop new technology despite the considerable experience gained during the 
inter-war period. Alan Booth argues that by the end of 1940 ‘the whole war effort was 
threatened by shortages and the lack of authoritative allocations machinery’ 71 and 
concludes that the country had far more pressing priorities than the development of new and 
unproven technology: 
 
Between May and December I940 the driving force in economic policy had 
been crisis. The army had been rescued more or less intact from Dunkirk, 
but it had been forced to leave most of its equipment. It stood alone and 
unarmed. The threat of airborne invasion was dire, so the need for anti-craft 
defences and fighter aircraft was equally urgent. 72 
 
But in June 1940 one can thus easily understand why the diversion of financial and 
material resources into the development of untested technology may not have been 
considered a strategic priority. Niall Ferguson believes that ‘changes in military technology 
and government regulation ensured that one could never be certain that the next war would 
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have the same financial impact as the previous war’. 73 The financial implications of the war 
were difficult enough to predict without further interference. 
  
However, the strategic military situation was known to the government and the 
implications of technological investment could have been measured against the competing 
demands of the military situation. The responsibility for the development of airborne forces 
fell most heavily upon the Royal Air Force, which at the time was the only offensive force 
capable of conducting offensive operations against the enemy and despite the obvious 
enthusiasm there was no infrastructure in place for the progression of airborne warfare. The 
development required significant scientific research and investigation prior to the production 
of any bespoke equipment or a methodology of application could be defined. 74  
 
The British had to start from scratch and, although existing supplies and materials 
were utilised through necessity, the development of an airborne capability that could be 
deployed in strength was a gradual process that Ferguson believes took years to construct: 
 
At a time when national resources were strained as never before (in the 
short period between autumn 1940, and autumn, 1944) there were created 
a British airborne corps of two complete divisions. 75  
  
The creation of such a force required considerable technological application in the design 
and development of equipment, aircraft and technique that culminated in the formation of the 
A.F.E.E.  
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 The dedicated research Establishment originated in the Central Landing School.  The 
unit was formed at Ringway in the middle of 1940 under Army Co-operation Command to 
‘implement a high level decision to train a considerable body of parachute troops as quickly 
as possible.’ 76 The scope of technological research at Ringway was soon extended and 
included the development of assault gliders and the associated technique of glider towing. 
The Unit was subsequently re-named the Central Landing Establishment and divided into 
three separate sections with defined areas of development: a Paratroop Training Squadron, 
a Glider Training Squadron, and a Glider Development Unit. 77 
 
In early 1942 the Establishment was restructured into the A.F.E.E. and all aspects of 
routine training were absorbed into normal R.A.F. formations. Consequently, the 
Establishment was concerned with ‘development and experimental work in connection with 
the transport and delivery of airborne forces and their necessary equipment’ 78 and was 
placed under technical control of the Ministry of Aircraft Production as detailed in an official 
report: 
 
The main function of the Establishment was to test and assist in the 
technical development of the means for transporting and delivering on the 
ground in serviceable condition airborne forces with their equipment so that 
they can immediately engage the enemy. 79 
 
However, the expansion in dedicated materiel resources provoked Trenchard to reiterate the 
arguments he had formulated in 1916 that bomber aircraft were a much more effective 
method of offensive action that should not be compromised.  
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On 5 September 1942 the Prime Minister circulated a note by Trenchard amongst the 
members of the War Cabinet which expressed his opinions upon the effect of diverting 
aircraft away from the bomber offensive for use in airborne operations. Trenchard reminded 
members of the War Cabinet of the dangers of interfering with a major strategic plan, such 
as the allied bomber offensive against Germany, and argued that ‘compromise in war plans 
was invariably fatal’. 80 Unsurprisingly, Trenchard argued that nothing should be allowed to 
interfere with Bomber Command operations even though during the inter-war years, and in 
particular during operations in Mesopotamia, he had advocated that there was potential in 
further exploration of the airborne method: 
 
Germany is our chief enemy: The only force by which we are able to carry 
war operations into German territory and directly against the war production 
and industrial life of the German nation is the aircraft of our Bomber 
Command.  81    
 
In hindsight it would appear that Trenchard’s concerns were correct.  
 
The A.F.E.E. relocated to Sherburn-in-Elmet in the middle of 1942 but unfortunately 
local weather conditions proved unsuitable for experimental flying and caused serious 
disruption to the experimental research programme. 82 A suitable airfield was not available 
until the end of 1944 and the Establishment was relocated to Beaulieu, Hampshire, in 
January 1945. Although the improved weather conditions permitted a considerable increase 
in experimental and technological work relocation was too late to influence the military 
effectiveness of British airborne capability in the later stages of the Second World War. 
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The creation of British airborne forces was destined to attract controversy long before 
strategic plans for its technological development had been formulated. The thesis will 
examine the technological events chronologically and in detail to provide a considered 
technological understanding of the British airborne capability.   
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Chapter One: Science, Technology, Economics, & War 
Introduction 
 
The general war situation during the last six months of 1940 remained ominous for 
the British. Italy declared war on 10 June which exposed British shipping in the 
Mediterranean to attack by enemy land based aircraft forcing ships carrying vital supplies to 
make longer journeys. 1 The Italian invasion of Greece in October also forced Britain to 
dispatch aircraft desperately needed for home defence. 2 
 
In Britain the Luftwaffe was conducting an intensive bombing campaign that required 
extensive resources to be made available to the R.A.F. whilst preparations were being made 
for a German invasion both by sea and airborne forces. The responsibility for defence 
against such threats fell most heavily upon the R.A.F. which consequently became the 
strategic priority in terms of resource allocation. The only force capable of offensive action 
was Bomber Command and this was naturally considered one of the highest strategic 
priorities. Consequently, the resources required for the development of an airborne capability 
were scarce.  
 
This chapter will explore the mechanisms of the war-time economy and the political 
and scientific environment in which new technologies were procured. Despite the ‘Heath 
Robinson’ nature of the early training programme the embryonic airborne force required 
substantial resources. Millet and Murray identify political efficiency as a critical element of 
military effectiveness and argue that resources needed to be procured consistently and 
efficiently in order to achieve success. Naturally, the first step to achieving such success 
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required the ‘military to obtain the cooperation of the national political elite.’ 3 However, in 
terms of British airborne warfare the strategic direction was dictated by the political, rather 
than the military sphere of influence.  
 
The majority of resources were required from the Royal Air Force and took the form 
of bomber aircraft, personnel and airfields. The demands were difficult to satisfy, particularly 
as they would have to be supplied primarily by Bomber Command, subsequently aircraft 
shortages for the conduct of airborne operations remained a problem throughout the Second 
World War. 4  
 
Within this context the proposed development of a British airborne capability 
attracted two conflicting schools of thought, 5 not too dissimilar to the conclusions drawn in 
Mesopotamia. 6 The proponents of airborne warfare doubted that the bomber offensive 
alone could deliver victory and believed that the decisive battles would still be fought by 
infantry. In order to achieve success an airborne force would be required and, since such a 
capability would take time to develop, it should take strategic priority over the bomber 
offensive. 
  
The opponents argued that the bomber policy was clearly defined and results were 
immediately attainable, whereas the concept of an airborne army was ‘a slightly Wellsian 
dream of the somewhat distant future.’ 7  Ultimately, the bomber offensive prevailed and the 
creation of an airborne capability was, certainly for the first two years of its existence, limited 
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to the development of technique, specialist equipment, training of personnel and small-scale 
raids. Until American troop carrying aircraft were available from 1943 onwards the British 
airborne force had to tolerate whatever equipment and aircraft other R.A.F. Commands 
could spare. 8  
 
 The impact of the decision to commit technological resources to the development of 
a British airborne capability cannot be fully appreciated without an appraisal of the war-time 
economy, the government departments responsible for the procurement of new technology, 
the personalities contained therein, and contemporary scientific debate. The chapter will 
contextualise the environment in which the British airborne force was conceived and 
ultimately developed in order to determine whether a strategic necessity had been 
sufficiently demonstrated to justify the immediate and future investment.       
Mechanics of the War-time Economy 
 
The normal market orientation of the British economy was replaced by a government 
system of control and economic planning during the Second World War. The primary 
characteristic of this framework was the controlled allocation of material resources through a 
process of physical planning determined by strategic necessity as argued by Ely Devons:  
 
Planning was necessary in war-time, because the Government was acting 
as the sole consumer of the products of the economic system, and had to 
weigh up the relative importance of the production of different items in 
achieving the single objective of winning the war. 9 
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Following Chamberlain’s resignation on 10 May 1940, Churchill instigated further 
adjustments within the institutional framework of the wartime administration and developed a 
‘system for the central direction of the war economy’ 10  in an attempt to maximise 
productivity. The system for strategic policy making within the British government was 
relatively simple and provided direct lines of communication between the military and 
politicians. However, Murray argues that the system required personal drive to ensure 
operational efficiency and that ‘unfortunately in the pre-war period without the drive that 
Churchill provided, the system allowed for maximum delay by both civilian and military 
bureaucracies.’ 11 The unforeseeable consequence of Churchill’s determination, however, 
was his ability to directly influence and manipulate strategic policy and resource allocation.     
 
Churchill had advocated the principle of governmental management of strategic 
industry for the purpose of rearmament throughout the 1930s. During a Commons debate on 
10 March 1936 he argued that the manufacture of aircraft components should not be 
restricted within the aviation industry but widely dispersed amongst numerous manufacturers 
to ensure a continuous flow of parts to satisfy war-time demand. A method of procurement 
and assembly later adopted in the manufacture of assault glider which Churchill argued was 
‘the simplest and most primary method by which the freedom of a country can be assured, 
and it is the very heart of modern national defence.’ 12 The logic was theoretically sound and 
in the same year the Baldwin Government commenced a programme of aircraft production 
to re-equip the R.A.F. with a new generation of aircraft. 
 
The expansion in the aviation industry resulted in the construction of state financed 
‘shadow factories’ managed by non-aviation specialist companies which manufactured 
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designs supplied from established airframe and engine manufacturers. 13 It was believed that 
the adoption of the mass production technique in aviation would dramatically increase the 
output of aeroplanes and return efficiencies in the procurement process.   
 
However, not everyone was convinced that the ‘shadow factory’ technique of 
manufacture was feasible. The Society of British Aircraft Constructors (S.B.A.C.) opposed 
the Air Ministry Scheme and believed that manufacturers of standardised products ‘lacked 
the flexibility to accommodate the frequent modifications in design inherent in aircraft 
production.’ 14 However, Jonathan Zeitlin has suggested that many members of the S.B.A.C. 
were inclined to delay the introduction of new aircraft types in an attempt to obtain ‘lucrative 
continuation orders on well-established models.’ 15  
 
In practice, the scheme was of limited success. Some firms such as Standard Motors 
(later English Electric) successfully adapted to the challenges and continual modifications 
demanded by the aviation industry but other large scale manufacturers were less effective. 
For example, the Austin Motor Company was demoted from the position of sole aero engine 
assembler outside the aircraft industry and the factory was subsequently transferred from 
Nuffield (Morris) to Vickers-Armstrong in 1940. However such manufacturers later became 
involved in the production of gliders for the airborne forces which were produced solely by 
the sub-contract technique and the difficulties will be discussed later.     
 
Despite the efforts of the re-armament programme in the 1930s, once in power Taylor 
Downing argues that Churchill established additional departments in 1940 with 
responsibilities for the production and procurement of all aspects of war materiel:  
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Churchill immediately started putting together his national government. And 
he set about restructuring the war effort to streamline the complex and 
cumbersome decision making system that had been in existence up to this 
point. 16 
 
These departments consequently dominated the wartime economy and controlled delivery of 
commodities that were required by the armed forces. 17 Clement Attlee described the 
mechanics of the administration in the Commons on 22 May 1940 in accordance with the 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill): 18 
 
It is essential in this crisis that we should produce to the full all our essential 
munitions, and the Minister of Labour has been given the responsibility of 
supplying the labour required for the programmes of the various 
Departments. He proposes to set up at once a Production Council 
consisting of representatives of the chief Government Departments 
concerned with munitions supplies—the Admiralty, the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production, the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Mines. 19 
 
But raw material and personnel were not infinite commodities. Consequently, numerous 
situations arose which resulted in inter-departmental competition for supplies conducted 
through a system whereby a business case was presented to a War Cabinet Committee 
before a decision was taken by the War Cabinet. Robin Higham suggests that such 
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competition was actually detrimental within the war-time economy and could ‘complicate the 
awarding of contracts and frustrate or delay progress.’ 20 
 
Departments not only consisted of professional personnel to deliver specific contracts 
but were also dependent upon the ability of departmental advocates and strong political 
representation to present convincing arguments. This was crucial during the development of 
British airborne forces and not unlike the free-market economy of peacetime. 21 Peter 
Howlett has suggested that: 
 
The allocation of resources to a department depended on the relative 
priority given by the War Cabinet to their production programme and the 
relative strength of that department compared to other departments, 
including the ability of each of the service departments (those directly 
responsible for the army, navy and air force, respectively the War Office, 
the Admiralty and the Air Ministry) to influence overall military strategy. 22 
 
Howlett identifies key criteria that a department needed to satisfy before it succeeded in 
securing any desired resource allocation. The Churchill government effectively split the 
decision making process into two separate categories of ‘production’ and ‘strategy.’ A 
process whereby ‘in the strategic sphere the military decisions which affected production 
were taken; in the Production Sphere, the production programmes were formulated and 
implemented so as to meet the military needs.’ 23 
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The inter-relationship between strategy and final production followed a staged 
process, not followed in the development of airborne forces. Requirements were identified by 
Service Departments and passed to the Chief-of Staffs Committee which met daily to debate 
the military situation. The Chief-of Staff Committee then passed the strategic plans to the 
Defence Committee (Operations) where a final decision was made as to whether they would 
be passed to the War Cabinet for approval. 24 Despite this process, whereby consensus, 
based upon the military situation and strategic requirements, was theoretically reached 
before final submission to the War Cabinet it was heavily dependent on the whims of the 
prime minister.  
 
For example, Churchill was the only official permanent member of the Defence 
Committee (Operations) and thus had ultimate discretion over strategic objectives. 25 His 
governance style was such that he could not resist involvement in departmental affairs which 
Mark Harrison describes as ‘a taste for strategy and enthusiasm for interference in 
operational decisions; [often] dictatorial towards subordinates and intolerant of correction by 
them.’ 26  However, Harrison concedes that such character traits were endemic amongst war 
leaders and were shared by Stalin, Hitler and Roosevelt. 27 What is important to recognise in 
relation to airborne forces was that if Churchill believed in a particular military strategy, he 
had the influence to ensure it went ahead regardless of process. 
    
Howlett argues that Churchill directly influenced strategic objectives through the War 
Cabinet and edited information presented to the Production Sphere for the physical 
manufacture of goods or associated scientific research: 
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The War Cabinet was responsible for the overall direction of the state. Its 
members represented the senior ministries of the Crown and as such they 
reflected the political balance of the Coalition Government. The supply and 
service ministers were excluded except in the case of Beaverbrook, whose 
place in the War Cabinet was not due to his ministerial brief but to his role  
as trusted adviser to Churchill. In most cases the War Cabinet merely 
rubber-stamped the decisions passed on to it by the co-ordinating 
committees.’  28 
 
Consequently, Churchill’s aspiration for an airborne force became more important than 
considered professional military opinion.  
 
The composition and management of the war-time economy naturally attracted political 
criticism. Churchill himself had to defend the system in the House of Commons on 7 May 
1941 in response to criticism from Lloyd George concerning the effectiveness of the 
administration and a desire to know who was responsible for the conduct of the war: 
   
The War Cabinet consists of eight members, five of whom have no regular 
Departments, and three of whom represent the main organisms of the 
State, to wit. Foreign Affairs, Finance and Labour, which in their different 
ways come into every great question that has to be settled. That is the 
body which gives its broad sanction to the main policy and conduct of the 
war. Under their authority, the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services sit each 
day together, and I, as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, convene 
them and preside over them when I think it necessary, inviting, when 
business requires it, the three Service Ministers. All large issues of military 
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policy are brought before the Defence Committee, which has for several 
months consisted of the three Chiefs of Staff, the three Service Ministers 
and four members of the War Cabinet, namely, myself, the Lord Privy Seal, 
who has no Department, the Foreign Secretary and Lord Beaverbrook. 
This is the body, this is the machine; it works easily and flexibly at the 
present time, and I do not propose to make any changes in it until further 
advised. 29 
Despite Churchill’s obvious authority within the hierarchy Franklyn Johnson argued that the 
process of forming the War Cabinet was a necessary ‘form of constitutional dictatorship’ 30 by 
which power was effectively transferred from Parliament to executive. The system in times of 
crisis was both efficient and flexible:  
 
The Prime Minister, in rejecting efforts to decrease the War Cabinet 
membership, explained that, under his system, a War Cabinet of both 
departmental and portfolio-free ministers saved time in the long run. 31 
 
Essentially this amalgamation meant that Churchill would have no competition from another 
Minister of Defence for example, but he did have a Defence Committee (Operations) and the 
Defence Committee (Supply) which regularly considered the larger issues of the war.   
 
Despite the bureaucracy of the organizational structure key personalities had the 
opportunity to manipulate the strategic direction of the British war-time economy, particularly 
from within the War Cabinet, and by-pass the prerequisite that decisions were taken based 
upon military necessity and immediate strategic requirements. In order for Churchill to obtain 
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an airborne capability he required support from fellow ministers and it is briefly worth 
examining certain key government appointments and their associated portfolios to determine 
the influence of personalities upon the procurement of new technologies. 32 
Churchill and Lord Beaverbrook 
 
Beaverbrook’s appointment to the War Cabinet could be interpreted as being more 
for the purposes of supporting Churchill’s personal opinions, and reinforcing his prejudices, 
than to provide professional expertise. 33 He immediately established himself as one of 
Churchill’s intimate advisors upon the latter’s appointment as Prime Minister. Described as a 
‘conservative free-booter’ 34 in one contemporary American article, Beaverbrook’s career 
was certainly diverse and included a wealth of experience as a financier, politician, 
statesman, newspaper proprietor and amateur historian.   
 
Churchill entrusted him to give advice on new appointments and relied on his 
network of contacts from both a wide political and professional spectrum. The two had been 
associates for some thirty years and by 1940 Beaverbrook was the Prime Minister’s few 
personal friends in political circles and he came to rely heavily upon both his judgement and 
support. Brian Farrell argues ‘his closest colleague and kindred spirit was Beaverbrook. The 
ties between them rested on shared experiences, compatible personalities, a view of the war 
as a crusade and the desire to press it as vigorously as possible.’ 35 Beaverbrook’s principal 
career was as a newspaper proprietor and his major expertise was publicity and media but 
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Churchill charged him with a task that, on paper, he was not ideally suited for and initially 
hesitated to accept. 36  
 
The assignment in question was the formation of a government organisation for the 
production of aircraft. In his memoirs Churchill acknowledged both Beaverbrook’s reluctance 
and capabilities and commented that ‘I felt sure however that our life depended upon the 
flow of new aircraft; I needed his vital and vibrant energy, and I persisted in my view.’ 37 
Consequently, following pressure from Churchill, Beaverbrook accepted the position of 
Minister of Aircraft Production on 17 May 1940 in the newly constituted M.A.P. and, 
combined with his later appointment to the War Cabinet, became an extremely influential 
figure in the realisation of the strategic military direction of the war. 38 A.J.P. Taylor, 
admittedly not the most obvious choice of biographer, made the following pertinent 
observations concerning Beaverbrook’s influence and management technique:  
 
In this new world of government Beaverbrook remained what he had 
always been. He did not run the ministry as a trained administrator or a 
politician would have done. He ran it as he ran his private life. He ran it as 
a drama, working through individuals, not through committees, and ready 
to fight every level. 39 
 
Beaverbrook’s chief struggle was in his relations with the Air Ministry, which was resentful of 
its supply branch being removed from its control, and the immediate competition for limited 
material resources between rival ministries, 40 a task in which Lewis Broad suggests ‘the 
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poacher from Fleet Street was the star performer’. 41 But it was Churchill’s experience of the 
Air Ministry during the later stages of the First World War and the re-armament period that 
may well explain the appointment of Beaverbrook and the creation of M.A.P. The origins of 
the relationship are briefly worth examining as both M.A.P. and the Air Ministry were crucial 
to the development of airborne forces.   
Churchill and the Air Ministry 
 
In October 1936 two R.A.F. pilots embarked upon a private visit to Germany in order to 
determine the technological capabilities of the Luftwaffe. During their tour they were warmly 
hosted by German pilots who even permitted them to fly the latest German bomber designs. 
Upon returning to England Squadron Leader Rowley produced a report concerning the 
capabilities of German airpower and suggested that British efforts be concentrated upon 
medium-bombers and advanced fighters to counter German aviation technology. 42 The 
report was largely ignored by the Air Ministry but Rowley sent a copy to Wing Commander 
Charles Anderson who, between 1936 and 1939, secretly supplied Churchill with information 
pertaining to what he perceived to be weaknesses in R.A.F. aircraft design.  
 
Such intelligence persuaded Churchill that the Air Ministry was negligent and that the 
country was technologically incapable of defending itself against German air attack. Vincent 
Orange argues that such information gave Churchill the opportunity to return to government 
circles: 
 
Nominally a mere back-bench Member of Parliament, with little prospect of 
returning to office, Churchill’s persistent, widely publicized, and apparently 
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well-informed agitation had persuaded the government to appoint him a 
member of the important Air Defence Research Sub-Committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence in July 1935. 43    
 
It also gave him a suspicion of this professional advice when he became prime minister. 
Higham believes that for a particular project to obtain the necessary resources high-level 
political support was thus crucial to the outcome and the flow of funds depended upon 
ministerial-level support. ‘This has often been as much dependent upon political and national 
economic considerations as upon the technical aspects of the enterprise.’ 44 Ultimately, it 
was difficult to dissuade the Prime Minister from any strategic direction he might wish to 
advocate and must be considered in relation to the development of the airborne capability.  
 
However, it would be wrong to assume that Beaverbrook, through association with 
Churchill, was also a proponent for the development of airborne forces. But he did have 
indirect influence upon the military effectiveness of the new technology. Beaverbrook was 
singularly determined to produce fighter aircraft for the purpose of securing strategic victory 
during the Battle of Britain; a task in which he was undoubtedly successful, but not without 
wider strategic consequences.  
 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, a proponent of the strategic bombing offensive, 
suggested that through this accomplishment the ‘bomber programme was disrupted to allow 
high-speed production of fighters.’ 45 Consequently, the delay in bomber production had a 
significant secondary impact upon the airborne forces programme. Greenacre argues that 
‘airborne forces relied on bomber aircraft throughout the war but almost exclusively until late 
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1942. During this period operations and some areas of training were often frustrated by a 
lack of aircraft.’ 46  Although high-level support was crucial to the successful outcome of any 
particular project it would be wrong to assume that every ministerial decision was mutually 
beneficial. 
Ministry of Aircraft Production 
 
Without an understanding of M.A.P’s. responsibilities and its relationship with the Air 
Ministry the technological investment in airborne forces cannot be placed into any 
meaningful context. M.A.P. was created to take responsibility for the ‘supply, inspection and 
repair of aircraft and all their armament and equipment; for design and development and for 
storage up to the stage of issue to operational squadrons.’ 47  Although these responsibilities 
themselves do not appear unfamiliar it is important to recognise that these were originally 
the functions of an Air Ministry department under the Air Member for Development and 
Production (A.M.D.P.). 48 In the early months of its existence M.A.P. simply became a new 
name for the A.M.D.P. but under Beaverbrook the organisation significantly altered and the 
new ministry rapidly gained autonomy and political dominance. 
 
Beaverbrook’s primary task was to achieve maximum output of existing aircraft types 
to meet the strategic requirement of the R.A.F. Following an investigation into German air 
strength the Air Ministry had estimated that a programme of aircraft production was required 
with an output figure of 2,450 aircraft per month. 49 Britain faced an unprecedented military 
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crisis and thus it was realised, even before M.A.P. came into existence, that the traditional 
method of production and procurement was inadequate to meet strategic necessity. 50  
 
Consequently, it was agreed with the Air Staff that production would be concentrated 
on a small number of aircraft types in order to achieve maximum efficiency as highlighted by 
Scott & Hughes: 
 
Effort should be concentrated on the five types of aircraft capable of making 
then most immediate contribution to saving the situation – Wellington, 
Blenheim, Whitley, Hurricane and Spitfire. Nothing – and the point was 
most emphatically driven home – was to be allowed to stand in the way of 
the maximum production of these types in the shortest possible period. 51  
 
The strategic situation took immediate priority in an effort to avert military disaster. It 
appeared that M.A.P. would operate as ‘easily and flexibly’ as Churchill had claimed the War 
Cabinet conducted its business in the House of Commons of 7 May 1940. 52  
 
However, the decision to produce only five aircraft types severely limited the future 
technological development of airborne forces. Although Churchill undoubtedly recognised the 
paramount importance of the military situation and the strategic necessity to produce 
numbers of proven aircraft types he still called for the formation of an airborne force. His 
minute of 22 June 1940 contained little appreciation of associated doctrine. For example 
Britain was not then in a position technologically to satisfy the primary concept. Churchill’s 
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demand for ‘a capability for the deployment of at least 5,000 parachute troops’ 53 was 
certainly not a strategic priority in June 1940 and such interference in the M.A.P. aircraft 
programme was entirely irresponsible.  
 
Meanwhile on 19 June 1940 the newly appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Ministry of Aircraft Production, Colonel Llewellin, was directly questioned by Mr Cocks, M.P. 
for Broxtowe in Nottinghamshire, with regard to the protocol for aircraft specifications, the 
procedure for variation and effect upon production efficiency: 
 
Mr Cocks asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production whether, in order to expedite production, he will cut out 
unnecessary elaborations in specifications; and, in view of the fact that 
aircraft inspection department inspectors have no authority to sanction 
variations from specifications but must submit all queries to the technical or 
designs staff for decision, he will see that these departments are 
adequately staffed to enable prompt replies to be given? 54 
 
Llewellin assured Cocks that close liaison already existed between design, production and 
maintenance directorates within M.A.P. to ensure that any unnecessarily complicated design 
specifications were eliminated before production. He continued to make assurances that: 
 
Suggestions from contractors for speeding up production are encouraged, 
and I am satisfied that consideration of such suggestions is not delayed by 
lack of adequate staff. In addition the local technical staffs stationed at firms 
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have since the Ministry was formed been given wider discretionary power 
to release equipment not conforming precisely to specification. 55 
 
The technicalities and efficiencies of production were naturally of great interest but it is worth 
noting that the concentration of production on limited numbers of proven aircraft types also 
provided economic certainty. 
 
In the Official History of British War Production Professor Postan recognised that 
variation in aircraft design was incredibly expensive and time consuming. Postan believed 
that aircraft were being designed and ordered ‘without clear ideas about the comparative 
costs of different shapes and different methods of production of aircraft parts, which were 
made necessary by differences in design.’ 56 Consequently, standardisation not only 
increased production but also provided a degree of cost certainty upon which the war 
economy was dependent. 
 
In fact, the potential for the standardisation of components had been recognised in 
1937 by the Air Ministry. Sir Ernest Lemon, Director General of Production (D.G.P.) at the Air 
Ministry initiated a cost evaluation exercise of different types of aircraft wings ‘with a view to 
establishing standard wing costs, or even designing a standard wing’. 57 Standardisation was 
to prove essential in the production of assault gliders and associated airborne equipment. 
 
Nevertheless, the defining characteristic of M.A.P. under Beaverbrook’s 
administration throughout 1940 was its progress towards obtaining responsibility and ultimate 
control over the supply function of the Air Ministry. On 1 May 1941 Beaverbrook was 
succeeded by Colonel Moore-Brabazon as Minister of Aircraft Production and subsequently 
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M.A.P. was reorganised in a more structured format whereby roles and responsibilities were 
clearly defined (See Appendix 2.). One tactic employed by production ministries was to 
overestimate the amounts of raw materials required to ensure sufficient allocation and they 
consequently ‘grabbed at resources haphazard,’ 58 a tactic repeatedly adopted by M.A.P. 
John Jewkes, a government economic advisor, found the planning machinery to be in such 
chaos that he believed he could contribute more to the war effort ‘by sorting out the statistics 
and information on aircraft production than by remaining at the centre of government.’ 59  
 
During this period the executive position, entitled Controller of Research and 
Development (C.R.D.), was created with responsibility for all aviation technical and scientific 
establishments. Air Marshal F.J. Linnell was appointed to the position in June 1941 and 
succeeded the eminent aviation scientist Sir Henry Tizard who had been temporarily 
supervising the research and development directorates in the transition period. 60  
 
In his capacity as C.R.D. Linnell was very influential in the technological development 
of the British airborne capability and thus requires early introduction. The involvement of 
Tizard, although not as direct, was also an important influence on this research as he 
remained associated with M.A.P. in an ex-officio capacity with regards to scientific research 
throughout the entire war. 61 Consequently, Tizard had the opportunity to voice his 
professional and personal opinion at the very heart of the aviation establishment, and 
although there is no direct evidence that he had any influence upon strategy, his professional 
reputation would have undoubtedly made him a very difficult man to ignore; particularly in 
light of the fact that the development of airborne forces went ahead regardless of both 
contemporary economic and scientific opinion.              
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Scientific Influences 
 
The importance of individual personalities in the development of a particular 
technology should not be underestimated, but it would be wrong to assume that such a 
factor was the only catalyst for development. Higham recognised that international affairs, 
political, and public opinion were also significant factors in the formulation of government 
policy and this was certainly evident during the development of the British airborne 
capability: 
 
If the international situation becomes urgent or appears critical, then official 
and public opinion attitudes toward national defence sharpen and a speed-
up in purchasing takes place, even though many of the items now required 
will not be deliverable for many months. 62 
 
The successful demonstration of airborne warfare by the Germans in 1940 was used by 
some interested parties as evidence that the application of new technology could achieve 
significant strategic military results. Garro-Jones argued in the Commons for serious 
investigation into airborne warfare 63 and articles were also being published in popular 
magazines such as Picture Post which declared that ‘This Wasn’t New in 1899’ 64 and 
referred to previous ambitions for an airborne force.    
 
Public and political opinion were consequently stimulated and government policy was 
questioned in light of the British inability to field such a specialised military resource. 65 
Paradoxically there was also a strong counter-argument from prominent members of the 
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scientific community that investment in new technology, or gadgets, would seriously 
compromise the effectiveness of Britain’s offensive military capability. 66 This was an 
argument which appeared to have prevailed when production was focused upon limited 
numbers of proven aircraft types. 
 
Churchill’s self-appointment as Minister of Defence effectively ensured his personal 
control over the service chiefs. This gave him considerable influence upon the strategic 
direction and any subsequent technological and scientific investment required to convert 
policy into reality. Edgerton concisely summarised both the significance and the irregularity 
of the situation: 
 
Churchill was a great enthusiast for science and machines, particularly in 
relation to war, in a country where the elite, and especially the old 
aristocratic elite from which Churchill came, were thought to be either 
above such matters or sunk in rural idiocy. 67 
 
He believes that Churchill, through his passion for technology, was a break from the 
traditional model of the English aristocratic classes. But such enthusiasm did not necessarily 
qualify him to determine the technological investment of a limited wartime economy.  
 
Churchill’s preference for the ‘mechanical forms of warfare, for machines over 
manpower,’ 68 originated from his experiences during the Great War. During his tenure at the 
Admiralty he was the key player in the invention of the tank, which Michael Pattison has 
commented that he ironically entrusted the development to the Director of Naval 
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Construction. 69 Edgerton confirms that ‘he was a regular attendee at demonstrations of new 
gadgets and one who clearly believed that Britain had great reserves of ingenuity which 
would be critical for victory.’ 70 
 
The key point in relation to the advancement of British airborne warfare was that 
Churchill was not averse to arguing for, or indeed accelerating, the development of any 
machine or technology that he believed would be militarily advantageous. His model for the 
conduct of the war-time economy meant that he could influence all aspects of technological 
progression. Although first-hand experience of the suffering endured by front line infantry 
during the Great War was probably the benevolent motive behind Churchill’s technological 
ambitions, solidarity with infantry and preference for technology was no guarantee for 
military success.     
 
Despite his profound interest in the field of invention, Churchill was not a scientist and 
required academic advice to realise his theories. In 1921 he was introduced to the Oxford 
physicist Frederick Lindemann, later Lord Cherwell, from which developed a life-long 
friendship which culminated in the latter becoming his primary council on all matters 
scientific. 71 However, the close relationship ultimately resulted in constant criticism 
concerning the technological direction of the war-time administration from members of the 
scientific community. The dispute is central to the exploration of the justification for the 
development of airborne warfare and it is important to establish its origin.  
 
Bond and Murray have suggested that British politicians possessed significant defects 
with regard to military and strategic issues during the inter-war period. 
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With few British politicians possessing either interest or background in 
strategic affairs, it is not surprising that the British military, especially the 
army, found it difficult to persuade ministers of their needs and 
requirements. 72 
 
However, once Churchill assumed power the ignorance of previous governments was rapidly 
reversed and he assumed control of both military and strategic issues as Minister of 
Defence. Strategic direction, particularly in the development of airborne warfare, 
subsequently became determined at the political level rather than through the identification of 
the armed forces of a particular technology that satisfied a specific tactical or operational 
requirement.  
 
Churchill’s experience of the inertia of the inter-war period resulted in the creation of 
an effective wartime system of policy and decision that was undoubtedly key to the political 
effectiveness of Britain throughout the duration of the conflict. The consequence of such 
control, however, resulted in an ability to influence policy without a full appreciation of the 
military requirements or strategic realities, and ignorance of the opinions and expertise of the 
political and scientific communities.  
Origins of the Scientific & Technological Debate 
 
In order to understand such fundamental differences of opinion the research areas in 
which the key scientific personalities were engaged prior to the outbreak of the Second 
World War must be explored. 73 The argument between new versus established technology 
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will then be referenced throughout the thesis in relation to the development of airborne 
forces.  
 
The focus of scientific application to military problems during the 1930s was centred 
upon the potential application of radar for the detection of enemy bombers. The anxiety 
stemmed from a debate in the House of Commons on 10 November 1932 in which Stanley 
Baldwin made the demoralising prediction that ‘The Bomber Will Always Get Through.’ 74 
Lindemann voiced concerns over Britain’s ability to deploy adequate air defences against air 
bombardment, and with Churchill’s political assistance, the scientist pressed for a high-level 
committee to urgently consider the problem.  
 
In fact, at the time of Lindemann’s proposal the Air Ministry had already established 
the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence (C.S.S.A.D.), with Henry Tizard as 
Chairman, which sat for the first time on 28 January 1935. Tizard was a skilled government 
scientist ‘with a long experience of aeronautical technology and test flying.’ 75  The 
Committee consisted of pre-eminent scientists and engineers and included H.E. Wimperis, 
Director of Scientific Research at the Air Ministry, P.M.S. Blackett 76 and A.V. Hill. 77 
Lindemann was also invited to join the committee but initially delayed in acceptance 
probably out of suspicion that both Tizard and the Air Ministry had circumvented his own 
proposal that the scientific appraisal should be directed by the Committee of Imperial 
Defence.  
 
Meanwhile, Lindemann’s recommendation was acted upon by the government and 
was entitled the Air Defence Research Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial 
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Defence (C.I.D.) which first met on 10 April 1935. 78 Effectively, two separate groups had 
been formed with Tizard and Lindemann represented on both. The C.I.D. was principally 
concerned with the ‘political and military decisions required to implement the air defence 
programme of research and development’ 79 whilst the C.S.S.A.D. (Tizard Committee) 
concentrated on scientific research.  
 
Nevertheless, when Lindemann finally did join the Tizard Committee his relationship 
was so thoroughly uneasy with the other members that in July 1936 both Hill and Blackett 
resigned. Speaking at the Tizard Memorial Lecture in 1960, Blackett gave his own account 
of the dispute between Tizard and Lindemann over the priorities for research and 
development in which it was evident that the relationship had become entirely unproductive: 
  
On one occasion Lindemann became so fierce with Tizard that the 
secretaries had to be sent out of the committee room so as to keep the 
squabble as private as possible. In August 1936, soon after this meeting, 
A.V. Hill and I decided that the Committee could not function satisfactorily 
under such conditions; so we resigned. 80  
 
The basis of the dispute stemmed from the fact that Lindemann wanted to concentrate 
efforts upon the development of aircraft detection by means of infra-red radiation and ‘for the 
dropping of parachute-bombs’ 81  into the path of enemy night bombers, 82  whilst the 
remainder of the Committee believed that the perfection of radar was the priority in terms of 
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resources. Lindemann’s preference for untested technological solutions to immediate 
problems of defence cannot be ignored and his close relationship with Churchill would have 
made opposition to the development of the airborne capability unlikely.  
 
The Air Ministry simply reformed the Committee but did not extend an invitation to 
Lindemann, a pragmatic response in light of the importance of the research but a decision 
that undoubtedly cost them dearly once Churchill and Lindemann established themselves in 
Whitehall. Hore-Belisha believed that Churchill displayed an intense loyalty to friends, even if 
they did not agree politically, and that whilst ‘you are a friend you can expect support to the 
hilt.’ 83 However, once Churchill had formed an opinion, an opinion unquestionably 
influenced by Lindemann in all matters scientific, he would become an ‘unrelenting 
opponent.’ 84 There can be no doubt from Churchill’s memoirs of the mutual dependence 
that existed between them: 
 
He was my trusted friend and confidant of twenty years. Together we had 
watched the advance and onset of world disaster. Together we had done 
our best to sound the alarm. And now we were in it, and I had the power to 
guide and arm our effort. 85 
 
Lovell identified that the decline in influence of the Air Ministry coincided with the abrupt 
decrease in the scientific authority of Tizard, Hill and Blackett in matters of defence. 86 
Consequently, any professional scientific opposition to the development of airborne forces 
had been effectively removed long before the decision to procure such a method of warfare 
was taken. 
                                               
83
 C. Eade (ed.), Churchill by his Contemporaries (London, 1953), p. 399. 
84
 Ibid.  
85
 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 312. 
86
 B. Lovell, ‘Blackett in War and Peace’, The Journal of the Operational Research Society’, Vol. 39, 
No. 3, 1988, pp. 221-233, p. 222-224.  
54 
 
The significance of the scientific and technological development of radar was that it 
was an example of a service request for scientific assistance in the development of a 
strategic requirement, rather than a technological specification to which the manufacturers 
would respond. The importance of technology and scientific application were beginning to be 
realised amongst military staffs, but the personalities involved were also crucial. Tizard 
continued his close association with the Air Ministry throughout the 1930s on perfecting the 
technique of airborne detection and he accepted an appointment as Scientific Advisor to the 
Chief of Air Staff.  However, upon the return of Churchill to the Admiralty in 1939, 
accompanied by Lindemann as his chief scientific and economic advisor, Tizard found his 
position in Whitehall increasingly difficult. 87   
Lindemann and the War-Time Government 
 
Upon appointment as Prime Minister, Churchill assigned Lindemann as his personal 
scientific advisor with the joint role of offering advice and acting as the guardian and selector 
of all fellow scientists’ entry to Downing Street. The scientific influence within the government 
was a direct result of the rapidly changing demands of war and the subsequent necessity for 
rapid technological development.  
 
Due to the ever-changing requirements of the armed services new technological 
opportunities could easily be overlooked in the conduct of daily war-time administration and 
Churchill was determined not to miss an opportunity. Thomas Wilson argues that: 
 
Churchill was determined to prevent important proposals from drifting around 
Whitehall in their manila folders. Moreover, although the various 
departments had expert knowledge, they were by no means infallible. 88 
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However, despite Churchill’s selection of specialist advisors he often found it difficult to resist 
interference in departmental business and was quite prepared to lecture departmental 
ministers on what he believed should be done. 89 Wilson suggested that it may well have 
been this spontaneous aspect of Churchill’s character that resulted in the somewhat irregular 
job description that Lindemann ultimately fulfilled. 90  
 
Lindemann’s remit was not simply confined to scientific matters. He was also head of 
‘S Branch’, the Prime Minister’s statistical section, and required to compile information from 
a wide variety of departments; a not insubstantial task according to Farren and Thompson:  
 
He had to summarize the monstrous mass of statistics thrown up by the 
administration so that the P.M. could see what was happening and grasp 
the essence of the big quantitative issues that arose for decision. 91   
 
Consequently, Lindemann was in the position of having the complete faith of Churchill but 
also of attracting the suspicion of ministers as noted by the Earl of Birkenhead: 
 
In spite of the immense usefulness of his work, his Section had no definite 
status. He was not a minister with a department behind him, yet he had the 
task of requiring statistics from them, often with the object of hostile 
scrutiny. Although never a member of the War Cabinet, he was in closer 
and more continuous contact with the Prime Minister than any other man. 92 
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Lindemann’s team of statisticians analysed the figures collated by individual departments in 
order to ensure that they were both realistic and showed maximum productivity in the war 
economy. Edgerton believed that no scientist ever had more influence in British history, and 
probably no academic either. 93 
 
Lindemann’s influence was significant, however, not necessarily because he had any 
direct involvement in the British airborne capability, but because he shared Churchill’s 
passion for scientific gadgetry and had an in-depth knowledge of all aspects of the 
departmental war effort. Consequently, opportunities for the development of new 
technologies in the Churchill government were potentially abundant.  
 
Yet the enthusiasm for invention which characterised the Churchill administration 
was not universal within the scientific community. Perhaps the most important scientific critic 
of the Churchill government was A.V. Hill, Professor of Biophysics at University College 
London. Hill believed that Churchill and Lindemann were responsible for wasting precious 
materiel resources and exploiting their position in government to sponsor unqualified 
technological development. In essence, he believed that production would be more efficient 
if effort was concentrated upon the improvement of existing weapons rather than in the 
development of new and unproven technologies. 94   
 
Hill considered that the development of new weaponry detracted from improvements in 
existing technology which ultimately resulted in a failure to anticipate future requirements 
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and put British forces at a military disadvantage. He encapsulated his misgivings in an open 
letter printed in The Times on 1 July 1942. 95  
 
The inferiority is not due to bad workmanship, but to a system which has 
failed to anticipate future tactical requirements in guns, projectiles, armour, 
and performance, failed to collect and analyse, and profit by previous 
operational experience, failed sometimes to obey the elementary rule that 
production must follow, not precede, development. 96  
 
Hill believed that the primary cause for the inferiority of British weaponry was that scientific 
and technological control was entirely practised at departmental level, usually subordinate to 
administration, and that there was insufficient scientific representation at central government.  
 
Indeed, there was no technical staff to advise the Cabinet directly and objectively on 
scientific or technological matters and consequently no independent body to ensure that 
design and development was both efficient and technologically perceptive. As Hill observed: 
 
For operations, planning has been centralized in the Chiefs of Staff 
organization, for supply, in the Minister of Production. The third member of 
the trinity, dealing with research, design and development and quantitative 
planning of the use of technological resources, is altogether unrepresented 
at the highest level. 97  
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His personal experiences whilst serving on the Tizard Committee resulted in strong 
misgivings about Lindemann’s monopoly within the government on all matters scientific.  
 
Hill’s concerns resonated in the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee to 
the War Cabinet formed of officers of the Royal Society. A similar committee had been 
established during the First World War but had failed to gain the desired influence. 98 The 
Committee’s basic terms of reference were to advise the Lord President of the Council and 
appropriate government departments on any particular scientific problems and select 
suitable scientists with relevant expertise who might offer assistance. The committee was 
also instructed to ensure that the authorities were informed of any promising new scientific or 
technological developments. 99 
 
Zuckerman, a leading British scientific advisor throughout the Second World War, 
neatly summarised the influence of the scientists at the centre of the British establishment 
and ultimately found in favour of Hill and his colleagues in terms of their strategic influence: 
 
These germinal centres of wartime advice enjoyed different kinds of power. 
Cherwell’s was immense because of his close friendship with Churchill. So 
too was Tizard’s and also that of his colleagues – in particular Blackett, 
R.H. Fowler, G.I. Taylor, A.V. Hill and Charles Darwin. My own view is that 
during the war they exercised a much bigger influence on the body of 
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British scientists as a whole than did Cherwell, whom on the other hand I 
would say had a bigger impact on events. 100 
 
Hill was also an advocate for what became one of the principal scientific and technological 
features of the British war effort, Operational Research (O.R.): that is to say the ‘scientific 
investigation of military operations and the effectiveness of weapons in the field.’ 101 The 
principles of O.R. are worth briefly exploring, and subsequently considering throughout this 
examination in reference to airborne capability.  
Operational Research & Combined Operations 
 
O.R. has been defined as ‘numerical thinking about operations, with the aim of 
formulating conclusions which, applied to operations, may give a profitable return for a given 
expenditure of effort.’ 102 Joseph McCloskey argues that in the modern scientific context the 
achievements of wartime British O.R. could appear almost trivial with the solutions ‘little 
more than what appears in hindsight to be common sense.’ 103 However, it did create the 
blueprint for future collaboration between the military, technological and scientific 
communities. 
 
The most significant aspect of the O.R. methodology was the fact that it was the first 
time civilian scientists and engineers directly combined with military personnel to achieve 
maximum efficiency of available resources. Crowther & Whiddington argued that: 
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The invention and improvement of equipment has long been, and will 
always be, one of science’s chief contributions to the technique of warfare. 
In the war of 1939-1945, however, science entered in a new way; scientific 
method was applied more consistently and deliberately to the use of 
weapons and the conduct of military operations. 104   
   
Consequently, the early ambassadors of O.R. were able to advise designers directly and 
promptly about any particular technical deficiencies, work closely with manufacturers to 
accelerate research and development and, ultimately, advise the end-user upon the most 
efficient method of deploying both equipment and personnel.  
 
The most obvious benefit of the application of O.R. was in the development of new 
technology and Crowther & Whiddington argued that the first identifiable starting point was in 
the study of radar equipment, 105 as discussed above in relation to the Tizard Committee. 
Tizard certainly believed that such cooperation was a unique phenomenon and wrote the 
following in 1946: 
 
Without such collaboration I feel confident that much time would have 
been wasted, and much scientific effort misdirected, which with our limited 
supply of men and resources we could not afford. 106  
 
Although there was no named scientist devoted specifically to the development of airborne 
warfare scientists such as P.M. Blackett, S. Zuckermann, and C.H. Waddington became 
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scientific advisors to the various military commands. 107 K. Brian Haley rightly identified 
Blackett as the leading exponent of the technique and was instrumental in establishing the 
reputation of scientific contribution at the operational level: 
 
He advocated adopting a scientific discipline with formal analysis to the 
studies that were not aimed at producing better weapons but more 
concerned with how to improve the use of existing ones and how to deploy 
troops, ships, aeroplanes, tanks, and guns more effectively. 108 
 
However, it is important to note that Blackett, along with other members of the scientific 
community such as Hill, did not just advocate the appliance of science to the development of 
new technology. In fact, they were more inclined to combine scientific investigative technique 
with operational analysis to improve the military effectiveness of existing hardware.  
 
The application of scientific technique did not require the scientist employed to have 
any specialist knowledge of the work assigned, more the appliance of a scientific 
methodology and it remained the responsibility of the military headquarters staff to utilise or 
discard any analysis provided. 109 Although evidence of the application of the principles of 
O.R. cannot be documented during the development of the British airborne capability it was 
clear that the leading exponents were determined not to let the new techniques become an 
opportunity for the production of ‘gadgetry’.   
 
Ironically, Zuckerman’s assessment of the influence of scientists on strategic matters 
is most perceptive in relation to the development of British airborne forces whereby all the 
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protagonists were intrinsically linked. Without the inclination for new technology possessed 
by Churchill and Lindemann the development of a British airborne capability may never have 
commenced, but without the application of scientific principles, as championed in O.R., it is 
doubtful if deployment would have become an operational and tactical reality. 
  
McCloskey believes that Lindemann undoubtedly supported the principles of O.R. but 
ultimately ensured that the priority for resource allocation was directed where he personally 
believed they would be best placed:  
 
Cherwell must be recognised for his interest in Bomber Command and his 
support of O.R. activities there. Moreover, because of his key position as 
scientific adviser to Churchill, he was in a position to advance – or obstruct- 
this use of scientific talent. 110 
 
Lindemann supported the application of radar technology to aircraft to enable Bomber 
Command to locate specific targets and thus increase accuracy and efficiency. He backed 
strategic bombing and his status allowed him to ensure that there was minimal interference 
in the administration of the campaign. This would suggest opposition to the competition 
created by airborne development.  However, analysis into the effectiveness of airborne 
forces was conducted from early operational deployment and influenced the research and 
development programme accordingly. The scientific resource allocated to the progression of 
British airborne warfare would thus suggest that Lindemann was also supportive of the 
capability.  
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Conclusion 
 
The strategic and economic situation that confronted Britain in 1940 was such that the 
British could not, in the words of Hancock, ‘afford to indulge themselves in day-dreams of a 
magical multiplication of their forces and equipment.’ 111 He argued that although the ‘British 
were compelled to fight a defensive war: they fought it with an offensive spirit.’ 112 Churchill 
had become increasingly concerned in June 1940 that the defensive position that Britain had 
been forced to adopt had the potential to severely undermine the morale of the armed forces. 
On 25 June 1940 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff reported to the War Cabinet that: 
 
A Memorandum had been widely circulated emphasising the need for 
instilling the offensive spirit into all ranks. The morale of the Army had 
inevitably suffered as a result of the series of retreats which had been 
forced upon them through no fault of their own, and every effort was being 
made to bring morale up to the highest possible level. 113 
 
The concern over morale was indeed justified and Hew Strachan has suggested that the 
crisis culminated in large-scale desertion, which peaked during the campaign in North Africa:  
 
In 1941-42 the British army confronted a crisis in its morale. It had been 
defeated on the battlefield; its equipment was poor; and its institutions 
seemed ill-adapted to the needs of a citizen army in a world war.  114 
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Consequently, the ability to launch airborne (and Commando) raids had both direct and in-
direct military and psychological benefit.  
 
The mechanics of the wartime administration were such that Churchill, surrounded by 
political, scientific and personal allies, could manipulate the direction of the economy to focus 
resources accordingly; whether for strategic military purposes or for the allusion that Britain 
was capable of further offensive action. His influence upon national investment in military 
technology was contrary to the contemporary scientific argument championed by Professor 
Hill and the subsequent methodology proposed by Millet and Murray for the analysis of 
operational effectiveness which asserted that the military should champion specific 
technological requirements. 115 The orientation of influence and the scientific debate is crucial 
to the understanding of the development of airborne warfare.  
   
Strategic effectiveness, and the subsequent technological necessities, can be defined 
as the employment of the military to secure by force national goals as agreed by the political 
leadership. Millett and Murray suggest that strategic activity consist of plans which specify 
timescale, mission and objectives: 
  
Subsumed within the definition are the analysis and selection of strategic 
objectives and the linkage of those objectives to national goals through the 
mechanism of campaign or contingency plans. 116  
 
However, when this is applied to the technological development of British airborne warfare it 
is evident that there were serious shortcomings in terms of strategic effectiveness. 
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Greenacre identifies the inadequacies of the original airborne doctrine 117 and the influence of 
Churchill resulted in the adoption of strategic goals that were neither operationally nor 
technologically possible in the short-term, nor capable or being adequately resourced for 
future exploitation. The development of airborne forces had failed to ‘obey the elementary 
rule that production must follow, not precede, development’ 118 as would be later argued by 
Professor Hill.  
 
Moreover, regardless of the political ambition, technological investment, or the 
efficiency of its application, the British were not capable of reconciling the more fundamental 
requirements necessary to achieve military effectiveness in airborne warfare, such as the 
limitations in aircraft availability and their military capability. These factors will be explored in 
the following chapters.  
                                               
117
 Greenacre, Churchill’s Spearhead, p. 173. 
118
 A.V. Hill, ‘Science and War: Technical Advice at the Centre’, The Times, 1 July 1942, p. 5.   
66 
 
Chapter Two: Central Landing School / Central Landing 
Establishment 
Introduction 
 
With the economic, scientific, and administrative background established attention 
can now be concentrated upon the actual technological development of the British airborne 
capability. The Central Landing School (C.L.S.) was established at R.A.F. Ringway, near 
Manchester, with the specific task of turning Churchill’s request into an offensive reality.  
 
The R.A.F. involvement in the development of airborne warfare was paramount from 
its inception and came at a time when Bomber Command was engaged in ‘operations 
designed to reduce the scale of air attack’ 1 on Britain and was focused upon strategic 
targets such as enemy aircraft factories and aluminium works. Nevertheless, despite the 
importance of these objectives precious resources were relinquished for the development of 
new technology. 
 
The chapter will examine the early technological development and the resources 
required for the deployment of a British airborne capability. The procurement mechanism will 
be scrutinised in order to deduce whether sufficient strategic military requirement had been 
demonstrated to justify the necessary technological development. 
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Early Development 
 
Major John Rock of the Royal Engineers was initially tasked with the development of 
British airborne forces by the War Office but there were also R.A.F. officers involved in the 
embryonic planning and training period. These were chiefly Group Captain L.G. Harvey 
(Station Commander R.A.F. Ringway), Squadron Leader Louis Strange, and Wing 
Commander Sir Nigel Norman. 2  
 
Parachute training became the responsibility of the R.A.F. whilst the Army focused 
upon the military requirements and tactical considerations of airborne warfare, what 
Greenacre defined as the ‘concept’. 3 By 5 July 1940 all pilots at the C.L.S. had passed on 
the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley, the primary aircraft allocated in accordance with M.A.P. 
concentration on particular aircraft types, 4  and on 6 July Strange obtained permission from 
Lord Egerton to use Tatton Park for parachute landings. This was sanctioned by the Air 
Ministry on July 8 and the following day the first training course started at the Central 
Landing School. 5  
 
However, the C.L.S. was also responsible for the development of all associated 
technology required by an operational airborne force. On 17 July a conference was held 
between the Commanding Officer, Chief Ground Instructor, Chief Landing Instructor and the 
Managing Director and General Manager of Messrs. Elliot and Accessories Limited 
regarding the manufacture of containers for carriage of equipment. The firm agreed to 
produce a specimen container for trial which was subsequently successfully dropped from 
the bomb bay of a Whitley on 2 August 1940.  The container was loaded with equipment 
                                               
2
 A. Wood, History of the World’s Glider Forces (Kent, 1990), p. 37.  
3
 Greenacre, Churchill’s Spearhead, p. 172. 
4
 Scott & Hughes, Administration of War Production, pp. 291-292.  
5
 T.N.A., AIR 29/512, C.L.S. Ringway, 8 July 1940. 
68 
 
consisting of 11 rifles, 100 rounds of ammunition and 1 Bren gun. 6 The technical 
development, and subsequent liaison of key stakeholders, had commenced. 
 
The first army pupils to arrive at Ringway for parachute training were men of No.2 
Commando and, after a course of ground training, the first live descents were made from a 
converted Whitley on 13 July. 7 Six Whitley bombers were initially transferred to the C.L.S 
but required extensive modification in order to be used for parachute training. In the first 
instance this involved the removal of the rear gun turret which was replaced by a platform 
from which the parachutist performed the jump.  
 
It was soon necessary for the platform method of alighting to be replaced by a more 
realistic exit to give the parachutists experience of jumping under operational conditions. On 
29 July tests were made with dummies to simulate the dropping of eight men on a single run 
but proved unsatisfactory as only the first and last dummy actually landed within the 
specified landing zone. Consequently, it was decided that the Irvin type parachute 8 then in 
use was unsuitable for airborne purposes and all trainees were sent away for a fortnight of 
tactical training under Army arrangements whilst an alternative substitute was sourced and 
tested. 9 
 
The platform method of jumping was far too clumsy to allow a ‘stick’ of ten parachutists 
to be deployed quickly from the Whitley and subsequently reach a designated landing zone 
in a reasonably close grouping. 10 The problem was resolved by means of cutting a hole in 
the floor of the aircraft through which parachutists could deploy swiftly via the ‘static-line’ 
technique. The static-line method required the rip-cord of the parachute to be fixed via a clip 
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to a point on the aircraft fuselage. The parachute was consequently deployed by the weight 
of the parachutist pulling the cord on exit from the aircraft rather than having to be physically 
pulled once in free fall as with the Irvin. The Airborne Forces Manual described this 
modification: 
 
The Whitley V has a floor aperture occupying the hole originally provided for a 
bottom turret which is not fitted. The aperture is an oval hole 36 inches wide, by 
40 inches long, and provides the means by which the paratroops leave the 
aircraft. The aperture is covered by two doors hinged to the bottom of the 
aircraft. These doors are semi-circular in shape and are secured, during flight, 
by means of two sliding bolts engaging with fitments on the floor of the 
fuselage. For action by paratroops each door is opened and hitched to one of 
the fuselage frames by means of a strap and press stud. 11  
 
Figure 1: Trainee Parachutists and R.A.F. Aircrew posed next to a Whitley Bomber 
Source: Image Courtesy of the Assault Glider Trust 
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Although the inclusion of the aperture into the Whitley was a vast improvement upon the 
earlier method it still posed a series of hazards.  
 
The major problem was that there was a tendency for the lower end of the body to 
become caught by the slipstream of the aircraft which resulted in a blow to the face from the 
edge of the aperture upon exit from the aircraft fuselage. 12 This became known as the 
‘Whitley kiss’ and although the parachute would deploy regardless of whether the parachutist 
was conscious or not it was a major disadvantage during the landing stages of the descent. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Deane-Drummond recounted the following experience of 
parachuting from the Whitley in his memoirs: 
 
One of the difficulties of ‘hole-jumping’ was to make a completely clean exit 
without touching the sides. If you pushed off too hard, your face 
encountered the far edge as you went. If you slid out too gently, the 
parachute on your back bounced you off your side of the hole so that your 
face again met the far side! Nor did the slip-stream help, for as it acted first 
on the legs of the parachutist as he emerged from the aircraft, it tended to 
topple him over unless he went out perfectly straight. As may be imagined, 
there were quite a few bruised and bleeding faces walking about Knutsford 
and Ringway in those days, disfigured by what came to be called a ‘Whitley 
Kiss.’ 13 
 
In an attempt to reduce the effects of this phenomenon a windshield was fitted to the forward 
edge of the aperture to help divert the air-flow and a streamlined tail spat was also fitted to 
prevent the parachute and static-line from getting tangled in the tail wheel. 14 However, 
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despite the minor technological modifications, the slipstream remained a common problem 
for all descents that were conducted through an aperture in the fuselage floor, particularly as 
no alternative aircraft were available. 
  
 On 27 July 1940 the Director of Combined Operations (D.C.O.), Admiral Keyes, 
carried out a brief inspection at Ringway to review the equipment and training of parachute 
troops. He subsequently wrote the following note to the Prime Minister regarding the 
suitability of the Whitley as a parachute aircraft: 
 
It is of the utmost importance that a more suitable plane than the Whitley 
bomber should be provided at once. After going into the matter with the 
R.A.F. Officer on my Staff and the Officers Commanding the Training Staff 
and the troops at Ringway, and myself dropping through the hole in the 
bottom of a stationary Whitley plane, with a squad of parachutists, I am 
strongly of the opinion that the Whitley machines are thoroughly 
unsatisfactory. 15 
 
Despite the protest the dependency upon obsolete equipment was further reinforced at a 
conference at the Air Ministry on 5 September 1940 where it was stated that any specialist 
aircraft would require research and design resource that would ‘seriously compromise the 
production of aircraft for other purposes’. 16 The airborne forces had to make the most of 
available resources.  
 
After the initial political enthusiasm it was clear that the airborne force was far from 
being a strategic priority with regards to aircraft provision, but without clear parameters for 
operations it would be unfair to claim that the Air Ministry were obstructive. At a conference 
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held at the Air Ministry on 4 September a minute was produced entitled ‘Note on the 
Employment of Airborne Troops’ 17 in which an attempt was made to produce some form of 
policy regarding the future development and subsequent deployment of an airborne 
capability.  
 
After the potential for evacuation or extraction of airborne forces by air had been 
deemed unrealistic the report concluded that the only economical means for employing 
airborne forces were ‘under conditions of air superiority’ 18 and when that airborne force is 
expected to be ‘supported immediately by sufficient land forces to secure the whole 
situation.’ 19 With regard to future expenditure the Air Ministry recommendation was both 
pragmatic and clear: 
 
In view of the forgoing considerations, it seems essential, before a large 
expenditure of effort is put into the development of an airborne force, that 
the principles governing the employment of such a force should be 
established and, if possible, certain situations in which that airborne force 
might be employed should be examined to determine how the force should 
be constituted. 20 
 
However, despite the obvious need for clarification of the strategic requirement the training 
and development programme continued without clearly defined research parameters.   
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Live descents through the Whitley aperture commenced at Ringway on 14 July 1940 
and initially proved successful. The decision was taken at this time to stop the practice of 
preliminary ‘pull-off’, whereby the parachutists pulled the rip-cord prior to exiting the aircraft, 
and allow the parachute to open by means of the static-line alone. On 25 July twenty-one 
live landings were conducted at Tatton Park until, at the third drop from Whitely K.7230, 
Driver Evans of the Royal Army Service Corp (R.A.S.C.) was killed after his parachute failed 
to open upon withdrawal from the pack. Consequently, a signal was received from the Air 
Ministry at 16.45 in the afternoon that ordered all parachute training to cease until further 
orders. 21 
 
On 30 July successful trials were carried out with the alternative Quilter type 
parachute 22 which opened immediately down to 100 feet. After a conference between senior 
C.L.S. officers it was recommended ‘that no more live landings should be carried out until 
the parachute had been tested by 500 dummies’ and that Messrs. G. Quilter would send 500 
covers for parachutes at the rate of 100 a week. 23 After extensive tests and evaluation it 
was concluded that the Quilter type would be suitable for live descents. 
  
However, after an incident involving parachute lines becoming entangled it was 
deduced that the aircraft must be throttled down to 90 miles per hour to avoid fouling the 
parachute on the tail wheel which had been caused by the slipstream of the engine. 24 The 
C.L.S. not only had to train parachutists but also had to deduce the operating procedure for 
all aspects of parachute operations which included the flying technique of numerous aircraft 
types to ascertain maximum tactical and operational effectiveness.    
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Despite approval for the staffing claim from C.L.S. personnel the Chief Ground 
Instructor was unable to proceed with further live drops from the Whitley until permission had 
been received from either the Director of Combined Operations or the Air Ministry (A.M.). In 
the interim a Bristol Bombay 25 aircraft was acquired from No. 271 Squadron on 6 August 
and 22 successful live descents were made on the evening of 13 August. In fact Keyes had 
championed the use of the Bombay in his note to Churchill on 27 July in preference to the 
Whitley: 
 
I was informed at the Air Ministry yesterday that the possibility of allocating 
some Bombays will be considered, but it will be some time before these are 
available, owing to a shortage of engines. 26 
 
The irony of the situation was that the D.C.O. was actually advocating the utilisation of a 
technology even more obsolete than the Whitley aircraft he wished it to replace. On 8 August 
the Air Ministry notified the C.L.S. that all Army trainees should pack their own parachutes 
but the approval for live descents to recommence from the Whitley was not discussed until 
11 August. 27 
 
On 14 August live descents were resumed and research was begun at R.A.F. 
Henlow into the feasibility of making further modifications to the Whitley fuselage for 
parachute jumps. The first trials with a modified Whitley were undertaken at Ringway on 20 
August but the rail-shutes for static-line attachment were found unsuitable and required 
further modification. 28 The instigation of modifications directly by the C.L.S. later caused 
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concern at both the Air Ministry and M.A.P. and resulted in the formalisation of the technical 
development process. 
 
Improvements in parachute stability were also being investigated at the Air Defence 
Research Establishment during this period by the aeronautical engineer, William Jolly 
Duncan. Duncan’s main contribution was the application of scientific theory to the 
phenomenon of ‘squidding’ whereby the open rim of the parachute collapsed inwards 
‘without becoming completely deflated’. 29 This resulted in reduced drag and high speed 
landings that were completely unsuited to airborne operations.  
 
Duncan subsequently contributed more widely to airborne forces development when 
he became Head of the Flight and Airborne Section at the Royal Aircraft Establishment in 
1942. Although the section had a varied research programme it was tasked to assist in 
research into ‘gliders and army assault problems in general.’ 30 Civilian scientific support for 
the airborne forces contributed throughout the development process.    
 
On 26 August 1940 99 live descents were undertaken. However, on the 27 August a 
second fatal accident occurred at Tatton Park when Trooper Watts’ parachute failed to open 
after withdrawal from the container. Mr Quilter was called to investigate the cause of the 
accident and after analysis it was decided to make alterations in the method by which the 
parachute was secured inside the container. 31 Consequently, a message was received from 
the A.M. suspending use of the ‘Q’ type parachute but was superseded on 30 August by a 
signal authorising use once modifications had been carried out. The same day two Whitley 
aircraft were despatched from Ringway to Brooklands with 150 parachutes for necessary 
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modification and by the end of the first week of September training had resumed with some 
123 live descents recorded. By the end of September 1940 975 live descents had been 
achieved since the creation of the C.L.S. 32  
 
Despite progress technical issues continued to plague the training programme. On 
27 September another incident occurred whereby a parachute caught on the tail wheel of a 
Whitley during a dummy drop and resulted in an investigation into the feasibility of fitting a 
shield or fairing. This modification was carried out by the Development Squadron which was 
successfully tested at Ringway on 16 November and an instruction was issued that all 
Whitley aircraft were to be fitted with the arrangement. The reliability of the training aircraft 
also remained a hindrance as on 2 October, upon receipt of jacks for the inspection of 
aircraft undercarriages, certain fittings were found to be fractured rendering all Whitley 
aircraft temporarily unserviceable.  However, continued technical development did not 
prevent a third fatal accident which occurred on 19 November 1940 when Corporal Carter’s 
parachute failed to open due to the static-line becoming disconnected from the chute-rail. 33  
 
Research into the production of a standard methodology for parachute procedure 
was not only confined to technological development and the application of custom 
manufactured apparatus. A significant contribution was also required from R.A.F. Medical 
Officers to ensure that procedures were carried out as safely and effectively as possible. Air 
Marshal Whittingham, Director-General of Medical Services, made the following 
observations concerning medical officer involvement which were published in The British 
Medical Journal in 1946: 
 
Duties were to advise on parachuting from a medical aspect, and, for this 
purpose, to make liaison with Army Airborne Forces and the R.A.F. Institute 
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of Aviation Medicine. Researches he [Medical Officers] undertook show 
that liability to injury on landing by parachute varies with age, weight, force 
of wind, and type of terrain. Statistics revealed that injuries were more 
frequent in those over 25 years of age than in younger persons; that the 
injury rate rose rapidly in those over 12 stone in weight, and the stronger 
the wind the greater was the risk of injury from wrong stance on landing. 34  
 
Unsurprisingly, the commonest parts of the body to be injured during training jumps were the 
legs, which accounted for 64% of all recorded accidents. Whittingham claimed that ‘the 
incidence of injuries during training was initially 4% of jumps, but subsequent to improved 
attachment of parachute harness and landing stance, it was reduced to 0.5% of jumps. The 
application of scientific analysis not only helped determine the most effective method of 
jumping but also ensured that only those physically suited to parachuting were selected.  
  
Meanwhile, following a visit by Group Captain Bowman, Deputy Director Combined 
Operations (Air), notification was received from No. 22 Group 35 that a Glider Section would 
also be established at Ringway on 8 August. 36 The decision to form the glider section 
undoubtedly originated from an Air Staff note dated 12 August, author unknown, sent to 
Ismay regarding the potential strategic advantages of the assault glider. 37   
 
The report suggested that although German parachute forces had been successful in 
the Low Countries it may well have been the last time that such troops were deployed ‘on a 
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serious scale in major operations.’ 38 It would appear that the vulnerability of parachutists had 
been recognised by the Air Ministry, particularly once the element of tactical surprise had 
been compromised: 
 
We are beginning to incline to the view that dropping troops from the air by 
parachute is a clumsy and obsolescent method and that there are far more 
important possibilities in gliders. The Germans made excellent use of their 
parachute troops in the Low Countries by exploiting surprise, and by virtue 
of the fact that they had practically no opposition. But it seems to us at least 
possible that this may be the last time that parachute troops are used on a 
serious scale in a major operation. 39 
 
The Air Ministry believed that the glider could be an alternative method of deployment for 
airborne troops in either an air-landed or parachute capacity and had the potential to be more 
efficient and effective than parachutists dropped from transport aircraft: 
 
We are pressing ahead with the development of gliders, and have made 
good progress. The glider has all sorts of possibilities other than the 
carriage of troops, such as for increasing the endurance of heavy aircraft by 
refuelling in the air. 40 
 
Churchill was suspicious of the strategy after being previously informed that only 500 
parachutists, some 10% of his initial request, had been selected for training. The Prime 
Minister responded that if gliders were considered a better capability than parachutists then 
the scheme should be seriously considered but he also expressed doubts that the pursuit of 
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such experimental technology might have been detrimental to one that had already been 
proven. 41  
The Assault Glider 
 
The concept of the assault glider was pioneered in Germany as a direct result of the 
restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty. The desire to beat the restrictions became an 
obsession that, to observers throughout the world, had simply manifested itself in the 
apparently innocuous past-time of sport gliding. 42 Many frustrated former pilots from the 
Imperial Germany Army Air Services of the Great War, the Luftstreitkrafte, embraced gliding 
as the only way to beat the ban and the glider became much more than a symbol of defiance 
when, during the 1920s, its potential future technological application as a military weapon 
was recognised. 43 Andrew Barros has argued that the Rhön glider competition was a 
valuable testing ground: 
 
It proved to be a critical laboratory for German aeronautical engineers and 
provided important lessons in aerodynamics, structural design, single long-span 
wings, thermodynamics and meteorology. A diverse and skilled group of aviation 
enthusiasts including Willy Messerschmitt and Kurt Student, then Reichswehr 
Captain (and later commander of German airborne troops), made a virtue out of 
the necessity imposed by the control regime. 44 
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Subsequently the Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fur Segelflug (D.F.S.), the German Institute 
for Gliding, conducted exploratory military research for the German aero industry that 
included the development of the D.F.S. 230 military glider which was based upon a sailplane 
that had been originally designed for high altitude meteorological research. 45 
 
However, it was not only the German government which recognised that the existence 
of organised national gliding and soaring clubs had potential military benefits during the 
inter-war period. The British also acknowledged the importance of air-mindedness and 
offered financial incentives to cadets to complete their basic gliding qualifications. Although 
this was conducted on a much smaller scale in Britain than in Germany it does illustrate the 
fact that gliding was considered an important aspect of initial military pilot training. 46  
 
The D.F.S. 230 was principally designed to alleviate the fundamental deficiency of the 
limited carrying capacity of parachutists during the descent to a target. The German 
Fallschirmjager were dependent upon weapons containers that were dropped into action 
simultaneously, and this was one of the very first technical investigations undertaken by 
C.L.E. 47 Locating the weapons containers for essential supplies such as ammunition had to 
be undertaken before parachute forces could move off the drop zone and onto their 
objective. As a result of these restrictions the Germans realised that another method was 
required for the delivery of heavier weapons and supplies in support of parachutist forces if 
the airborne units were to become tactically and operationally effective.  
 
A 1943 article in Flight Magazine on the British Horsa Glider summarized the 
relationship between glider-borne infantry and parachutists in the airborne context: 
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From a purely military point of view the main function of a glider is, of 
course, the carrying of troops, the glider having certain advantages 
compared with the dropping of troops by individual parachutes. It is not that 
one takes the place of the other, but rather that they are complementary. 
The glider can be cut adrift from its tug and, if it is cast off at a substantial 
height, it can cover quite a respectable distance under perfect control, and 
in almost complete silence, and can land on almost any field, irrespective of 
size and surface conditions. 48  
 
It was this requirement that facilitated the concept and development of the assault glider as a 
weapon of modern warfare.  The D.F.S. 230 was capable of carrying a variety of cargo or 
ten fully armed troops, including two pilots who were seated in tandem, and was towed by 
another aircraft to within range of its target. 49 The D.F.S. 230 secretly entered full scale 
production during 1937 which allowed nearly two years for the perfection of the assault glider 
technique before the outbreak of the Second World War. The British on the other hand had 
to effectively start development from scratch. 
 
The Operation Records Book of the C.L.E. confirms the scale of development required.  
On 3 August notification was received that the glider flight comprised two Westland Wallace 
aircraft for the purpose of towing but delivery of these aircraft was later cancelled on 13 
August. When it did arrive it consisted of an obsolete Avro 504 glider tug, 2 corporals, 3 
Aircraftsmen and a civilian glider towed by a Fordson car. 50  
 
On 8 August the C.L.S. was informed that under orders of the Director of Combined 
Operations the object of the Glider Flight was to produce glider carrying aircraft. Wing 
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Commander Buxton assumed command of all necessary experimentation and on 14 August 
No.22 Group confirmed that all Glider Flight personnel were to be posted to C.L.S. 51 for the 
formulation of an Experimental Glider Section. 52  
 
The primary obstacle to the development of glider-borne warfare, as with parachute 
operations, remained the availability of suitable aircraft. Although conversion of existing 
types for the role of parachute aircraft and glider tugs was not technically difficult it presented 
numerous engineering challenges. 53 Greenacre rightly identifies that any modification 
required significant resources and that ‘apparently minor alterations took up a 
disproportionate amount of time and effort and many were required before a bomber could 
be used to drop parachutists.’ 54 The effort involved in the modification of an aircraft for glider 
towing was even greater, particularly as larger gliders were produced, and this will be 
discussed in detail in following chapters. However, development also required specialist 
personnel and such expertise was not easily procured.    
M. A. P. and the Treasury 
 
The Ministry of Aircraft Production (M.A.P.) was created on 17 May 1940 to relieve 
the Air Ministry of responsibility for the procurement of aircraft and equipment. 55 
Consequently, M.A.P. assumed responsibility for the development of the C.L.S. and the 
acquisition of additional specialist staff and resources to enable the new establishment to 
function and for technological investigation to proceed. Before recruitment to certain 
positions M.A.P. had to request permission for additional resources from the Treasury to 
ensure that the necessary finances were available.  
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The first such application for additional resources was sent on 5 September 1940 from 
M.A.P. to the Treasury Chambers. 56 Despite the economic situation and the limitations upon 
specialist resources M.A.P. submitted ‘an urgent demand for some development staff in 
connection with Gliders, Parachutes and Rotachutes.’ 57 The request was for six specialist 
technical staff with a guarantee that the posts would ‘only be filled in so far as men of the 
required specialist qualifications’ could be found. 58 Although the men were to be employed 
at Ringway they were to be regarded as on the strength of the Royal Aircraft Establishment, 
Farnborough, for payroll purpose. The administration of specialist personnel required close 
collaboration between the C.L.S., M.A.P. and the Royal Aircraft Establishment (R.A.E.).  
 
The urgency for personnel meant that M.A.P. officials did not always follow Treasury 
recruitment protocol and approval was retrospectively sought after appointments had already 
been made. As Scott & Hughes pointed out:  
 
It was Lord Beaverbrook’s practice simply to notify the Parliamentary 
Secretary of his wishes in regard to new appointments and promotions in 
the higher ranks of the Ministry, and also in regard to the salaries to be 
paid. 59 
 
This was the case in regard to the recruitment of Mr W.S. Shackleton, the proprietor of a 
specialist aviation engineering consultancy, 60 ‘for special work in connection with gliders and 
specialist landing devices.’ 61   
                                               
56
 T.N.A., T 162/755, Ministry of Aircraft Production: A.F.E.E. Development Staff, Request for 
Development Staff, by R.A. Grieve, 5 September 1940.  
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Scott & Hughes, Administration of War Production, p. 314.  
60
 ‘Classified Advertisements’, Flight Magazine, 20 June 1940, p. 26. 
61
  T.N.A., T 162/755, Request to Recruit W.S. Shackleton, by R.A. Grieve, 11 October 1940. 
84 
 
M.A.P. considered Mr Shackleton to be ‘a man of much distinction – of the £2000 a 
year class in the Aircraft Industry,’ 62 but it was unable to secure his services full-time and 
consequently negotiated a fee of eighty guineas a month on the basis of 22 days’ work. The 
Treasury approved the procurement of Mr Shackleton’s services on 31 October but 
mistakenly assumed that he would be appointed to the position of Principal Technical Officer 
(P.T.O.) as detailed in the correspondence of 5 September. Consequently, the following 
M.A.P. response regarding Mr Shackleton’s duties was received at the Treasury on 8 
November:  
 
The duties which Mr Shackleton will carry out are of a somewhat different 
order. It is anticipated that at least five firms will be engaged on the design 
of various prototypes of gliders in view of the considerable expansion which 
is taking place in this direction. Moreover production of an approved type is 
beginning shortly and will be in the hands of woodworking firms hitherto 
outside the aircraft industry. 63   
 
It was certainly not made clear that Mr Shackleton was considered an additional appointment 
above the posts previously authorised but M.A.P. continued to argue its position and made a 
clear distinction between the need for contractual management and technological 
development: 
 
Clearly it will be essential to have available a man of wide experience 
capable of dealing with the numerous problems arising in such a situation 
and of sufficient authority to meet the firms’ designers and the senior 
serving officers concerned on level terms. It is for these duties of a 
technical supervisory that we purpose using Mr Shackleton’s services but 
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as these will not be available in a full time capacity we desire to use him as 
a consultant – not in a specific post. 64 
 
The Treasury agreed on 11 November 1940 to the terms of Shackleton’s appointment in 
addition to the six posts previously sanctioned but requested that M.A.P. reported on the 
progress on the situation in two months’ time. 65 However, a summary of the work in which 
Shackleton was engaged was not submitted to the Treasury until December 1941 when work 
was sufficiently progressed to enable Shackleton ‘to hand over his duties to the technical 
staff responsible.’ 66 
 
Despite the late report on progress, M.A.P. warned that it might have to utilise 
Shackleton’s services in a consultancy capacity in the future at additional cost. Further 
extracts from the correspondence between M.A.P. and the Treasury will feature throughout 
the main body of the research but it is important to remember that technological progression 
was dependent upon the close co-operation of a variety of governmental departments and 
the availability of the technical specialists required. The growing demands of the 
technological research programme consequently required restructuring to accommodate 
additional research responsibilities.  
Central Landing Establishment 
 
Following the increased scope of research work it was decided that a new organisation 
should be formed that would be responsible for all aspects of airborne forces, training and 
technological development. Ultimately the parachute commitment was severely curtailed and 
the technological emphasis was focused upon the development of glider-borne troops and 
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their associated equipment. 67 At a conference held at Ringway on 12 September 1940 
between C.L.S. and No.22 Group personnel it was decided that the future technical 
programme would be most efficiently conducted through the creation of a Central Landing 
Establishment (C.L.E.). The Establishment would amalgamate the existing Central Landing 
School and Glider Flight but also include a dedicated Technical Development Unit. 68 
  
Consequently, on 18 September 1940, Squadron Leader Strange was tasked to form 
the Central Landing Establishment with Group Captain Harvey retaining command of the 
C.L.S. and this was completed the following day. 69 On 1 October 1940 the Central Landing 
School Headquarters was officially formed and it was decided that the C.L.S. and Glider 
Flight should operate as independent, but intrinsically linked units, within the Establishment 
(See Appendix 3).  
 
Despite the use of obsolete equipment the Station regularly conducted demonstrations 
of the developing new technology for high profile visitors. On 26 September 1940 His Royal 
Highness the Duke of Kent observed a demonstration of the assault glider technique 
accompanied by live parachute descents on the aerodrome. The royal demonstration was 
followed on 4 October by an inspection by Anthony Eden. 70 Eden’s visit was conducted 4 
months after his exchange with Mr Garro-Jones in the House of Commons on the 
government’s failure to investigate the potential for airborne warfare 71 and although the 
infrastructure for research had been implemented, the technology required further extensive 
development and resource.  
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Following the creation of the C.L.E. the glider training programme progressed rapidly 
and on 16 October R.A.F. Ratcliffe and R.A.F. Rearsby aerodromes in Leicestershire were 
allocated to C.L.E. for the utilisation of the Glider Training Squadron. On the 26 October the 
Glider Training Squadron (G.T.S.) conducted its first operational exercise near Macclesfield 
in which two gliders landed in small fields adjoining a railway viaduct, the supposed 
objective. 72  
 
Despite an ambitious training programme the unit was still awaiting a purpose 
manufactured assault glider and consequently civilian gliders had to be acquired as an 
interim arrangement. On 28 October 1940 Flying Officer Davie departed Ringway tasked 
with the examination of civilian gliders for impressment into service with the G.T.S. During 
the period of detachment Davie was temporarily attached to No.41 (Maintenance) Group 
Headquarters which had previously compiled a list of gliders in civilian ownership throughout 
the country that required inspection pending possible selection for use with the Glider 
Training Squadron and the associated Development Unit. 73  
Development Unit  
 
On 22 October 1940 Establishment No. WAR/AC/116A was received from the War 
Office formally approving the creation of the Development Unit (D.U.) 74 (See Appendix 4)  
Previously the O.R.B. had been dedicated to the activities of the Central Landing School but 
on formation of the C.L.E. the document was sub-divided to incorporate the individual 
sections and for the purpose of the following discussion the focus will be primarily based 
upon the technological development of the D.U. but will continue to reference other sections 
of Establishment activity as appropriate.  
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On 2 November Wing Commander Buxton assumed command of the Development 
Unit and Flight Lieutenant Williams, Flying Officer Davie and Flying Officer Kronfeld reported 
for duty the same day, the last of which deserves some special attention. He was a much 
respected German-born Jewish champion glider pilot and aircraft designer. Kronfeld was the 
first glider pilot to fly over the Alps, cross the British Channel and achieve an altitude 2,500 
metres in a glider. However, in 1933 the Nazi Party banned all Jews from flying and Kronfeld 
moved to Austria to continue his passion before finally relocating to England in 1938 where 
he became a British citizen the following year. 75 Upon the outbreak of the Second World War 
Kronfeld joined the R.A.F. and was recorded on 3 October 1940 as a Pilot Officer on 
probation in the London Gazette 76 before he was posted to the D.U. where he remained on 
military glider development for the duration of the war.   
 
Development work began almost immediately and it was recorded in the D.U. 
Operation Records Book on 7 November that a tail trimming device had been fitted to a 
Minimoa glider 77 to add stability. 78 This was presumably one of the civilian gliders impressed 
into service by the Glider Training Squadron. 79 However, there is evidence to suggest that 
despite progress the fundamental strategic parameters of research and development 
required for the production of a British airborne capability remained undefined.   
 
In the meantime, Group Captain Harvey attempted to evaluate the envisaged 
functions of an airborne force in a document produced at Ringway on 31 October 1940 for 
the Air Staff. Harvey’s attempt at producing some form of strategic function and 
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corresponding developmental requirements was one of the first official policy documents 
produced for the fledgling British airborne capability: 
 
The development of very large air forces has made it possible for theatres 
of war to be changed almost overnight, particularly when air superiority 
enables the landing of airborne and seaborne troops. It is necessary 
therefore to consider to what extent a highly trained striking force, capable 
of being airborne, could influence operations within 500 miles from an air 
base. 80 
 
The appreciation of the strategic situation and scope of investigation was entirely accurate 
and it was also recognised from the outset that if Germany possessed such a force as 
described above this had serious implications upon the British army: 
 
Large numbers of our own troops are more or less immobilized in areas 
which may not be entirely favourable to our plans for this reason on this 
account. It has been stated that as many as 14 Divisions are employed on 
the guarding of vulnerable points largely because of the fear of attack in 
which airborne troops might be engaged. 81 
 
Harvey concluded that there were six potential functions that could be undertaken by 
airborne forces: 
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 Immobilisation of large numbers of enemy troops ‘in dispositions unfavourable to their 
strategy.’ 82 
 Form the spearhead for offensive action with a range of 500 miles from a suitable 
airfield. 
 Operate as a self-contained force for small localised action capable of being supplied 
by air. 
 Utilised for ‘planting’ of saboteurs, agents and other irregular troops in enemy 
territories.  
 Be utilised for air transport for towed gliders containing personnel, rations and 
equipment. The perceived advantage being that such a method of delivery would 
greatly supplement the scope of usefulness of operational bomber aircraft. 
 The ‘bringing into the war effort to a greater extent the woodworking trade’ 83 which 
could undertake the building of gliders.  
 
The potential functions were all feasible but required extensive technological investment and 
formalisation into a doctrine in which the efforts of all stakeholders could be focused to 
achieve maximum efficiency.  At the time of writing Harvey believed that 500 fully trained 
parachute troops could be available by March 1941; ‘1,000 lightly equipped’ glider-borne 
troops could be ready by September 1941, and an airborne force exceeding 3,000 could be 
made available ‘by concentrated effort’ in May 1942. 84 
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 Harvey’s report closed with a summary of the immediate decisions required if an 
airborne capability was to be made a reality. These included clarification of whether the 
aspiration was really going to be taken seriously, and if so, given the length of time required 
for training, was this to be available. Clarification was also sought as to whether a relatively 
small-scale development programme was required in the short term that could be expanded 
upon in the future if necessary. Such fundamental questions by the Commanding Officer of 
the C.L.E. suggests that very little policy development had taken place beyond Churchill’s 
initial minute calling for 5,000 parachute troops. 85 It is also interesting to note that there was 
no formal response produced by either the Air Ministry or War Office to Harvey’s document. 
The lack of clarity in both doctrine and concept remained prevalent throughout the entire 
research and development programme as will be evidenced from the variety of technological 
investigations undertaken.    
      
Despite the obvious deficiency in strategic policy, the D.U. soon began to address 
some of the fundamental technological challenges associated with the technique of glider 
towing and on 14 November 1940 a Cable Angle indicator had been designed and was 
undergoing tests.  The importance of the design and development of this particular 
instrument to the military effectiveness of glider forces will be discussed in detail later.   
 
Indeed, the work of the D.U. was a strange mixture of obsolescent machinery, as 
witnessed in the utilisation of redundant aircraft as tugs, and innovative technology. A 
pertinent example of such technology was the design and development of the Rotachute. 
The concept was for a one-man rotating wing parachute suitable for launching from aircraft 
that would give the paratroop the following advantage: 
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It was hoped that this type of parachute could be made steerable so that a 
more accurate approach to a particular spot on the ground could be made. 
It would have the further advantage of relieving the great demand on silk or 
similar material required for the conventional parachute. 86  
 
On 5 November 1940 it was recorded that a model Rotachute was launched successfully 
from a Tiger Moth aircraft and by the 11 November a full scale model weighting 300 lbs. had 
been assembled awaiting balloon test. 87 By 17 November 1940 general arrangement 
drawings had been completed for the manufacture of the Rotachute R.O.1. and more 
detailed drawings for components of a 10 foot Rotachute model were ready at the close of 
the month. 88 Early in 1941 Mr Grinstead, Deputy Director Research & Development 
Technical (D.D.R.D.T.) at M.A.P. had visited the A.R. III Construction Co., an independent 
specialist contractor, and the latter was subsequently tasked with the manufacture and 
development of the Rotachute. 89 
 .  
The general development of practical solutions to the problems encountered during 
paratrooping and glider towing remained the main responsibility of the unit and it was 
involved in a wide variety of research and experimentation in order to make deployment as 
efficient, safe and effective as possible. 90 Accidents remained a constant threat to the 
development programme and following the fatal incident on 19 November 1940 involving 
Corporal Carter a modified strop-hook was designed and issued to all paratroops (drawing 
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C.L.E. 2) on 27 November to prevent the recurrence of the static-line not being connected 
properly to an aircraft fuselage. 91  
 
A rapid research and design response to any technical problem encountered was 
crucial to minimise the potential for delay and allow training to commence with limited 
disruption. The method of deploying paratroops underwent constant refinement and further 
modifications were undertaken on 20 November to three Whitley aircraft that were fitted with 
tail wheel spats. Whitley K.7220 was also fitted with doors to close over static-line 
attachments to prevent premature detachment or interference. 92 
 
On 1 December 1940 the Development Unit was transferred from No. 22 Group to 
No. 70 Group, Army Co-operation Group, thus further reinforcing the diverse stakeholder 
relationship. Modification and conversion of a further 3 Whitley aircraft fitted with doors for 
closing over static-lines continued and on 10 December a system for dropping containers for 
service use from the bomb-bay of Whitley V aircraft was devised in conjunction with 
Armstrong Whitworth. 93 Close liaison with manufacturers was crucial to ensure the quick 
production of parts or modification to airframes for particular procedures not previously 
envisaged and on 17 December the D.U. completed a joint design project with Hawker 
Aircraft Co. in the manufacture of quick release mechanisms for glider tow ropes. 
 
In addition to the heavy development commitment the unit was also responsible for 
supporting its parent Establishment in preparation for exercises. On 12 December orders for 
an operational exercise were issued notifying the C.L.E. that they were required to take part 
‘employing troops transported by air and landed by parachutes and gliders.’ 94 The exercise 
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took place the following day at Tatton Park and was witnessed by the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, General Dill.  As interest by senior military officers and government officials in 
the work of the C.L.E. intensified the Establishment began to further expand to meet 
increased training requirements.  
On 30 December 1940 a movement order was issued with the intention of relocating 
a detachment of the Glider Training Squadron to R.A.F. Haddenham, near Thame in 
Buckinghamshire, where it was to ‘undertake the training of glider pilot instructors in 
accordance with a syllabus which will follow. Special instruction in regard to aircraft and 
glider flying will be issued.’ 95 The Temporary Headquarters was located at Yolsum House, 
Haddenham, under the Command of Squadron Leader Hervey and the relocation 
commenced between 31 December 1940 and 1 January 1941.  
 
Although the technical development, along with the supporting infrastructure, was 
proceeding Otway concedes that there was still a lack of clear policy with regard to the 
airborne concept and consequent direction of the research programme: 
 
 There was no clear idea as to how airborne forces would fit into the 
developing picture and therefore how they should be organized. 
Throughout 1940, and most of 1941, ideas on their employment were by no 
means definite and were not agreed either in principle or in detail by the 
two main organizations – the War Office and the Air Ministry. 96 
 
Such ambiguity does not suggest such forces were a strategic military priority and reaffirms 
the theory that airborne forces were more the result of the personal ambition of the Prime 
Minister in his capacity of Minister of Defence than the demands of the military 
establishment. Consequently, development had commenced without clear research 
                                               
95
 T.N.A., AIR 29/513, A.F.E.E. O.R.B. Appendices 1940-1942, 30 December 1940. 
96
 Otway, Airborne Forces, p. 25.  
95 
 
parameters which resulted in the design of glider aircraft that required tugs that were not then 
available and glider-borne troops that had yet to be identified. Yet, despite the confusion the 
British pressed ahead with operational planning in full knowledge of the strategic, tactical and 
operational limitations then apparent.     
Operation Colossus 
 
Before any further study of the Development Unit is undertaken attention must briefly 
turned to the parachute element of the airborne forces. On 10 February 1941 the 
technological investment in, and training of, these forces were applied operationally in the 
first British airborne operation of World War Two, codenamed Operation Colossus. The 
objective of the mission was primarily the destruction of the Tragino Aqueduct in southern 
Italy. 97 The operation itself involved only a small force of British parachutists and although 
the target was of dubious strategic military importance the mission had two specific 
objectives.  
 
Firstly, the operation was designed to lower the morale of the Italian civilian 
population by demonstrating that Italian home soil was not invulnerable to allied offensive 
action. Secondly, and more importantly, the operation was instigated to raise the morale of 
the British paratroopers under instruction at the Central Landing School, Ringway. Lack of 
aircraft and strategic direction meant that the initial intake of trainees qualified long before 
any actual operations had been conceived.  By February 1941, following intensive training, 
the parachute Commandos of No.11 S.A.S. Battalion had thus become restless and eager 
for offensive action. Indeed, the issue of morale amongst airborne forces remained a 
significant concern for allied commanders throughout the war, particularly as the 
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opportunities for the deployment of airborne troops became increasingly infrequent from D-
Day onwards. 98 
 
Fifty men, codenamed ‘Force X’, under the command of Major Pritchard of the Royal 
Welch Fusiliers, were assembled for the operation. Force X, which included a Royal 
Engineers demolition party and Italian interpreters, all underwent intensive, if not hurried, 
training for the operation using a mock-up of the aqueduct which had been erected at Tatton 
Park. The accuracy of the training programme can be attributed to the fact that the British 
military authorities possessed detailed plans of the Tragino aqueduct which had been 
passed onto them by a London-based firm of engineers who had been responsible for its 
design. 99 Although the model of the area constructed at Ringway proved valuable, the 
importance of accurate intelligence was highlighted as one of the most important lessons 
learnt from the operation when it was found that the target area contained two aqueducts 
rather than one. 100   
 
By 7 February the training was complete and Pritchard and his men emplaned in 
eight Armstrong Whitworth Whitley bombers at R.A.F. Mildenhall in Suffolk to commence a 
flight of nearly 1,000 miles to Malta. Force X arrived on 9 February where six of the Whitleys 
were loaded with weapons containers for the forthcoming operation whilst the other two 
aircraft were equipped with full bomb loads in order to facilitate a diversionary attack upon 
the railway marshalling yards at Foggia. Incidentally, a further eight Whitley bomber aircraft 
required modification to the airborne role before the operation was deemed logistically 
possible. 101 
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On 10 February the eight Whitleys left Malta on course for Italy. The drop zone was 
located close to the snow-capped Monte Vulture and somewhat down the mountain side in 
cultivated farmland. 102 The R.A.F. was tasked with the safe delivery of the airborne force to 
the drop zone but, once the parachutists had alighted from the aircraft, their responsibility 
ended and the airborne force was on its own. Once the objective was successfully 
neutralized the parachutists faced the most difficult part of any airborne operation: extraction.  
 
After Force X had succeeded in destroying their target they were required to 
withdraw on foot towards the mouth of the Sele River. An ambitious rendezvous had been 
organised for the evening of 15/16 February with the submarine HMS Triumph which would 
return the airborne troops to the United Kingdom. Five of the six Whitleys dropped their 
sticks of parachutists on target from where the airborne forces eventually retrieved their 
weapons and explosives from the parachute containers simultaneously dropped from the 
aircraft. The sappers made their way to the aqueduct encountering no opposition and laid 
the explosive charges and the structure was successfully breached.103      
 
Despite achieving total surprise and the successful destruction of the objective none of 
the fifty parachutists managed to make the rendezvous with HMS Triumph and most of the 
force was captured on the morning of 12 February, spending the rest of the war in captivity 
until the Italian surrender in September 1943. Anthony Deane-Drummond successfully 
escaped captivity but recalled his reaction upon learning of the extraction method in his 
memoirs:  
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I may say although the blowing up of the bridge had been practised and 
rehearsed to the minutest detail, the actual orders for getting to the coast 
were necessarily vague. 104 
 
The problem of successfully extracting airborne troops after they have achieved their primary 
objectives remained one of the most significant operational challenges throughout the war. 
Despite dedicated research and development the technology was not capable of ensuring 
self-sufficiency.   
 
Indeed, when news of Operation Colossus was reported in the British press The Times 
suggested that escape was impossible and ascribed a form of media martyrdom to those 
parachutists involved: 
 
The landing of British parachutists in a lonely part of south Italy, on the 
borders of the provinces of Lucania and Calabria, has caused great 
surprise in Italy at the daring of the whole enterprise and at the high spirit of 
sacrifice on the part of those engaged; for as far as one can guess escape 
is virtually impossible unless the object of the operation, which the Italians 
suggest to have been sabotage, was achieved quickly and the parachutists 
were taken quickly off. 105 
 
Although it is clear that the journals had no clue as to the method of evacuation allocated to 
the parachutists involved in Operation Colossus one cannot blame the correspondent for 
failing to comprehend how the force could possibly be retrieved once it had achieved its 
objective.  
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The operation had a limited strategic value. But it did provide the British with valuable 
information from an O.R. perspective that shaped future technological development. Aside 
from the obvious problems of extraction the method of dropping containers independently of 
the parachutists was scrutinised, particularly in terms of the delay between the parachutist 
landing and locating weapons. 106 Consequently, research and development into improving 
the carrying capacity of parachutes became a primary activity throughout the remainder of 
the war. One particular direct technological improvement was the incorporation of longer lift-
webs into the design of X Type parachute. 107 Lift-webs were first introduced to aircrew Irvin 
parachutes in the 1920s as described in a contemporary article: 
 
When near the ground and preparing for a landing, a sitting position in the 
harness is retained, but with the knees lower than the hips and muscles 
relaxed. Lift webs over the head are grasped and on the instant of contact 
with earth and before the parachute can collapse the body is lifted briskly 
by pulling on the lift webs. That action greatly helps to absorb the landing 
shock. Nothing is gained by merely lifting the body before the feet touch as 
the impact is merely delayed and not lessened. 108 
 
Lengthening the lift-webs allowed for the parachutist to carry more direct weight in the form 
of rifle valises 109 and kitbags 110 and subsequently reduced their dependency on supply 
containers.  
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Otway believed that such improvements to tactical and operational effectiveness, 
although technologically simple, could only be made through analysis obtained during 
operational conditions and believed that Colossus provided valuable ‘technological 
experience on which were based many of the later developments for parachutists aircraft 
and their equipment.’ 111 Unfortunately, considerable technological barriers had yet to be 
resolved and the development of the assault glider was deemed the most effective method 
of achieving military effectiveness.   
Glider Procurement & Development 
 
Following the Air Ministry recommendation for the development of the assault glider 
M.A.P. issued Specification X10/40, based upon Operational Requirement No.87 for a troop 
carrying glider. 112 General Aircraft Limited (G.A.L.) 113 won the tender and produced a 
prototype of their G.A.L. 48 Hotspur which made its maiden flight in February 1941. 114 
Although never used operationally the Hotspur proved a useful stopgap for training purposes 
and enabled the D.U. to experiment, evaluate and subsequently redesign the principles of 
assault gliders and towing techniques in an attempt to achieve the maximum possible 
military effectiveness in glider-borne operations. 115   
 
The procurement process for the acquisition of new military aircraft was based upon 
an Operational Requirement, a general description of the aircraft type, which was then 
issued by M.A.P.  to the aviation industry for the purpose of producing a manufacturers’ 
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tender. 116 The table below lists the specification, corresponding Operational Requirement, 
and name of the main glider types utilised by British airborne forces in both training and 
operational capacities during World War Two. The ‘X’ was the M.A.P. designation letter for 
an unpowered aircraft; the first number denoted the specification number; and the final 
number referred to the year of issue.  
 
Specification O.R. Description Glider Manufacturer 
X.10/40 O.R. 87 Troop Carrying Glider (7 troops) Hotspur I General Aircraft Ltd.  
X.22/40 O.R. 87 Production Order Hotspur II General Aircraft Ltd. 
X. 23/40 O.R. 87 Production Order Hotspur II General Aircraft Ltd. 
X. 25/40 O.R. 98 Troop Carrying Glider (14 Troops) Hengist Slingsby Sailplanes Ltd. 
X. 26/40 O.R. 99 Troop Carry Glider (24-36 Troops) Horsa Airspeed Ltd. 
X.27/40 O.R. 
100 
Cargo Glider Capable of Carrying 7 Ton Hamilcar General Aircraft Ltd. 
 
Table 1: Operational Requirements Issued by M.A.P. for Unpowered Aircraft 
Source: Author 
 
It was the responsibility of the D.U. to coordinate the development programme and 
work closely with successful manufacturers to ensure that the final production version of the 
specified type was suitable for its intended military purpose. On 1 January 1941 the first 
reference to the Hengist glider was recorded when Wing Commander Buxton and Mr 
Shackleton visited Slingsby Sailplanes Ltd. at Kirbymoorside 117 to inspect mock-up of the 
glider to Specification 25/40 and agree modifications. 118 Clearly, Shackleton was involved in 
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the process of glider procurement as noted in previous correspondence between the M.A.P. 
and the Treasury. 119 D.U. staff attended regular conferences with Slingsby during the 
development of the Hengist, four in January alone, 120 but despite extensive research and 
development the glider did not enter production beyond prototype stage.  
Despite the Hengist only being in the mock-up stage of development the expectation 
for success was high and exercises were carried out to simulate the future landing of large 
bodies of troops by glider. On 2 January Exercise Instruction No. 4 was received in which the 
C.L.E. was required to participate in Operation ‘Dragon’ which was conducted between 5 
and 8 January 1941. The exercise was ‘for the purpose of demonstrating how troops may be 
transported by air and surprise pin-point landings made at predetermined places by 
parachute and gliders.’ 121 It was noted that although the actual number of airborne forces 
taking part was relatively small, it was intended to show that much larger numbers could be 
employed when necessary. 122 
 
Meanwhile, a close working relationship with contractors was vital in the development 
of all associated airborne materiel. On 2 January Wing Commander Buxton visited Mr 
Lobelle of Messrs R. Malcolm Limited at Slough 123 to discuss the redesign of towing gear for 
gliders and on the following day visited Messrs Sperry Ltd. 124 to discuss the design and 
manufacture of limitless artificial horizons and de-icing instruments. 125 
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The utilisation of obsolete airframes for training purposes continued out of necessity 
and on 10 January 1941 representatives from the D.U. travelled to R.A.F. Tern Hill in 
Shropshire to deduce the suitability of Bristol Bombay aircraft for further parachute training 
purposes. 126 Two days later Mr Quilter, of G.Q. Parachute Co Ltd., Woking, attended 
Ringway to discuss parachute fittings for the Bombay and the aircraft. 127 
 
January 1941 was a particularly busy month and presented further opportunities for 
the D.U. to influence the development of the assault gliders under production.  On 14 
January Wing Commander Buxton attended an R.A.E. conference to discuss the prototype 
G.A.L. Hotspur glider and on 21 January the first test flight was conducted by Flying Officer 
Davie and Flying Officer Kronfeld.  What is interesting about the involvement of Davie and 
Kronfeld in the first test flight of the Hotspur is that it did not conform to established 
procedure whereby initial tests of all aircraft were supposed to be undertaken at 
Farnborough, thus further illustrating the confusion with regard to roles and responsibilities in 
the field of technological development that undoubtedly originated from the lack of strategic 
direction.   
 
The R.A.E. was responsible for all initial type trials for new aircraft and, in the case of 
gliders, C.L.E. was then supposed to conduct operational trials. However, the necessity of 
rapid development may well have taken precedence over protocol. Once the initial type trials 
were completed the next phase of the development process involved detailed collaboration 
between the D.U. and G.A.L. to evaluate the flying characteristics of the aircraft and identify 
any necessary modifications.   
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With the Hotspur in development, the Horsa encountered problems. Following the 
issue of Specification X.26/40, and the subsequent award of the contract, Airspeed began 
design work on the Horsa in December 1940 at Salisbury Hall in Hertfordshire and the 
project was closely supervised by the company’s Technical Director, Hessel Tiltman. 
Airspeed was originally housed in the unlikely location of a disused bus-depot in York but 
had moved to Portsmouth aerodrome in 1933 when orders outweighed production 
capabilities. 128 
 
Following the purchase of the majority of the company shares by De Havilland in 
1940 the design department was relocated to Salisbury Hall. 129 Historians have often 
expressed astonishment that it only took ten months for the first prototype Horsa aircraft to 
make its maiden flight in September 1941 as Postan noted:  
 
When the airframe was single in design and construction; when its design 
was not linked with the hazards of a parallel engine development; when the 
operational requirements were simple and above all did not impose on the 
design a multiplicity of operational roles; when the ‘users’ made up their 
minds early and did not find themselves under the compulsion to modify 
the original design by stages; where new and identical capacity not 
previously engaged in the design and production of other types could be 
brought in, it proved possible to put airframes (in this case gliders) into the 
air with very little trouble or delay. 130     
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However, there was evidence that the design and production process was not without 
difficulty. 131 The following entry was recorded in the D.U. Operation Records Book on 15 
January 1941 and suggests that the research, design and production of the aircraft was in 
no way near as efficient as has previously been assumed: 
 
Wing Commander Buxton inspected mock-up of 26/40 glider at Messrs Airspeed 
Ltd. Flying Officer Davie visited Messrs Phillips & Powis Ltd., later Miles Aircraft 
Ltd., a subcontractor for the Horsa based in Reading to discuss the design and 
the reason for the slow progress. It was deduced that this was due to the 
company being unwilling to invest in the programme without a clear future policy 
and consequently a guarantee of future return on their investment. 132 
 
The reluctance of Messrs Phillips & Powis 133 to invest in the production of the Horsa 
indicates that the industry did not have confidence that the airborne forces’ programme 
would be completed. However, it could also have resulted from the introduction of complex 
competitive tendering frameworks and fixed priced contracts which capped sub-contractor 
profit margins. 134 These additional contractual restrictions coupled with the complexity and 
uncertainty of the glider procurement processes may well have been the source of sub-
contractor reluctance.  
 
The manufacture of gliders was highly dependent upon the work of non-aviation 
specialist sub-contractors and the materials chosen for their construction were primarily non-
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essential, but this still required assurance to the industries involved that their initial 
investment in production capacity would be rewarded. Consequently, the gliders were 
manufactured almost entirely from wood in numerous sections before final assembly at 
R.A.F. Maintenance Units (M.U.) and their associated Aircraft Storage Units (A.S.U.s). It 
would appear that certain sub-contractors were unwilling to invest in the Horsa programme 
without the guarantee of future orders to justify the capital outlay in materials, equipment and 
personnel. There was certainly evidence that glider production was being delayed as late as 
1944 due to lack of components from sub-contractors. 135 
 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the second Hotspur Glider (B.V. 138) was delivered 
on 6 February after modification to the ailerons, upon the recommendation from the D.U. 
Test flights were undertaken at R.A.E. Farnborough on 10 February, this time in accordance 
with protocol, and the following day B.V. 138 underwent operational performance trials at 
Ringway and the modifications were considered ‘a great improvement on first model.’ 136 
 
Close liaison with contractors continued and on 12 February Flying Officer Kronfeld 
attended a further meeting at Slingsby regarding the Hengist and Wing Commander Buxton 
and Flying Officer Kronfeld visited again on 22 February. 137 Similarly, numerous meetings 
were held regarding the development of the Horsa and on 17 February Wing Commander 
Buxton visited Airpseed Ltd. On 21 February Flying Officer Davie visited Philip & Powis Ltd., 
Bracknell, to discuss the Horsa design and Flying Officer Davie flew from R.A.F. Thame to 
inspect the glider mock-up the following day. 138 However, despite the close liaison between 
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client and manufacturer the future composition of the airborne force was still undecided and 
the type of loads to be carried largely undefined. 139  
 
Flight tests of the Hotspur produced valuable information in relation to the 
functionality of glider/tug combinations and resulted in numerous modifications and 
improvements. On 13 March 1941 Mr Boothroyd, a G.A.L. draughtsman, visited the D.U. at 
Ringway literally to draw the necessary modifications to the Hotspur glider whilst on site. 140 
Following further development and modification the third Hotspur glider, B.V. 140, was 
delivered on 17 March to R.A.E. for evaluation flights.  
 
Despite the intensity of the development programme and the innovative nature of the 
work in progress on 1 March 1941 Wing Commander Buxton was unexpectedly attached to 
R.A.F. Church Fenton for temporary engineering duties. Flying Officer Davie assumed 
command of the Unit and was replaced by Flight Lieutenant Williams upon his return from 
leave.  On 14 March information was received that Buxton had been permanently posted to 
No. 54 (Night-Fighter) O.T.U. which left the Unit under temporary command at a crucial 
period in the development programme. The situation was not rectified until 9 April 1941 when 
Squadron Leader Brie R.A.F.O. was posted from 74 Wing and assumed command. Brie was 
subsequently appointed to the unpaid Acting Rank of Wing Commander on 1 June 1941. 141 
Further reorganisation commenced on 19 March when Flying Officer Kronfeld and Flying 
Officer Pitkethley were transferred from D.U. Flight to Development Unit Headquarters staff 
for design and modification work. 
  
Flight trials with the Hotspur glider formed an integral part of the research programme, 
during this period but the tug aircraft available remained inadequate for operational 
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purposes. The primary aircraft available was the Hawker Hector 142 and on 27 March 1941 
initial test flights were conducted with Hotspur B.V. 140 and Hector No. 9755. After tug pilot 
procedures had been established a twenty minute satisfactory general flying test was 
undertaken with the combination on 30 March but the Hector remained underpowered.  
 
Following further research and evaluation flights by the D.U. it was considered that the 
Hotspur could be demonstrated to the Glider Training Squadron.  Consequently, Hotspur 
B.V. 140 was transported by road to Haddenham on 5 April 1941 and this was followed by a 
liaison visit from Flying Officer Fender to brief flying personnel about the handling 
characteristics of the aircraft. 143 
 
Research and development on all equipment associated with assault gliders was also 
an on-going responsibility of the D.U.  Following a visit on 21 March to discuss the 
development of tow cables by Mr Farquharson and Mr Lobelle of Messrs R. Malcolm Ltd, 
tests were conducted on 12 April of tow ropes that had been manufactured from 300 feet of 
manila rope and 50 feet of wire cabling. 144 Two tows of the Hotspur glider towed by a Hector 
tug proved satisfactory. 145  
 
Following this, on 21 April Mr Shackleton held a conference with Squadron Leader Brie 
at R.A.F. Ringway regarding the Hotspur glider and the first performance tests were 
conducted on the Hotspur with B.V. 138 glider and Hector tug.  By 26 April the work of the 
unit had attracted sufficient interest to warrant a visit by the Prime Minister and Air Marshal 
Barratt, Air Officer-Commanding-in-Chief No. 70 Group. Personnel from the D.U. gave a 
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demonstration of the Hotspur glider and a mock-up of the Horsa glider arrived by road from 
the Airspeed factory at London Colney. 146 Yet Otway suggests Churchill was not entirely 
impressed:  
 
He was left in no doubt as to the hopelessness of accomplishing the 
ambitious programme laid down six months earlier, if the existing priorities 
for allotment of resources were to remain. 147 
 
 After all the initial investment the demonstration only comprised parachute drops from six 
Whitleys, the landing of five civilian sailplanes and the lone Hotspur.  
 
By May 1941 the D.U. began to consider the further application of technology to 
enhance the overall tactical and operational effectiveness of glider and tug combinations. 
One obvious advantage was the ability of the pilots of both aircraft to communicate in flight 
and on 10 May 1941 Captain North, Army liaison officer, visited R.A.E. Farnborough to 
discuss experiments on glider-tug communication techniques. By 16 June research and 
development had progressed sufficiently for the first flight tests to be conducted by which 
observers of both tug aircraft and glider could communicate whilst in flight. Lieutenant 
Peacock visited R.A.E. Farnborough on 2 July and discussed the test carried out into inter-
communication between tug and glider. The telephone sets and tug ropes under 
investigation by R.A.E. were subsequently brought back to Ringway for further 
experimentation by D.U. 148  
 
The functionality of the gliders in development was also being considered with 
particular reference to load capability, despite no official strategic requirement being issued. 
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On 14 May experiments were conducted on new flooring for the loading ramp and the 
fuselage opening of the Horsa glider. These were installed in the mock-up by Airspeed. 
Interestingly, army troops were used for the test and this may well represent the first time 
that the end-user was introduced to their future method of operational deployment.  149  
Technological Innovation 
 
Another aspect of potential future functionality under investigation was the utilisation of 
the Hotspur, 150 Hengist and Horsa for paratrooping. The possibility was first presented in a 
report on 12 September 1940 by Flight Lieutenant Hodges, C.L.S. Intelligence Officer, at the 
Central Landing School, following a discussion that had taken place at an Air Ministry 
meeting earlier that month. Hodges argued for the gliders then under development to be 
designed with exit doors in order to facilitate future experimentation to prove the feasibility, or 
otherwise, of parachuting from gliders. He concluded that: 
 
If this proves to be a practical proposition, and the towing of gliders can be 
successfully undertaken at night, my belief is that such a method would 
enable troops to be landed in greater safety and with greater definiteness 
as regards place and time. 151 
 
Ultimately, Hodge’s was advocating the disembarkation of parachute troops from a glider in 
preference to the disembarkation of air-landed troops by landing the glider on the site of an 
operation. This would only be undertaken once suitable preparations had been made on the 
ground to receive the glider-borne troops and equipment.  
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 In essence the theory was entirely logical in both ensuring the accuracy of delivery 
and providing a prepared environment for the eventual landing of gliders. However, the 
Intelligence Officer failed to appreciate the scientific and technological limitations of such a 
proposal, as was evident from his closing paragraph: 
 
Can we not envisage Whitley bombers, with little, if any modification, 
towing maybe two or three, troop-carrying gliders, each with 30 men, 
disembarking their ‘goods’ by parachute at a predetermined site and at a 
pre-arranged time; and then, having successfully disposed of their loads, 
returning with their appendages to the greater security of this Island? 152 
 
Despite Hodge’s enthusiasm the towing of gliders proved far more difficult than anyone first 
perceived and the availability of aircraft capable of such a task, let alone the necessary 
modifications, ultimately limited both the tactical and operational effectiveness of the airborne 
force throughout the course of the conflict. The opinion was typical of the time and a gross 
underestimation of the technological and materiel investment required.    
  
Nevertheless, on 15 July 1941 Flying Officer Pitkethly, along with M.A.P. 
representatives, visited the works of Harris Lebus in Tottenham to attend a conference on 
the subject of parachute static-lines for the Horsa glider: 153  
 
It had previously been decided that the strop panel layout for the sides of the 
machine as in Whitley aircraft was definitely out of the question for the Horsa and 
a mock-up of a proposed rail type attachment was fitted to the prototype of the 
Horsa glider by Messrs Lebus. The mock-up was inspected and considered 
satisfactory in the aft door position but not in the forward position. For the forward 
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door it was decided that the rail should be placed directly athwartships, instead of 
diagonally in the roof. This gives a much better layout of the men at ‘action 
stations’ and will allow a more rapid stick of paratroops to be dropped. 154 
 
Although the concept of using gliders for the deployment of parachutists was discussed with 
contractors during the development phase it took nearly two years before detailed flight trials 
and performance tests were undertaken. 
 
Between April 1943 and March 1944 a series of flight trials were conducted at the 
A.F.E.E. that had the potential to fundamentally alter the entire character and military 
effectiveness of glider-borne operations in the final years of the war. The final report, not 
issued until May 1944, outlined the parameters for the investigation: 
 
[To] investigate whether the Horsa I glider was suitable for paratroop 
operations involving the dropping of sticks of troops simultaneously from 
both fuselage doors together with containers from the wing cells, and if so 
the most suitable installation was to be determined and tested, making the 
minimum possible modifications and additions to the airframe. 155 
 
The investigation was to ascertain whether the Horsa assault could be effectively utilised as 
a rather elaborate airborne ‘trailer’ or ‘caravan’. Under this arrangement the tug aircraft could 
also contain a stick of parachutists or be bulk loaded with supplies for use by the 
parachutists once they had landed. The report continued: 
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In the original design of the Horsa, at a stage when it was considered that 
the glider might be required for paratrooping, certain equipment was 
incorporated including two strong points in the fuselage, and container 
racks in the wings with a manually operated release in the fuselage. This 
equipment was not used as the requirement was held in abeyance for a 
considerable time. When the glider was again considered for paratrooping 
and tests were put in hand at this establishment it was found that the above 
equipment was unsatisfactory and a considerable amount of modification 
was necessary. This report covers paratrooping from the Horsa whether or 
not simultaneous dropping from the tug and glider occurs, and a drill and 
technique have been included which are applicable in both cases. 156  
      
The ‘airborne caravan’ technique certainly had a considerable number of advantages 
and this may well have explained the suggestion by the Air Ministry that gliders had the 
potential to be more effective for the delivery of airborne troops. 157 The most obvious 
advantage was the increase in the number of parachutists capable of being deployed at any 
one time. The need for a purpose-built aircraft for use by airborne soldiers remained the 
most restrictive factor in Britain’s capability to launch large-scale airborne operations 
throughout the war.  
 
Consequently, British airborne forces were dependent upon American troop-carrier 
resources during the majority of operations in which they were involved. However, the 
utilisation of the Horsa glider airframe to extend the parachute carrying capabilities of 
modified bomber aircraft could not only potentially improve the military effectiveness of the 
British force but also enable them to operate autonomously.  
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The use of the Horsa glider would also have been far cheaper than developing a 
bespoke British-built aircraft specifically for the airborne/transport role and would this would 
have undoubtedly  been agreeable to the R.A.F. which would have been, to a large extent, 
absolved of its responsibility to continually source aircraft for conversion. The paratroop 
option could also have potentially reduced the attrition rate of another significant commodity 
in the glider-borne aspect of airborne operations, namely glider pilots. 158 
 
It is most likely that the perceived operational advantages of this method of 
deployment were major factors in the comprehensive and meticulous nature of the A.F.E.E.  
investigation. This encompassed the following parameters: 
 
 Design of suitable installation with necessary modification to the glider 
 Investigation of strop length of both doors to ensure safe development of the 
parachutes 
 Jumping technique and investigation of stick length at normal dropping 
speeds  
 Dropping containers with and without delaying devices in a stick of men 
 Handling technique for dropping 
 Retrieval of strops and bags after use 
 Loading for 10, 15 and 20 paratroopers 
 Movement of centre of gravity position of glider.  159 
 
All of the above required detailed analysis and continuous testing in order to ensure the 
technique was practicable for operational use. In the eleven months of testing which began 
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in April 1943 some 320 live parachute descents were made from the Horsa glider 160 as the 
technique was developed, evaluated, and finally perfected. The following conclusions were 
drawn: 
 
(1) With the modifications and additions described in this report the Horsa I 
is considered suitable for carrying and dropping 20 fully equipped 
paratroops with or without twenty 40 lb. kitbags or rifle valises, or 
thirteen 60 lb. kitbags. A crew of four must be carried consisting of two 
pilots and two dispatchers. 
 
(2) Mk III containers loaded to 350 lbs. may only may be carried and 
dropped from any of the eight racks, with the provision that the racks, 
other than the outer one on each wing are used, the undercarriage 
must be jettisoned. Mk III containers loaded to 400 lbs. may be carried 
on any or all of the inboard and outboard racks. Delay devices should 
always be used on the containers in order to avoid interference.  
 
(3) The containers are released by manually operated switches, either from 
the pilot’s or the dispatcher’s position the undercarriage. The strop 
length for the rear door is ten inches. 161 
 
Such analyses crucial to the development of the A.F.E.E.’s future research programme. 
However, despite the perceptiveness of the C.L.E. personnel the reality of developing a 
concept to the point of implementation was a substantially longer process, and this attracted 
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significant criticism from Major-General Browning in September 1942. 162 Technological 
investigations will be discussed in detail below.  
Conclusion 
 
Notwithstanding the change of strategic direction whereby glider development 
assumed precedence over the enlargement of the parachute force, 163 there remained some 
fundamental over-riding obstacles that not only delayed physical and technological 
development but also brought into question the future sustainability of the airborne capability 
and its ultimate operational and tactical effectiveness. On 5 December 1940 the Vice Chief 
of the Air Staff produced a minute entitled ‘Training of Airborne Forces’ and concluded that: 
 
A most important point is that all progress is being delayed by the lack of a 
decision by the Chiefs of Staff with regard to the details and the date of the 
proposed airborne operation. Without such a decision it is impossible to 
decide the priorities which are necessary if the development of that 
airborne force is to proceed. 164 
 
Although one must be wary of the blame being apportioned solely to the Chiefs of Staff the 
essence of the argument was accurate. Without clear strategic parameters the technological 
development of the airborne capability could not be conducted in a logical and efficient 
manner. Consequently, the lack of consensus regarding future deployment meant that 
strategic effectiveness, particularly in terms of offensive operation, was severely 
compromised.  
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Despite the creation of the Development Unit the majority of the research and 
development was relatively straightforward; a programme that Buckingham has described as 
‘prosaic’. 165 Apart from the glider programme the bulk of the research was focused upon the 
conversion of existing military technology for application in the airborne role. However, the 
technological investment could not reconcile the restriction in available resources, 
particularly with regard to aircraft that were simply not designed to accommodate 
parachutists or tow gliders.     
  
 The Air Ministry recommendation that gliders were a more suitable means of troop 
movement than deployment by parachutist not only resulted in the need for significant 
technological and scientific investigation but also created further pressure on the R.A.F. to 
provide aircraft.  The problem was effectively doubled in that the Air Ministry not only had to 
find aircraft suitable for conversion to the parachute role but also aircraft that could be 
utilised as glider tugs. The technological development of the glider programme was 
undoubtedly a success and the design and associated hardware were produced both quickly 
and efficiently but the aircraft resources required to achieve overall military effectiveness 
remained unattainable.  
 
Investigation into the capability of all glider types produced for the deployment of 
parachutists offered an interesting operational and tactical alternative but ultimately did not 
overcome the need for a suitable tug aircraft. Similarly, as the capacity of the Horsa and 
Hamilcar gliders was increased to meet operational requirements, inadequate consideration 
was given to the availability and suitability of existing aircraft for the purpose of towing. 
Consequently, disconnect existed between the limitations and availability of aircraft 
resources and the aspiration, or vagueness, of the airborne doctrine that could not be 
resolved by the professionalization of either the scientific or technological resources 
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committed to the airborne forces programme in 1941. The investment in the Airborne Forces 
Experimental Establishment the following year, a dedicated research and experimental 
facility, simply confirmed the materiel deficiencies and exploration of the scientific and 
technological detail is required to fully appreciate these restrictions.       
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Chapter Three: Experimental Flight &Technical 
Development Section 
Introduction  
 
 The multiple stakeholders involved in the development of airborne technology as 
evidenced in previous chapters, combined with an absence of strategic direction, 1  resulted 
in inevitable duplication with regards to responsibilities, particularly in certain areas of the 
research programme. Despite the robustness of the central government administration 
strategic ambiguity resulted in difficulties implementing the technical development 
programme and subsequent co-ordinated planning at the tactical and operational level.  
 
Although Otway considers the creation of airborne forces testament to the close co-
operation between the Army and R.A.F., 2 Greenacre has argued that despite the harmony 
of the central administration there was little evidence that such coordination existed below 
the political aspirations of the Minister of Defence: 
 
Fundamental disagreements over the structure, organisation and 
employment of future airborne forces became impossible to resolve at 
Chiefs of Staff level. 3   
 
Consequently, without an established concept and doctrine the technological development 
was inevitably slow and involved abortive and repetitive research. Whilst the Joint Planning 
Staff were working on airborne policy the Directorate of Combined Operations was 
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simultaneously deploying the airborne capability and reviewing the intelligence gathered by 
means of O.R. Until a clear strategic direction was determined the technological 
development programme was frequently reviewed and culminated in the formation of the 
A.F.E.E. in 1942. But it could not reconcile the fact that production almost always preceded 
development.  
 
The chapter examines the gradual professionalization of the research and 
development programme and the methodology upon which future technical investigations 
were conducted and reported. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities the often 
self-identified aspirations of the technical development programme could not be achieved.  
Clarification of Roles and Responsibilities 
 
By April 1941 it had become apparent that there was a duplication of responsibilities 
between C.L.E., M.A.P.  R.A.E. and greater clarity was required. Consequently, Air Marshal 
R.M. Hill, Director-General Research and Development (D.G.R.D.) at the Air Ministry, called 
a conference on 16 April to ascertain the relative responsibilities of M.A.P. and C.L.E. 4 The 
research areas in question comprised glider development, the development and application 
of associated technology, and the design of specialist equipment for trials of apparatus used 
in landing operations. The conference was attended by representatives of all stakeholder 
groups including the Air Ministry, War Office and M.A.P. (See Appendix 5)  
 
Hill opened the conference and stated that there was confusion, due to lack of 
strategic direction, as to what aspects of research and development should be conducted at 
C.L.E., M.A.P., and R.A.E.  He believed that this was mainly due to the rapid growth of the 
C.L.E. and that it had subsequently become ‘essential to organise the development work at 
the Establishment to meet the needs of all concerned in the various spheres of work 
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undertaken.’ 5 The lack of direction, as recognised by the Air Ministry, was further evidence 
that development of the airborne concept was difficult to coordinate efficiently due to the 
ambiguity of the doctrine. 6  
 
The conference also aimed to determine to what extent the work was technical, 
experimental and operational in order to ensure that development responsibilities were 
allocated to the most suitable establishment. Major Curme, Operational Requirements 
(A.M.), gave a brief explanation of the origin of the C.L.E: 
 
Its original purpose was the training of parachutists following the wish 
expressed by the Prime Minister that 5,000 parachutists should be 
trained. Its official formation followed a conference held on September 5 
1940, and was sponsored by D.M.C. It was decided at that conference 
that the C.L.E. should comprise three sections: Parachute Training 
Section, Glider Training Section and Technical Development Section 7 
 
It is interesting to note that no reference to technical development was noted yet despite a 
lack of official sanction for development D.G.R.D. emphasised that no criticism was directed 
against the C.L.E. and that the initiative shown by them in finding solutions to technical 
difficulties under exceptional circumstances was admirable.  
 
However, C.L.E. had now reached a stage whereby ‘it was considered dangerous to 
allow it to continue to grow without proper organisation in relation to other branches 
associated with glider and parachute development.’ 8  It was also believed that past 
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experience had proved that technical development and operational work were best 
separated. Although this amalgamation of roles had worked perfectly well at C.L.E. from the 
perspective of providing technical solutions it had not conformed to established  
procedures. 9  
 
Air Commodore Mansell, Air Ministry Director of Operational Requirements (D.O.R.), 
referenced instances where C.L.E. had initiated investigation of technical points affecting 
policy without consultation or reference to the Air Staff. One such example was the direct 
instruction to G.A.L. regarding modification to the Hotspur. He also highlighted further 
occasions where the C.L.E. had not followed procedure and had given instruction to a 
variety of manufacturing firms without first approaching the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff 
responsible for Tactics and Requirements, A.C.A.S. (T).   
 
However, in defence of the C.L.E., the confusion with regard to protocol probably 
originated from the instruction from the Director of Combined Operations on  8 August 1940 
that the C.L.S. was responsible for the production of ‘glider carrying aircraft’ and the 
subsequent establishment of the Glider Flight at Ringway. 10 The strong political backing was 
certainly not complemented by strategic guidance in the organisation of those stakeholders 
responsible for development.  
 
The apparent disregard of formal process could well have resulted in all future 
technical development work being placed with establishments outside the C.L.E., however, it 
was instead decided that a Technical Development Section (T.D.S.) should be set up at 
Ringway under the direct control of M.A.P. to undertake the following parameters of 
operation. It would be under D.T.D control, M.A.P. would be responsible for administration, 
the head of the Section would be a P.T.O. and there should be a civilian technical staff 
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sufficient to cope with the technical and scientific work assigned to it. The T.D.S. would be 
responsible for dealing with technical problems arising from operational experience and 
would answer technical questions in connection with the use of different types of aircraft for 
parachutists. It would consider C.L.E. proposals for modifications but they would be 
submitted to D.T.D. for final approval. Questions affecting strategic policy would be referred 
by the Unit to the Air Ministry through the normal channels and no action on such questions 
would be taken by the T.D.S. without prior Air Ministry agreement. 11 In addition to the duties 
outlined above the Section was required to produce periodical technical reports.  
 
It was concluded that the T.D.S. would be mainly focused upon the experimental, 
technological and research aspects of the work; and that the new Section would not alter the 
existing procedure whereby gliders went to R.A.E. for type trials before C.L.E. for operational 
trials. Close liaison was envisaged between the C.L.E. and the R.A.E. so that personnel form 
Ringway could take part in the type trials in order that the end-user could influence design 
during the development stages. 12 In reality, with regard to glider, this had already been 
happening but the arrangement was a retrospective approval of process. 
 
The principles regarding the terms of engagement for the T.D.S. were thus 
comprehensively established. The advantage of the Section working closely with the C.L.E., 
although it was to be administered by M.A.P., was that technical questions could be both 
identified and answered swiftly. However, Hill was determined to ensure that all future 
technical investigation, and subsequent solutions, followed the correct procedures and that 
the C.L.E. conformed to conventional practice.   Consequently, on 5 August 1941 the 
Development Unit was reorganised and divided into two separate sections: Experimental 
Flight and the Technical Development Section. The creation of these two sections was the 
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second stage in the evolution of the technological aspect of the airborne forces and formal 
recognition of its contribution towards tactical and operational development. 13 
 
The Experimental Flight comprised all personnel from the D.U. flight and was put 
under the command of Flight Lieutenant Fender. The Technical Development Section 
comprised the remaining officers and sufficient other ranks for technical purposes 
strengthened by the addition of nine civilian scientific staff from M.A.P., one of whom, Dr 
Bennett, assumed control as Chief Technical Officer (C.T.O.). 14  
 
However, the inconsistency with regards to roles and responsibilities was not simply 
confined to research establishments and friction was also evident within central government. 
Greenacre argues that this was essentially due to a ‘lack of coordination across the many 
ministries and departments’ 15 involved in the development of the airborne force. This was 
particularly apparent in the development of suitable aircraft. The War Office, Air Ministry, 
M.A.P. and the Ministry of Supply were all heavily involved in this matter but no one 
department was responsible for clear direction of the programme or with the executive 
authority to make decisions. 16 Consequently, technical coordination was increasingly difficult 
and thus was reflected in the work of the T.D.S.  
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 T.N.A., AIR 29/512, D.U. Ringway, 5 August 1941. 
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 Dr. J.A.J. Bennett was a pioneer of helicopter flight and designed the C-40 Autogiro, the first direct 
lift aircraft. Bennett worked for Fairey Aviation in the post war period and became Professor of 
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 Greenacre, Churchill’s Spearhead, p.71.  
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Scope of Technological Development and Investigation 
 
On 8 August a meeting was held at the Ministry of Aircraft Production in Millbank, 
London, to deduce the parameters of the research programme of the Technical 
Development Section at Ringway. 17 The conference was attended by the following 
personnel: 
 
Ministry of Aircraft Production 
Mr Grinsted (D.D.R.D.T.) (Chairman) 
Dr Roxbee Cox  (D.D.S.R.1.) 
Captain Liptrot (A.D.R.D.T. 1.) 
Dr Walker (A.D.R.D.L.) 
Squadron Leader Hayes (R.D.T.2.) 
Central Landing Establishment 
Group Captain Harvey (C.O.) 
Wing Commander Norman (S.A.S.O.) 
Dr Bennett (C.T.O.) 
No. 70 Group 
Squadron Leader Colebrook (D.M.C.) 
Squadron Leader MacPherson (A.C.) 
18
 
 
Table 2: List of Delegates for M.A.P. Conference 8 August 1941  
Source: T.N.A., AIR 29/513, Technical Development Section Conference, 8 August 1941 
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The meeting settled the organisation of the Technical Development Section, broadly in line 
with the recommendation of D.G.R.D., and the roles and responsibilities of key personnel. 
The Section was to be organised upon the same principles as other Ministry of Aircraft 
Production research Establishments whereby the C.T.O., Dr Bennett, was responsible 
directly to Group Captain Harvey as Commanding Officer of the C.L.E. for all aspects of 
Station compliance but general administration and research and experimental work was 
coordinated by M.A.P.  
 
Consequently, Dr Bennett oversaw the technical element of the C.L.E.’s activities and 
M.A.P. corresponded directly with him on all contractual and design matters. 19 It was also 
agreed that a monthly report of the technical work undertaken at C.L.E. would be compiled 
by the Head of the Section and a quarterly meeting at M.A.P. would be instigated to discuss 
the technical programme and ascertain future direction and policy.  
 
The work of the Technical Development Section was thus invariably initiated by 
M.A.P., and on occasion by the Commanding Officer of the Establishment. The Chief 
Technical Officer was required to maintain close contact with M.A.P. Headquarters and 
frequently visit R.A.E. for research purposes. The Section effectively became a separate 
entity within the Central Landing Establishment and consisted of the Glider Training 
Squadron (G.T.S.), Parachute Training Squadron (P.T.S.), Exercise Unit (E.U.), 
Experimental Flight (E. Ft.) and the Technical Development Section (T.D.S.). 20 
The research and development remit of the Technical Development Section broadly 
comprised the following responsibilities which will be examined thematically: 
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Trials and Development of Gliders: 
 
The work of the C.L.E. and M.A.P. remained intrinsically linked through the R.A.E. 
which maintained all responsibility for the first flight trials of any prototype aircraft with the 
aim of determining whether it was, in essence, a ‘good aeroplane.’ Once the initial 
examinations had been satisfactorily completed all further development was undertaken by 
the C.L.E. which was responsible for carrying out performance trials broadly in line with 
those of other Service aircraft conducted at Boscombe Down. 21  
 
Glider Equipment: 
 
Technical development was solely the responsibility of the T.D.S. and it was 
concluded that the C.L.E. would ‘undertake the development of special equipment for use in 
the operation of gliders, experimental equipment for trials of gliders and apparatus used in 
landing operations.’ 22  
 
Gliders under Construction by Contractors: 
 
Representatives of the T.D.S. and M.A.P. were required to make joint visits to firms to 
discuss technical and prototype development. The Chief Technical Officer was authorised to 
instruct contractors by telephone as long as M.A.P. was informed and retained control over 
the prioritisation of contractor performance and development schedules.  
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 T.N.A., 29/513, A.F.E.E. O.R.B. Appendices 1940-1942, 8 August 1941. 
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Parachutes: 
 
The T.D.S. assumed responsibility for the testing and development of parachutes 
relating to paratroops and equipment in line with Army requirements. The remit of the T.D.S. 
fell broadly into two categories. Firstly, the development of parachutes used in landing 
operations such as the statichute and associated equipment; and secondly, the design, 
construction and performance testing of such equipment as containers for weapons, 
ammunition and radio sets.  
 
Modifications to Aircraft for Paratroop Dropping: 
 
One of the main functions of the T.D.S. was the modification of existing aircraft 
designs for the purpose of paratroop dropping and to determine whether a particular aircraft 
was suitable or not. It became the responsibility of C.L.E. to produce trial installations for 
aircraft in collaboration with manufacturers and then conduct all necessary experimentation. 
With regards to these modifications it was recorded that ‘the C.O. of the Establishment is 
permitted to take this responsibility as far as one of a type is concerned, which should be 
considered as a flying mock-up’ 23 but major modifications required the prior approval of 
M.A.P.  
 
Rotary Wing Aircraft: 
 
The development of rotachutes was controlled by the Chief Technical Officer, as was 
Autogiro experimentation conducted by A.R.III Construction (Hafner Giroplane) on behalf of 
M.A.P. 24 
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Modifications to Tug Aircraft: 
 
Aircraft tug requirements were the responsibility of the Director of Operational 
Requirements and the work was conducted by the R.A.E. However, C.L.E. representatives 
were required to attend mock-up conferences at manufacturers’ works to discuss further 
research and conduct operational experimentation. 
 
Co-ordination and Allocation of Work: 
 
The meeting to discuss this role of the T.D.S. on 8 August was particularly important 
in that it clarified the division of work between the C.L.E. and R.A.E. in relation to the 
development and trial of gliders and reiterated the close working relationship required 
between the two Establishments. 25 Decisions were made upon the responsibilities for future 
developmental work and included a wide variety of research questions. Research was to be 
conducted into glider stability problems with a view to developing semi-automatic and twin-
towing techniques, the collation of statistical records of glider accelerations and tow cable 
tensions, and the design of automatic winches to deal with cable snatches. 26 
Exceptions 
 
Naturally the research included, technical issues concerning the technological 
development of aircraft. Initial flight tests would thus be conducted at R.A.E. on glider 
prototypes such as the Horsa and Hengist but contractor flight trials and official acceptance 
tests would be managed by C.L.E. This was the most pragmatic solution as C.L.E. was 
responsible for accommodating all service requirements. However, there was one aspect of 
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 T.N.A., AIR 29/513, A.F.E.E. O.R.B. Appendices 1940-1942, 8 August 1941. 
26
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the research programme that R.A.E. requested to retain independently: experimentation with 
rocket assistance for glider take off. 27  
 
The scheme was devised to alleviate the forces expended on the tug aircraft, 
particularly during take-off when engine oil temperatures were found to increase 
disproportionately. 28 The rockets were attached directly to Horsa and Hamilcar gliders in 
order to increase take-off speed simultaneously with the tug aircraft. 29 The only recorded 
experimentation with the Horsa was with a Whitley tug in 1943 and although deemed 
‘successful’ it required further significant technological development and was never used 
operationally. 30 Such abortive experimentation would not have been necessary if the 
strategic direction of airborne forces had been sufficiently clear.  
 
However, the utilitarian design of the Hamilcar afforded the simple installation of two 
Bristol Mercury engines in which it became a powered freighter. The introduction of such 
engines did not alleviate the requirement for a tug aircraft but it did mean that once the 
desired altitude had been reached the engines could be throttled back for economy and a 
Hamilcar X and Halifax tug combination could provide an operational range of over 600 
miles. In a contemporary article in Flight Magazine it was ‘envisaged that the Hamilcar X 
might be very useful to a civil concern’ 31 pending availability of Halifax aircraft. Unfortunately, 
the concept was not subsequently utilised by either military or civil operators, probably due to 
the introduction of dedicated powered freighter types, such as the Bristol Type 170 which 
entered service in 1946.     
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Despite continued restructuring and development to improve the effectiveness of the 
T.D.S. the Senior Technical Officer position sanctioned by the Treasury in September 1940 
remained vacant for a further year. On 9 September 1941 M.A.P. enquired about appointing 
to the position. The favoured candidate was currently employed on a higher salary at the Air 
Registration Board. However, M.A.P. confirmed that the applicant displayed ‘willingness to 
forego some money in order to take up as position more valuable to the war effort.’  32 The 
Treasury approved the appointment at the revised salary on 16 September but on the 
following condition: 
 
This is not to be regarded as a precedent for filling S.T.O. posts at rates 
above the minimum of the scale, and is also on the understanding that Mr 
Fraser will not receive any subsistence allowance or billeting allowance for 
working at Ringway. 33 
 
Despite some progress suitably qualified personnel remained difficult to procure. But 
following the reorganisation into a more recognised research establishment under M.A.P. 
administration, the development programme continued in line with the parameters set out 
above.  
Experimental Flight & Technical Development Section 
 
The first monthly technical report issued by the T.D.S. (1/41) covered the period from 
8 August to 8 September 1941, in line with the principle of submitting such a document 
established at the meeting with M.A.P. at Millbank. 34 The reports were comprehensive and 
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are abundant in technical detail but it is worth summarising the research and development 
work recorded in the first report produced for two reasons.  
 
Firstly, it represented the first time that the experimental work of the C.L.E. was 
professionally presented in accordance with M.A.P. requirements. Secondly, the report not 
only identified the origins of the core tactical and operational practices later utilised by 
airborne forces but also contained evidence of ambitious technological ‘gadgetry’. The 
format of the report was broken up into the following sections according to the experimental 
work undertaken during any one period. 
Technical Report 1/41 
Gliders: 
 
One of the articles in the report was entitled ‘modification to Hotspur for Parachute 
dropping’ and detailed experiments undertaken with this glider type compiled for a M.A.P. 
report dated 29 August 1941. 35 The tests were predominantly to determine the effect of 
opening the doors in flight and of trailing static-lines and equipment bags. However, it was 
recorded that during a flight test intended for dropping dummies from Hotspur B.V. 199 the 
forward door, when opened, was forced out of its frame against the leading edge of the main 
wing by the slipstream and resulted in an emergency landing. 36 Despite these initial 
difficulties tests were continued to determine seating positions for paratroops and 
investigations into the ease of exit were carried out with fully equipped personnel resulting in 
the successful simultaneous dropping of two dummies from both fuselage doors.  
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However, the glider type itself required intensive and detailed modification in order to 
improve its design and the T.D.S. was required to provide drawings and recommendations to 
manufacturers. 37 Some eighteen modification drawings were required ranging from relatively 
simple operational additions, such as rear and front footsteps, to integral structural changes 
which included the redesign of flap controls. 38 Despite the realisation that the Hotspur had 
been operationally superseded by the larger Horsa and Hamilcar the level of attention 
afforded to the aircraft can only have been conducted for experimental purposes. Given the 
scale of development required to satisfy the requirement of the airborne capability further 
research on the Hotspur could be interpreted as scientific indulgence but in reality it was the 
only glider then available upon which experimentation could be conducted.    
 
Scientific research was also being carried out at R.A.E. in late 1941 into the problem of 
keeping glider landing speeds as low as possible during the delivery of troops and supplies 
to the battlefield. In the case of the Horsa and Hamilcar the aircraft were equipped with 
substantial pneumatically-controlled flaps supplied from compressed air bottles. Louis Hagen 
described the importance of the Horsa flaps during Operation Market Garden in his memoirs: 
 
Half flaps down and our gliding angle steepens suddenly. Another fifteen 
degrees to starboard and we are just about over our landing area. Full flaps 
down and our nose is now pointing directly to the ground. The flaps keeping 
our speed constant and just above stalling speed. 39 
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However, a more ambitious technique was investigated by Owen and Young, two 
aeronautical engineers based at Farnborough. 40  
 
The concept was based upon the ignition of cordite charges immediately prior to 
landing which would act as an injector channelled through ducts in the wings. The air could 
then be manipulated to flow over the flaps and subsequently sucked over the ailerons to 
maximise lift and thus reduce landing speed. Following wind tunnel tests to ascertain the 
practical arrangement of duct designs a scheme for full scale investigation was 
recommended. 41  However, research was abandoned after it was realised that the results 
would not be ready in time to allow large scale production to commence. 42 The introduction 
of such an accelerant into the structure of a wooden wing root does appear ambitious but it 
is a good example of the type of solutions envisaged in the development process, however 
impracticable operationally.  
 
In addition to the modifications required to the gliders themselves extensive work was 
undertaken in the design of associated ground equipment 43 and nineteen drawings were 
produced for the manufacture of items such as trestle tables for assembly and repair of 
glider assemblages, tow bars for tractor towing of gliders on the ground and drums for the 
carriage and stowage of tow rope cables. 44 
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Glider Equipment: 
 
Another important aspect of research as identified in the first T.D.S. report was inter-
communication technology between tug and glider for the purpose of military effectiveness. 
There were obvious operational and tactical disadvantages of pilots being unable to 
communicate in flight. This was overcome by the installation of the standard Army D.8 
telephone into the cockpit of both glider and tug connected via a telephone cable attached to 
the tow rope. Although the solution was relatively low-tech it was invaluable for operational 
purposes. 45 Full reports into the installation and operation of such devices were issued in 
1942 and became standard installations in all gliders thereafter. 46 
Tugs: 
 
With regards to tug aircraft experiments were conducted on two potential aircraft for 
operational use with the Hotspur glider. The first was the Westland Lysander 47 which had 
proved satisfactory 48 but the second, the American Curtiss Tomahawk, proved more 
challenging due to difficulties in making modifications to the stressed all-metal skin 
construction of the aircraft. Further complications with the Tomahawk arose from the 
increased towing speeds at which the glider would have to operate. 49 The conversion of 
aircraft for the purpose of towing (Appendix 6) remained complicated mainly due to the fact 
that glider development and manufacture had commenced before the identification of 
suitable tug aircraft. Such strategic oversight and the amount of time spent evaluating often 
obsolete aircraft types does not suggest that development was considered a priority.    
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Paratroop Aircraft:  
 
The suitability of a number of heavy bombers for the purpose of paratroop dropping 
had been investigated and suggested modifications had been developed but, as with glider 
tugs, there was a significant delay before some of the aircraft could be released for 
experimental purposes and no guarantee that they would ever be available in sufficient 
numbers for airborne forces to achieve tactical and operational effectiveness: 
 
Aircraft Type Availability 
Vickers Wellington Few days 
Vickers Warwick 1 January 1942 
Avro Manchester 2 months 
Handley Page Halifax 4 weeks (if M.A.P. agreed priority) 
Short Stirling Ruled out meantime 
Consolidated Liberator None available at present 
Vickers Valencia 1 inspected at Cranwell on 26 January 1941 
 
 Table 3: List of Aircraft Identified for Parachute Purposes as of August 1941  
Source: T.N.A., AIR 29/513, Report 1/41, 8 September 1941 
 
Although Greenacre argues that modification was technologically straightforward it required 
the allocation of a particular aircraft type for airborne forces in the first instance and then 
considerable time for the development of a satisfactory dropping technique. Once again, 
resource allocation caused considerable delay and abortive research which culminated in 
delay to operational deployment. 50  
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Paratroop Equipment: 
 
The majority of bespoke design was focused around equipment containers and their 
stowage in gliders or tug aircraft. At the time the T.D.S. report was issued three different 
types of container had been manufactured to carry a variety of equipment. Investigations 
were also underway into the production of plastic containers to replace the external 
woodwork of the existing types in order to prolong their serviceability, particularly under 
training conditions. 51 
 
Investigations were further conducted to overcome a wide variety of difficulties in the 
ground handling of containers. 52  These included the illumination for night operations and 
quick release mechanisms to aid the removal of the parachute from the container once on 
the ground. 53 Although such experimentation may appear relatively mundane, it was crucial 
to the tactical and operational effectiveness of the airborne forces.  
Statichutes: 
 
Extensive tests were undertaken to ensure that statichutes, parachutes deployed by 
means of a static-line, operated safely and effectively. 54 This aspect of the experimental 
work was critical to operational effectiveness to minimise the risk of fatal accidents such as 
those experienced during the training programme. 55 Yet the inability to source a dedicated 
aircraft type for paratroop operation ultimately delayed statichute development and 
standardisation of design.  
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Statichute Equipment: 
 
The T.D.S. report included a paragraph entitled ‘Statichute Attachments for Gliders’ 
which provides evidence that the gliders then in production were indeed expected to be 
capable of deploying paratroops as an operational requirement: 56 
 
Discussions with firms and other M.A.P. departments have taken place. For 
the Horsa, a rail type attachment was considered the most suitable, and 
modifications to the mock-up of the arrangement designed by the Airspeed 
Company have been suggested. For the Hengist, Messrs. Slingsby have 
been given the requirements for the static attachments and these are being 
designed to fit at the top of the trailing edge of each door. A mock-up of the 
fittings has been made by the firm. 57 
 
 Research and development activity also focused upon procedures associated with 
operational and training use. The problem of parachute transport and maintenance were 
another important part of the C.L.E. remit. Designs were consequently prepared for the 
conversion of a R.A.F. Stores Trailer for the transport of 160 statichutes, vehicles for drying 
and hanging statichutes, mobile workshops equipped with sewing machines for repair works 
and the installation of mobile packing tables. 58 
Rotary Wing Aircraft: 
 
By September 1941 the design of the A.R.III Construction Company full-scale 
Rotachute was all but completed and 12 prototypes were being manufactured by Messrs. F. 
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Hills & Sons. 59 However, due to the unique nature of the aircraft trials test apparatus needed 
to be specially designed for evaluation purposes. The A.R.III Construction Company was 
also involved in the design and development of Autogiros and will be examined below. 60 
 
Monthly Reports: September 1941 – January 1942 
 
With the format of the monthly reports now established the thesis can now examine 
them both thematically and chronologically to determine the pattern of development and 
technological progression which culminated in the capability available at the time of the 
formation of A.F.E.E. 61 
 
Gliders: 
  
Report 2/41 stated that on 10 September 1941 a full military load test comprising a 
crew of seven, and ballast that totalled 2000 lbs, was carried out with the Hotspur II. 62 
Stalling tests and all relevant performance data were also completed. 63 However, the only 
available tug was the Hawker Hector and the performance limitation had already been 
identified. 64 The main finding was that the glider became unstable at speeds over 135 mph 
in the low-tow position and pilots notes were drafted accordingly. Such information was 
crucial in determining a practicable piloting technique of blind towing 65 via instruments and 
under operational conditions. 66  
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The position of the glider in relation to the tug aircraft was critical. The most efficient 
and safest flight position had to be identified for inclusion in pilot’s notes and relevant training 
syllabuses. It was also crucial in determining the effective military range, maximum load and 
speed of any such combination for the purposes of operational planning and target 
identification. 67 The following experiments were conducted on 16 September 1941: 
 
The rate of descent figures for a Hotspur II was requested so that 
approximations could be made as to the operational range of the aircraft. 
An estimate of 500 feet per minute at 80 indicated air speed was 
suggested based upon the observations of flight tests carried out to date. 68 
 
In order to achieve maximum range the undercarriage assembly of the Hotspur, as with all 
British assault gliders, was designed so that it could be jettisoned after take-off in order to 
reduce weight and thus increase operational range. The glider would then land on a belly 
skid.  
 
During 7 and 8 October full load take-off and landing tests were conducted with the 
Hotspur II but problems were encountered when the starboard undercarriage did not 
release. 69 The same tests were conducted the following day but once again there were 
difficulties with the undercarriage jettison system which caused damage to the tail plane and 
subsequent experimentation was conducted with the undercarriage assembly locked in 
position. 70  
 
                                               
67
 T.N.A., AVIA 21/16, Hotspur II: Comparative Trim and Stick Forces Tests for Low-Hook and Nose-
Hook Towing, February - December 1941.   
68
 T.N.A., AIR 29/512, Experimental Flight O.R.B. Ringway, 16 September 1941. 
69
 T.N.A., AVIA 21/337, Hotspur II Glider: Tests (G.28), 23 April 1942.   
70
 T.N.A., AIR 29/512, Experimental Flight O.R.B. Ringway, 9 October 1941.  
141 
 
Glider Pilot H.N. ‘Andy’ Andrews underwent training in the Hotspur in 1943 and 
detailed the flying characteristics of the glider and the advantages of keeping the 
undercarriage locked: 
 
The stick (mostly the spade grip) was reasonably easy to use, and 
sensitive. However, perhaps the hardest thing of all to get used to was the 
position of the legs and feet in close relation to the nose, the skid and, 
ultimately, the ground in landing. There were twin wheels under each wing, 
originally designed to be jettisoned, but actually used in position. It was 
found to be much easier to manoeuvre on the ground and quicker, 
therefore, for practice flights. 71 
 
The development works required extensive, and repetitive, evaluation with different glider 
and tug combinations. The following extract from Report 4/41 gives an indication of the 
nature of the experimental trials undertaken by T.D.S.: 
 
Tests have been made with a nose-towed glider flying below the tug and no 
difficulty was experienced in passing through, nor from the slip-stream. 
Preliminary trim, stick force and stability tests have given satisfactory 
results. 72 
 
The slip-stream produced by the tugs propeller(s) could cause significant turbulence for the 
glider that could result in decreased fuel efficiency, or in extreme cases, the breakage of the 
two-rope itself which had been investigated at the Glider Training Squadron. 73 
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Consequently, the position of the tow cable attachment to both the tug and the glider 
required close investigation and was an important aspect of the A.F.E.E. programme. Glider 
Pilot Alexander Morrison recalled the experience of releasing a Hotspur glider from a 
Harvard glider tug aircraft during training at No.1 Glider Training School, R.A.F. Croughton: 74 
 
There was a loud ‘clunk’ and I could see the tow rope whipping behind the 
complete silence that prevailed. The noise of the slipstream then suddenly 
disappeared and we seemed to be suspended like a huge bird in the 
heavens. 75  
 
A conference was held on 26 September to discuss the operational requirements for a 
Mark III Hotspur glider. The conference comprised representatives from both the M.A.P. and 
General Aircraft. The main conclusions drawn were that the dropping of parachute troops 
was no longer a requirement, stalling speeds should be lowered, the controls should be 
improved and that towing speeds should be raised. 76 But despite the recommendations a 
Mark III Hotspur never entered full scale production as the aircraft was superseded by the 
larger glider types, although a prototype Mark III was built and tested in 1942. 77  
  
Meanwhile, 31 December 1941 experimental work had begun into the feasibility of 
using the Whitley V to tow two Hotspur gliders simultaneously. 78 Initial tests were conducted 
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with the glider attached to a single tow cable in a ‘fly-cast’ technique but this proved 
unsatisfactory and investigations were continued with separate tow cables. 79  
 
The investigation into the twin tow technique was a further example of the T.D.S. 
attempting to maximise the military effectiveness of the glider-tug combination whilst 
simultaneously minimising the number of tug aircraft required. The research concluded that 
the technique was feasible but that a more powerful tug would be required. In fairness, 
however, the concept was not entirely new and had been demonstrated operationally by 
German airborne forces through the twin tow of D.F.S. 230 gliders by a Junkers JU.52.  
 
 Another fundamental aspect of the research programme initiated in December 1941 
was to determine the technical requirements for night operations. Trials were conducted with 
a Hotspur and Lysander tug and included a glide path indicator attached to the tug that 
produced a narrow beam of light to aid the glider pilot in following the correct flight path. 80 
Each component required design and extensive trials to ensure optimum functionality without 
making the combination easily identifiable from the ground.  
 
 However, research was not only confined to the functionality of the technology and 
end-user comfort had to be considered, although this had not been relatively neglected prior 
to construction orders being placed. Consequently, air sickness tests were undertaken in 
order to identify the suitability of both gliders and glider-borne infantry for operational 
purposes. John Ellis has argued that:  
 
Purely physical constraints could be demoralising. Air-sickness was a 
serious problem, especially in gliders, where the normal instability of aircraft 
was complicated by a continuous to-and-fro movement as the glider 
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repeatedly pulled against the slack of the towing hawser. Most men were 
sick on most trips and the floor of the glider was soon awash with vomit. 81  
 
Report 5/41 noted that air sickness tests were being conducted using a Hotspur II glider and 
the O.R.B. stated that on 2 January 1942 further air sickness trials were being undertaken 
‘following the need to test the suitability of glider-borne troops for combat purposes.’ 82 
Additional tests included the internal temperatures of the glider and its effects upon troops. 83  
 
 Tests continued into 1942 and it was reported in Report 1/42 that Hotspur BT.548 
was being modified to include a ventilation system and lighting for further air-sickness  
trials. 84 However, the main workhorse of air-landed troops became the Horsa in which 
passengers sat on wooden benches either side of the fuselage. Although securely strapped-
in the surging motion of the glider whilst on tow invariably caused nausea that ‘despite efforts 
to develop airsickness remedies’  85 was never overcome.  
 
 Test flying during January 1942 was, however, severely curtailed by both weather 
conditions and airfield infrastructure improvements. Despite the limited activity some 
research was undertaken which included preparation for the second prototype Horsa to be 
flown to R.A.F. Snaith by a Wellington III tug.  86  
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Glider Equipment: 
 
The main focus of research and development contained in Report 2/41 during 
September 1941 was the installation of ‘blind-flying’ instruments in Hotspur BT.483 which 
included a tug position indicator, a device that later became known as the ‘angle of dangle’. 
87 This allowed the glider pilot to determine the relative position of the glider to the tug aircraft 
and thus maintain the most efficient and safest flying position. However, it was recorded that 
trouble had been experienced with the tow cables jamming in the quick release mechanism 
which resulted in the glider not being able to release itself from the tug aircraft. 88 
Consequently, it was realised that a standard quick release mechanism was necessary and 
requirements were defined and numerous examples were subsequently tested. 89 
 
By Report 3/41 arrangements had been made to work collaboratively with a wide 
range of stakeholders to develop inter-glider, tug-to-glider and air-to-ground communication 
techniques. A conference was requested to define the Army’s radio requirements and a 
Signals Branch of the T.D.S. was established to conduct this aspect of the work.  
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Figure 2: Sketch of Intercommunication Method for Hotspur Glider 
Source: T.N.A., AVIA 21/22, Present Position of Direct Wire Communication Between Tug & 
Glider, 18 February 1942 
 
 
At a conference on 27 October 1941 further requirements for glider ground 
equipment were identified and the standardisation of equipment for all glider operations was 
beginning to develop. One such example was the redesign of the cable drum trolley for the 
Hotspur tow cables so that it could be utilised to carry the drums for the Hengist, Horsa and 
Hamilcar. 90 Similarly, a prototype of the standard ‘Lobelle’ towing hook had been received 
by the T.D.S. and satisfactory flight tests had been conducted. 91 
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Tugs: 
 
Report 2/41, ending 8 October 1941, recorded that the Westland Aircraft Company 
had made successful modifications to Lysander V.9517 for the purpose of glider towing. 92 
Arrangements had also been made with 30 M.U. Sealand for the conversion of further 
Lysander and Hector aircraft for glider towing.  In November it was reported that following a 
M.A.P. conference all available Hector aircraft, estimated to be 40, would be converted for 
glider towing at A.F.E. rather than by independent contractors. Rollason Aircraft Service 93 
was already in the process of converting 25 Hector aircraft for this purpose. 94  
 
Report 4/41 detailed further modifications carried out directly by A.F.E. in an attempt 
to identify suitable glider tugs. 95 Experiments had been carried out on two Whitley V aircraft 
and a Hawker Audax bi-plane, a successor to the Hawker Hart. It was also reported that a 
Wellington III was imminently expected for flight tests with the Horsa.  
 
By 31 December the Hawker Audax modifications had been completed and 
arrangements had been made for engine cooling trials on the Wellington III before towing the 
prototype Horsa glider. It was also recorded in Report 5/41 that Stirling, Halifax and 
Albemarle tugs were expected shortly at T.D.S. for prototype trials. 96 The wide variety of 
aircraft types on test required additional experimentation with no guarantee that suitable 
numbers could be supplied for operational purposes.  
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Conversion of aircraft for evaluation as tugs remained a key aspect of the work and the 
following paragraph was included in Report 1/42 issued in January 1942: 
 
The conversion at A.F.E.E. of one Whitley V for glider towing has been 
completed and work on the second Whitley V is in progress. A third set of 
modified drawings, however, has been received from Armstrong Whitworth 
and both Whitleys are being modified accordingly. 97  
 
It is interesting to note from the above paragraph that it was stated that A.F.E.E. was 
conducting the modification work. This could simply have been an error with the addition of 
an E to Airborne Forces Establishment or, in the absence of the document containing a 
precise date when the report was issued, have been transcribed after the official formation of 
the A.F.E.E. on 16 February.  
 
Paratroop Aircraft: 
 
On 23 September 1941 dummy dropping was carried out from a Wellington aircraft. 98 
An Armstrong Whitworth Albemarle and Lockheed Hudson were also examined with a view 
to assessing their suitability for paratroop dropping. 99 A mock-up of the proposed 
modifications to the Albemarle were completed and tested. 100 
 
There is evidence of close liaison between the T.D.S. and contractors throughout the 
period as paratroop requirements, and the aircraft available to fulfil them, gradually became 
more clearly defined. By 8 November 1941 3 Halifax aircraft, the first of which arrived at 
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Ringway on 12 October, 101 had been modified as the mock-up upon which standard 
Handley Page Test Installations (T.I.) could be based. Arrangements had also been made 
for the conversion of an Avro Manchester and an Albemarle for paratroop dropping once the 
manufacturers had made the necessary structural alterations. It is interesting to observe that 
gliders also appear in the ‘paratroop aircraft’ section of the report reinforcing the desire to 
utilise gliders for paratrooping and container dropping. It was reported that statichute 
attachments and container requirements for the Hengist and Horsa had been discussed in 
detail with the manufacturers. 102 On 9 October 1941 representatives of the T.D.S. visited 
Slingsby to view the prototype Hengist glider. 103 
  
Meanwhile, the War Office also requested that arrangements were made to enable 
parachute training in India. 104 A Hudson III, delivered to Ringway on 22 October, 105 was 
modified for statichute training by ‘hole technique’ 106 and instructions received that a further 
12 aircraft were to be modified as quickly as possible for training in India. By 8 December 
1941 modifications had been completed to Hudson AE.507 as the prototype and trials with 
single sticks of four men had proved satisfactory 107  and tests with double sticks of four men 
had been included in the programme. 108  
 
A second aircraft, Hudson V.9228, was modified in order to test the slide method of 
paratrooping by which the individual paratroops exited the aircraft by means of a slide 
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through the fuselage floor. 109 It was recorded that the method required the development of a 
new statichuting technique before it could be approved for training or subsequent operational 
use but by 31 December 1941 a solution had been devised which allowed a stick of seven 
men to be dropped. The aircraft was subsequently sent back to the manufacturers to enable 
the necessary T.I. drawings to be prepared.   
 
By the end of 1941 further aircraft had been identified as potentially suitable for 
paratroop purposes. Representatives from A.V. Roe worked at Ringway throughout 
December in co-operation with technical staff to produce the T.I. drawings for the 
Manchester and Lancaster to be modified for paratroops, 110 and trials with both aircraft types 
were completed the following March. 111 However, despite the paratrooping principle being 
proved technically possible with a wide variety of aircraft types no single type was identified 
that could carry sufficient numbers. The wide range of aircraft on test as potential parachute 
and tug aircraft suggests uncertainty rather than systematic scientific analysis into suitability.    
 
Paratroop Equipment: 
 
Report 2/41 listed a range of research, development, test and modifications undertaken 
on a wide variety of support equipment. The following extract is an indication of the amount 
of technological development and manufacture necessary to equip a fully operational 
airborne force: 
 
No. 18 W/T set container has been approved by the R.A.E.  Prototypes of 
the No. 11 W/T set container and the mortar baseplate and the collapsible 
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trolley cradles have been completed and are at Farnborough for strength 
tests. No. 11 W/T set container has been modified to take a No. 19 W/T 
set, when available. Drawings of the training type of Mk. 1and Mk. II 
containers have been completed. A prototype of a dimly illuminated 
container for night operations has been built and tested, and a minor 
modification has been made. 112   
 
All the detailed drawings had been completed for the manufacture of the equipment listed 
above by the following month (Report 3/41). Improvements and economies were continually 
made in order to make all associated materiel operationally effective.  
 
The work included the re-design of containers and their statichutes so that as much 
equipment could be carried as possible. In Report 4/41 progress in the development of the 
Mk. III container was recorded: 
 
 A new type of statichute pack has been manufactured which occupies less 
space than those for Mk. I and Mk. II containers. This enables the Mk. III 
container to carry everything required, including the motor board, with the 
exception of the anti-tank gun. 113 
 
The continual evaluation sought to ensure that there was time for troops to receive adequate 
training with airborne equipment. By 31 December 1941 Mk. I containers were fitted with 
collapsible wheels and a handle ‘so that it could be towed behind any commandeered 
vehicle’ 114 and the prototype had been sent to No. 1 Parachute Battalion for approval and 
practicality assessment prior to descent tests.   
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In Report 1/42 further progress had been made in the development of equipment that 
would increase the military effectiveness of airborne forces once on the ground. It was 
recorded that ‘detail drawings are in hand for the conversion of vehicles required for the 
transport column of a Battalion’ 115 which culminated in the development of the airborne jeep 
and Tetrarch tank.  
 
However, there is evidence that certain tactical issues, outside physical hardware, 
were also being considered at the T.D.S. by January 1942 and it was recognised that 
disorientation of enemy defences was as important to achieving operational success as 
specialist weaponry. 116 
 
A paratroop dummy for tactical purposes has been made and satisfactory 
descents have been carried out. A batch of ten are being manufactured to 
enable the technique to be developed for dropping a stick of dummies. 117   
  
One of the first recorded instances of dummies being dropped was during the Normandy 
landings in an operation entitled ‘Titanic’ which involved some 300 dummy parachutists 
being released. The ploy was relatively successful and caused some members of the 
German high command to continue to believe that Normandy was simply a feint for an allied 
invasion in the Pas-de Calais. 118 However, not every German was fooled as Gefreite Walter 
Hermes of the 21st Panzer Division recalled: 
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I reported to the sergeant major’s office and he said to me, ‘Do you want to 
see our first prisoner? He’s standing right there by the door.’ I quickly 
turned round and saw not a man but a life size dummy made of some kind 
of rubber and hung all over with firecrackers. There were some more 
firecrackers in boxes on the sergeant major’s desk. I said, ‘By God, if the 
allies expect to win the invasion with this sort of thing, they’re crazy. 
They’re just trying to scare us.’ 119          
 
Statichutes/Parachutes: 
 
Between 8 September and 8 November 1941 128 dummy drops had been completed 
with the Mk. II Statichute and it was reported that one incident ‘involving a defective canopy 
was being investigated.’ 120 The trial and development required considerable photographic 
work in order for each stage of the process in which the canopy was deployed to be 
analysed which simplified the process of evaluation and allowed for prompt modifications to 
be made as necessary.   
 
One element of the design and development process in which photographic evidence 
was crucial was the ability to determine the effect of changes in static-line installation upon 
the clearance of an aircraft tail-plane. By 8 December 1941 sixty-two dummy drops had 
been completed with the Mk. II statichute but the weather conditions and a lack of test 
facilities had delayed research. 121 Consequently, the programme had focused upon 
statistical analysis and the design of a system that delayed the opening of container 
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statichutes in order to obviate the necessity for time intervals of one to two seconds between 
the dropping of troops and containers. 122  
 
The amount of time taken to exit the aircraft, by either paratroops or the despatch of 
containers, had a significant effect upon the grouping of troops and equipment on the 
landing zone and subsequent operational effectiveness. The advantage of such a system 
was that the troops and equipment could be landed closely together thus reducing the 
distance between paratroop and their fighting apparatus. 
 
In Report 5/41 issued on 31 December 1941 the term ‘statichute’ was discontinued 
and replaced by ‘parachute’. During December problems were experienced with the Mk. II 
static-line parachute (previously referred to as the Mk. II statichute) and evaluation work was 
temporarily suspended pending investigation:     
 
The Mk. II static-line parachute has exhibited an irregularity of deployment 
and further research is required before statistical trials are resumed. The 
work has been temporarily transferred to Henlow where better packing 
facilities are available. 123    
The transfer of the research to R.A.F. Henlow (where the R.A.F. had a facility for testing 
bale-out parachutes) is interesting as following the conference of 8 August 1941 at M.A.P. 
the responsibility for all parachute research and development was devolved to T.D.S. 
However, it may have been possible that the T.D.S. staff were continuing the work 
programme off-site to utilise improved facilities rather than Henlow personnel conducting the 
research on their behalf. 
   
                                               
122
 T.N.A., AVIA 21/340, Relative Positions of Containers and Men during Deployment of their 
Respective Statichutes (T.D.S./P.3), January 1941.  
123
 T.N.A., AIR 29/513, Report 5/41, 31 December 1941. 
155 
 
Statichute/Parachute Equipment: 
 
Between 8 October and 8 November 1941 ‘detailed drawings were completed for the 
Sten-gun case as a replacement for the obsolescent Smith and Wesson gun and 
ammunition variety.’ 124 However, the objective of the T.D.S. was not restricted to the design, 
manufacture and trial of purpose made equipment. They were also responsible for 
developing the operational procedures under which the R.A.F. would operate and thus 
maximise the operational capabilities of the airborne force.  
 
One such aspect of this work involved the training of aircrew in the dropping of 
parachutists to ensure that all the fundamentals of flight were correct so as not to jeopardise 
the effectiveness, or the safety, of the troops involved. For example, Report 4/41 detailed a 
dummy that had been designed for release from the bomb bay of the Whitley so that 
squadrons operating the aircraft type could begin the necessary training. 125  
 
One the ground, by 31 December the design of a parachute simulator had also been 
completed which allowed for more realistic training and thus reduced the dependency on 
aircraft flying hours. 126 Although new to the British, the technology had actually been proven 
in Russia during the 1930s as the Soviet Regime continued a national drive to promote 
public interest in aviation that had commenced prior to the First World War. 127 Such 
machines were constructed throughout the Soviet Union in public parks to encourage 
physical exercise amongst the civilian population. 128  
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The synthetic parachute trainer was a relatively simple device from a technological 
perspective and consisted primarily of a spool fastened to a steel spindle which had a two 
bladed rotary air brake at one end. A steel cable was attached to the pupil’s parachute 
harness and then wound onto the drum so that the air brake was driven during descent. 129 
The low inertia of the fan resulted in an initial downward acceleration representative of free-
fall from an aircraft and the ‘acceleration was exponentially reduced to zero during the 
descent.’ 130 These devices were mounted in batteries of either six or eight over platforms 
near the roof of an aircraft hangar and ‘played a large part in the preliminary training of 
parachutists.’ 131  
 
The installation of such a machine was a good example of how simple technology 
could increase the effectiveness of training and reduce the requirement for materiel 
resources. However, it also had the negative side effect of producing qualified parachutists 
far more quickly than airborne strategists could identify suitable operations.      
 
Rotary Wing Aircraft: 
 
The work on Rotary Wing Aircraft was particularly specialist and was initially 
undertaken on behalf of M.A.P. by an external contractor. The A.R.III Construction Company 
was established in 1934 by an Austrian aero-engineer named Raoul Hafner. During the 
1920s Hafner had produced a series of prototype helicopters before he turned his attention 
to autogiro design. 132 The principal technological difference between the two aircraft types 
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was that the autogiro was a hybrid between a fixed wing aeroplane and a helicopter that 
comprised a set of conventional wings and a tail but with a rotor mounted on a vertical shaft 
above the fuselage. However, unlike a helicopter, the autogiro rotor was not powered directly 
and was thus completely free to rotate on its shaft. The rotor was thus turned by the action of 
airflow over the blades and provided a certain amount of vertical lift. This was known as 
autorotation. 133   
Rotary-wing aircraft development was firmly split between the proponents of the 
autogiro and the helicopter during the 1930s and on 14 October 1937 Hafner had the 
opportunity to advocate rotating wing technology in a lecture to the Royal Aeronautical 
Society. 134 It would appear that Hafner presented a compelling and charismatic argument 
and the following review was published in Flight Magazine on 21 October 1937:    
Rarely in the long and distinguished history of the Royal Aeronautical 
Society has a lecturer managed to please and satisfy every section of his 
audience.  Generally the unfortunate speaker must perforce talk right over 
the heads of some of those present (for let it not be thought that all who 
attend the meetings of the R.Ae.S. are learned scientists), or else he must 
run the risk, by keeping to generalities, of having a large proportion of the 
audience coming away with a feeling that they did not learn very much after 
all. Mr. R. Hafner, the Austrian inventor and designer of the Hafner 
gyroplane, achieved the apparently impossible last Thursday, when, at the 
first Royal Aeronautical Society Meeting of the present session, he 
explained his rotating wing aircraft. 135  
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The presentation was not without challenge and an interesting and polite exchange of 
scientific opinion was published between Hafner and Dr Bennett, later C.T.O. at Ringway, in 
the subsequent issues of Flight Magazine. On October 28 Dr Bennett complimented Hafner 
on ‘designing such a neat and spectacular machine’ 136 to which Hafner responded on 
November 11 thanking Bennett for his comments which were ‘the more appreciated in view 
of his acknowledged position in the rotating-wing field.’ 137 Rotary-wing design was the zenith 
of the aviation technology of the day and the lecture closed by thanking Hafner ‘for having 
the good sense to come to England for the further development of his ideas.  
Figure 3: Raoul Hafner’s Home Office Exemption Card 
Source: T.N.A., HO 396/228, Aliens Department: Internees Index (R. Hafner), 19 October 1939 
Unfortunately for Hafner the European political situation ensured that he was classed 
as an alien. Indeed, whilst conducting research at Pobjoy-Short of Rochester he was 
interned following Britain’s declaration of war. Although The Home Office alien internee index 
recorded that Hafner was ‘exempted from internment and restrictions’ following a tribunal 
held on 19 October 1939 it would appear he was not released until 18 September 1940. 138 
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Following his release the A.R.III Construction Company was employed directly by the 
Air Ministry, and subsequently M.A.P., on the development of rotary-wing designs for military 
application. Hafner and his team were initially located at the C.L.E. before amalgamation 
upon the establishment of the A.F.E.E. where they developed the rotachute and rota-buggy 
designs. 139  
However, on 23 September 1941, Mr H. Grinsted, Deputy Director Research & 
Development (Technical) M.A.P., drafted an internal letter that suggested the termination of 
the contract with the A.R.III Construction Company and the direct government employment 
of the staff involved: 
They would be employed upon the completion of their present autogiro 
work, and also upon the development of gliders, equipment for us in gliders 
and equipment for paratroop operations. The advantage of this 
arrangement would be less expense to M.A.P. for such autogiro design 
work as is required, the availability of Hafner and the others for work 
urgently required on the glider and paratroop equipment programme, and 
the termination of the inconvenience of having a private company 
accommodated at an R.A.F. Station. 140  
Grinsted also suggested that the ending of the relationship with the A.R.III Construction 
Company would require additional civilian staff positions within the Technical Development 
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Section at Ringway. 141 The arrangement was formally agreed between M.A.P. and the 
Directors of A.R.III Construction, Mr Hafner and Mr Welsh.  
The C.L.E. Technical Reports detail the progress of the rotary-wing development. 
Report 2/41 detailed tests that had been conducted with a full-scale 15 ft. rotor mounted on a 
lorry and these had proved satisfactory. The design of the full-scale Rotachute was 
completed and manufacture was underway. By November 1941 the component parts of the 
rotachute were completed and the aircraft was undergoing assembly. Evaluation was also 
being conducted into the operational use of the Autogyro and an example with modified 
controls was tested in October 1941 and, after further modification, was flown to Duxford on 
15 October. 142  
 
 
Figure 4: Detail of Rotachute Design 
Source: T.N.A., AVIA 21/24, Rotachute Trials (G.26), 2 April 1942 
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In report 5/41 it was recorded that two full-scale Rotachute prototypes had been 
assembled and that one of which was being mounted onto a lorry for ground trials. 143 In 
January 1942 three hours of test flying had been conducted from this installation and 
experimentation had progressed to launches from a winch towed sledge. 144 Despite 
progress the following recommendations were made by the Airborne Forces Committee on 4 
September 1942:  
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Walch (Airborne Division) said that a Rotachute for 
carrying a man was put up as an operational requirement and forwarded by 
War Office. Squadron Leader Waddington said that a Rotachute was not 
practicable as a man dropper, although it had possibilities for vehicles. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Walch expressed the wish to see the equipment before 
it was finally rejected as a man carrier, and it was AGREED that a party 
from Airborne Division should visit A.F.E.E. at an early date. 145 
 
Following a visit later that month all work on rotachute designs was considered impracticable 
for operational use. The specialist nature of the work was ultimately abortive for the purpose 
of airborne forces but later made a significant contribution to British helicopter design. 146 
Further Developments 
 
By October 1941 the War Office realised that the size of the developing airborne 
force, despite the strategic and technological limitations, required reorganisation into a larger 
formation under the control of a single senior officer. Consequently, on the 29th of the same 
month, General Alan Brooke appointed Major-General F.A.M. Browning head of all airborne 
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forces which were soon renamed the 1st Airborne Division. Major-General Frost made the 
following comment in his memoirs upon learning of the selection: 
 
General ‘Boy’ Browning, known to the regular officers as the most famous 
Adjutant Sandhurst had ever had, was to command the Division. We began 
to realise that we were destined to do far more than land behind enemy 
lines and carry out raids or act as guerrillas. 147 
 
Upon appointment it was unclear if the airborne force would ever operate at more than 
Brigade strength but Brooke was determined to give it divisional status since ‘apart from 
reasons of morale, and convenience at home, it also served to impress the enemy.’ 148 The 
psychological role of airborne forces must not be underestimated and proved as relevant as 
their actual offensive capability.  
 
Following his appointment, Browning accompanied Group Captain Harvey on a visit 
to the T.D.S. on 13 November primarily to inspect the mock-up of the Horsa glider. 149 
Brooke then interviewed Browning on 20 November to determine the progress he had made 
with the Airborne Division and concluded in his diary that ‘at last, after many uphill moments, 
it is beginning to make strides.’ 150 By late January 1942 the T.D.S. was working on the 
performance trials of the Horsa and on the 24 of the month Flight Lieutenant Fender visited 
R.A.F. Station Snaith, Yorkshire, and inspected the airfield with a view to the practicability of 
undertaking the Horsa glider flight tests at the aerodrome.  
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Alongside this, the production of glider prototypes continued and the first Hamilcar 
glider arrived by road at Ringway from R.A.F. Station Snaith on 29 January 1942. 151 
However, although the appointment of a Divisional Commander and the delivery of gliders 
was visible progress, but the lack of strategic direction and suitable tugs remained restrictive.    
Conclusion 
 
The formalisation of roles and responsibilities with regard to the development of an 
airborne capability undoubtedly provided much needed clarity between the Air Ministry, 
Royal Aircraft Establishment, Ministry of Aircraft Production, and ultimately, the Technical 
Development Section. The introduction of standard procedure for technical investigation and 
reporting meant that all stakeholders were regularly informed of progress. The programme 
could then be managed according to the requirements of both the strategic concept and 
doctrine. 
 
 The Technical Development Section was subsequently responsible for the 
technological development of all aspects of airborne forces requirements. The first formal 
Technical Report, compiled between the 8 August and 8 September 1941, 152 detailed 
research parameters that included both the innovative new technology of the rotary wing 
experiments and low-tech modifications of tow cables and fasteners. But despite the 
professionalization of the research programme the available technology and allocation of 
resources remained restrictive to future development as evidenced by the lack of aircraft 
available for experimentation. Consequently, the technical programme contained abortive 
research into aircraft types that were either entirely unsuitable for the purpose or would 
never be available in sufficient numbers for operational purposes.  
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The need to experiment with such a variety of aircraft types, especially after both 
training of parachutists was sufficiently advanced and assault gliders were in physical 
production, is evidence that the airborne forces’ programme lacked  a dedicated and realistic 
strategic vision. The training of parachutists and production of assault gliders prior to the 
identification of suitable aircraft to achieve both tactical and operational effectiveness thus 
resulted in a vast technical programme that was difficult to achieve.  
 
The political drive for the production of a British airborne capability overrode the 
technological capacity and availability of the necessary materiel and although the T.D.S. 
worked determinedly to discover solutions it was always at a disadvantage. When one 
considers the worrying economic and strategic military position of Britain at this time it is 
difficult to reconcile the development of the airborne force under such conditions. 
Nevertheless, the development continued and an independent experimental establishment 
was created to serve the newly created airborne division. But the limitations of the available 
technology soon caused conflict and frustration between the A.F.E.E. and the end-user.           
165 
 
Chapter Four: Airborne Forces Experimental Establishment 
Introduction 
 
By February 1942 it was believed that the development of airborne forces in Britain 
had reached a stage whereby glider training, parachute training and technical development 
required separation. Consequently, the Airborne Forces Establishment was disbanded and 
the responsibility for training was passed to regular Army and R.A.F. units.  
 
On 16 February, in response to War Office Establishment Order WAR/AC/168, the 
Airborne Forces Experimental Establishment was formed to conduct further technical 
development of airborne warfare 1 However, Greenacre has argued that despite the 
formation of the establishment in reality it remained under resourced, with only one officer 
responsible for the development of parachute equipment, albeit with a small professional 
staff. 2  
 
A.F.E.E. was positioned in No. 70 Group under Army Co-operation Command for 
administrative purposes but worked directly to the M.A.P. for technical matters. 3 Yet, Group 
Captain Harvey retained a degree of autonomy with regards to technical development and 
had authority to conduct any exploratory trials that he deemed to be beneficial at the direct 
request of the Airborne Division or any of the R.A.F. Commands concerned in the training 
and provision of equipment for the airborne force. 4   
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The chapter examines the function of the A.F.E.E. from its inception to disbandment 
in 1950. The technological progression of the Establishment will be measured against the 
wider development of the British airborne capability in order to determine whether the 
investment was justified and achieved any technological advantage in the post-war period.    
A.F.E.E. Organisation 
 
The new Establishment comprised all personnel of the Headquarters, Technical 
Development Section, and Experimental Flight of the Airborne Forces Establishment with 
Group Captain Harvey in command. 5 The A.F.E.E. also assumed responsibility for the 
station workshops at R.A.F. Ringway. Harvey attended a conference at M.A.P. on 20 
February with Air Marshal Linnell, Controller of Research and Development, regarding 
general policy on the allocation of work and visited the ministry again on 26 February to 
determine the future expansion programme and decide the responsibility and location for 
contractor glider trial facilities. 6 
 
However, it was not only the technical programme that required definition but also the 
staff complement that would conduct and administer the research programme. Following the 
decision to establish the A.F.E.E. as an independent M.A.P. experimental establishment 
further negotiation with the Treasury was required in order to ensure that an adequate 
number of specialist technical experts were procured.  
 
Consequently, on 17 January 1942 M.A.P. requested an additional two Senior 
Technical Officer (S.T.O.) posts to satisfy the A.F.E.E. programme. It was also requested 
that the appointments were made directly to the establishment rather than being an addition 
to the R.A.E. complement at Boscombe Down:  
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At a recent conference held at this Department, the civilian staff 
requirements of the Airborne Forces Experimental Establishment were 
reviewed in light of the decision that this should in future be an 
Establishment administered and controlled by this Ministry on similar lines 
to Boscombe Down. 7 
 
The procurement procedure allowed the Establishment delegated authority to make 
appointments between certain grades but formal permission was required for the addition of 
senior positions. 8 The Treasury was informed of any changes made within the delegated 
authority of the Establishment by quarterly return. However, it would appear that M.A.P. had 
utilised rather more discretion than it was entitled to, prompting the Treasury official assigned 
to the request, to comment in the margin that they ‘certainly have gone ahead on their own 
regarding this complement!’ 9 
 
Consequently, the Treasury conducted its own assessment with regards to 
appointments previously approved in comparison with those M.A.P. currently employed in 
January 1941 and the further additions they had requested (Table 4). Despite the 
discrepancies in approved and actual personnel strength, Treasury officials conceded that 
M.A.P. had delegated authority for appointment to the positions of Technical Officers and 
below and that the complement did not ‘look extravagant’. 10  
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Position Treasury Approved A.F.E.E. in Post A.F.E.E. Requested 
Principal Technical 
Officer 
1 1 1 
Senior Technical 
Officer 
1 3 4 
Technical Officer 4 6 7 
Assistant I - - 1 
Assistant II - 3 3 
Assistant III - 3 7 
Designer  - - 1 
Draughtsman I 1 2 3 
Draughtsman II - - 2 
Administration Service 
Clerk I 
- 1 1 
Administration Service 
Clerk III 
- - 1 
Temporary Clerk - 1 2 
Shorthand Typist - 2 3 
TOTAL 7 22 36 
 
Table 4: Treasury Analysis of Technical Development Section strength as of January 1942 
Source: T.N.A., T 162/755, Internal M.A.P. Memo, by S.G. Innes, 26 January 1942 
 
A formal reply to the M.A.P. request was sent on 13 February 1942 and although it 
was believed that four S.T.O. posts created a ‘top heavy complement’ 11 it was recognised 
that A.F.E.E. was a ‘new and relatively urgent service’. 12 Consequently, the request was 
approved on the condition that the situation would be reviewed bi-annually. The financial and 
human resource arrangements required serious attention in addition to the challenges of the 
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technical programme but the difficulty in obtaining the required professional expertise did not 
resemble any ‘urgency,’ particularly as the airborne capability was about to be deployed for 
the second time.  
Bruneval Raid (Operation Biting) 
 
The additional human resources reluctantly granted by the Treasury in February was 
to be somewhat justified later the same month when the airborne forces were presented with 
another opportunity to enhance their reputation as an effective fighting force with the 
capability to ‘strike a mortal blow’ as envisioned by Otway. 13  
 
The Germans had constructed a series of radar installations along the French coast 
to which British scientists attributed an increased interception and casualty rate of Bomber 
Command aircraft. 14 However, there was also concern that the German technology was 
capable of picking-up data traffic from the Telecommunication Research Establishment 
where all new British radio technology was designed and tested. 15 Consequently, the 
gathering of further information about the capabilities of German radio detection installations 
became of paramount importance both to the Air Staff, through the reduction in aircraft 
losses from intelligent coordinated searchlight and anti-aircraft gunnery, 16 and to the 
scientific community. The primary objective of Operation Biting was not to harass the enemy, 
as Churchill had originally decreed, 17 but to steal his technology. 
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The installations were well defended against seaborne attack, thus rendering a 
Commando operation impracticable, and consequently an airborne assault was selected as 
the preferred method of achieving the objective. The installation selected for attack was 
located on Cap d’Antifer to the north of the French village of Bruneval situated between the 
ports of Le Havre and Dieppe in northern France. 18 The airborne contingent chosen for the 
operation was the newly formed ‘C’ Company of the 2nd Parachute Battalion under the 
command of Major J.D. Frost, who was later immortalised for his defence of the road bridge 
at Arnhem during Operation Market Garden in 1944.  
 
‘C’ Company was to be delivered to its drop zone by Whitley aircraft of No.51 
Squadron R.A.F. and then extracted by means of Royal Navy landing craft. The Naval Force 
also contained a further thirty-two officers and men of the Royal Fusiliers and South Wales 
Borderers to assist by covering the withdrawal of the landing craft. 19 The airborne force was 
assigned specific tasks and split into three groups, each of which was forty men strong and 
named after famous sailors.  
 
‘Nelson’ Group under Lieutenant Charteris was to be dropped first in order to 
neutralise the shore defences ahead of the arrival of the landing craft and silence the 
garrison of Bruneval itself. ‘Drake’ Group under Lieutenant Young contained both Major 
Frost and Flight Sergeant Cox, an expert R.A.F. radio mechanic who was responsible for 
dismantling the radar. This group was tasked with storming the radar station itself. ‘Rodney’ 
Group was commanded by Lieutenant Timothy and tasked with containing a one hundred 
strong force of German troops garrisoned in an enclosure known as ‘La Presbytere’ situated 
some 400 yards north of the radar station. 20 
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As soon as the radar had been dismantled each group was to be withdrawn to the 
beach and evacuated by means of the naval landing craft. The gathering of detailed aerial 
photographs and intelligence was crucial in the construction of accurate scale models to be 
used in the briefing of the parachutists. The importance of accurate intelligence was another 
lesson learnt from Colossus whereby the airborne force discovered that the objective was 
constructed of reinforced concrete rather than masonry for which the explosive experts had 
prepared. 21  
 
With all intelligence gathered and favourable weather conditions reported the operation 
commenced on the evening of 27/28 February 1942. The flight was uneventful and the drop 
successful apart from half of Lieutenant Charteris’ force being deployed some two miles 
short of the target. Drake group was entirely successful in achieving its objective, with both 
the radar station and the troops stationed at ‘La Presbytere’ being taken by complete 
surprise. However, upon withdrawal to the beach this group sustained casualties from shore 
defences that had yet to be cleared by Lieutenant Charteris’ overly dispersed force. 22 
Communications were further hampered by radio failure which resulted in a breakdown of 
contact between the airborne forces and the waiting naval force. 23  
 
Indeed, breakdown in radio communication was a constant hazard to airborne 
operations during the Second World War. The effects of poor radio communication had not 
been satisfactorily addressed by September 1944 and had a devastating effect upon the 1st 
Airborne Division, particularly amongst Lieutenant-Colonel Frost’s forces at the Arnhem road 
bridge, during Operation Market Garden. 24 
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Fortunately, whilst the majority of ‘C’ Company were pinned down on the beach by 
the shore defences, the rest of ‘Nelson’ Group arrived and quickly subdued the enemy 
resistance. Shortly after 0200 hours the entire force was concentrated on the beach and 
made contact with the naval craft by means of emergency Very signal. Despite fierce enemy 
fire the airborne force and vital radar equipment were successfully withdrawn from the beach 
with the loss of six killed, five wounded and six missing. 25  
 
The Bruneval Raid not only gave the newly established Parachute Regiment its first 
battle honour but also gave the British public heart at a time when they had witnessed very 
little military success. Consequently, the War Office encouraged full media coverage of the 
raid and the King approved the award of numerous decorations ‘for daring skill, and 
seamanship in successful Combined Operations against the enemy at Bruneval.’ 26  
 
Although the decorations were undoubtedly deserved the omission of any awards for 
the role of the R.A.F. pilots of No.51 Squadron, or of Fighter Command, who launched a 
diversionary raid to draw off enemy aircraft, is notable.  Without the full cooperation and the 
navigational skills of the R.A.F. pilots there would have been no operation for other forces to 
have participated in. The contribution of the Airborne Forces Establishment and the newly 
created Airborne Forces Experimental Establishment to the success of the operation was 
also overlooked. This may have been understandable in terms of maintaining security, but it 
may well have prompted the Station Adjutant to record in the O.R.B. on 28 February that the 
‘Establishment and the A.F.E. were closely associated in the preparation for this operation 
not only in connection with the training of the paratroops and the design of equipment but in 
the actual preparation for the operation itself.’ 27  
 
                                               
25
 T.N.A., CAB 66/22/42, War Cabinet Weekly Résumé (No. 131), by Chiefs of Staff, 5 March 1942.  
26
 ‘Daring in Combined Operations’, The Times, 16 May 1942, p. 2. 
27
 T.N.A., AIR 29/512, A.F.E.E. Sherburn-in-Elmet, 28 February 1942.  
173 
 
Interestingly, those decorations awarded to airborne personnel only listed their parent 
regiments and there is no mention of the Parachute Regiment as an autonomous unit (See 
Appendix 8). The notion that they were only attached to the Airborne Division, as if on a 
secondment, is curious but could well reflect just how much work was required to create an 
independent airborne force amongst the more established regiments of the British Army and 
the determination of those regiments to retain their men. Peter Fleming argued that: 
 
All armies, however, have a strong prejudice against what the British Army in 
those days called ‘gladiators’. Picked troops are all very well, but they have to 
be picked from somewhere, and commanding officers take it amiss when their 
most promising young officers and NCOs are posted, or ask for a posting, to 
some new-fangled corps or unit with a supposedly glamorous role. 28 
 
The fact that the parent regiments of most of the parachutists involved in the raid were 
stationed in the United Kingdom is a good indication as to why there was no shortage of 
requests amongst regulars for service in the airborne forces. 29  
   
The Bruneval operation was an operational success which accelerated British 
knowledge of German radar technology 30 and also resulted in the relocation of the 
Telecommunications Research Establishment to Malvern, beyond the range of German 
radio detection capabilities. 31 It also demonstrated that extraction by sea was feasible, if not 
the most practicable technique. A demonstration for the King and Queen of British parachute 
forces soon after the Bruneval Raid further enhanced the status of British airborne forces. 
The Times reported the following on 26 March 1942: 
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The King and Queen saw the parachute troops in action. A flight of black 
painted Wellington bombers flew over the aerodrome and one by one white 
and coloured parachutes opened out as men dropped from the aircraft. A 
formidable company of parachute troops was soon on the ground. The men 
came over at the double and lined up to be inspected by the King and  
Queen. 32 
 
The opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Parachute Regiment in front of such 
distinguished guests may have been just as useful to General Browning, in terms of 
obtaining resources for his airborne troops, as was the successful outcome of the Bruneval 
operation itself.  
 
Indeed, Frost believed that both Browning and Churchill used the success of the 
Bruneval raid as justification for further requests of aircraft from the Air Ministry for the 
purpose of both experimentation and operational deployment. 33 Churchill also assembled 
the War Cabinet on 3 March for an analysis of the operation from those who took part and 
‘reasserted before them his belief in the future of airborne forces.’ 34 However, Biting was a 
relatively small-scale affair and only the second such parachute operation conducted by the 
British since training commenced some 20 months previous. Despite the good publicity the 
British were incapable of achieving the divisional strength deployment of airborne troops 
without the procurement of American aircraft and materiel.   
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Further Development 
 
Away from operations the development programme continued to gain momentum but 
on 8 March the prototype Horsa glider crashed due to the port engine of the Whitley tug 
catching alight. The poor performance of tug aircraft became a recurrent theme.  Fortunately 
there were no casualties and a replacement Horsa was delivered on 10 March in time for a 
visit by Colonel Hicks, 2nd in Command of the 1st Airlanding Brigade, to the Establishment. 35  
 
Further visits were conducted throughout the month and on 11 March Captain Elliot, 
Bomber Command Liaison Officer, departed A.F.E.E. after a short visit in possession of 
completed copies of lectures that had been prepared at the Establishment concerning the 
training of Bomber Crews in the practice of parachute dropping. 36 yet Elliot’s lectures may 
well have been premature since no single aircraft type had been identified in adequate 
numbers for the purpose of parachute drops. 
    
In the same vein, numerous aircraft types were still being tested in the glider 
programme. The first trials were conducted with a Miles Master II, a two seat monoplane 
advanced trainer, and twin Hotspur glider combination on 13 April. 37 However, the 
experiment was unsuccessful due to the poor performance of the tug engine which required 
the design and installation of a revised oil cooling system.  
 
Meanwhile, the professionalism of the A.F.E.E. was reinforced on 27 April when Sir 
Robert Renwick 38 visited from the Air Ministry to discuss technological production in his 
capacity as Chairman of the Committee for the development, supply, transport and storage 
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of all equipment of the Airborne Forces (later the Airborne Forces Committee). 
Consequently, regular contact was maintained between A.F.E.E. and the Airborne Forces 
Committee and Group Captain Harvey attended a further meeting on 6 June. 39 Otway 
argues that the Committee covered a ‘lot of useful ground and considerably speeded up the 
supply of equipment to airborne forces.’ 40 
 
The reorganisation of the Establishment continued and on 16 May 1942 Harvey 
attended a conference at the Air Ministry where it was decided that the A.F.E.E. should 
move to its own dedicated airfield at Sherburn-in-Elmet as soon as accommodation was 
available. 41 On 10 June Air Marshal Linnell visited the Unit to discuss future organisation 
and experimentation and on 15 June a detachment of the Development Squadron based at 
R.A.F. Snaith, moved to R.A.F. Sherburn-in-Elmet under the command of Squadron Leader 
Nesbit-Dufort. By 1 July 1942 A.F.E.E. was established there and transferred from Army Co-
operation Command to R.A.F. No. 21 Group Flying Training Command with detachments 
remaining at both Snaith and Ringway for research purposes. 42 Subsequent entries in the 
O.R.B. were entitled Sherburn-in-Elmet. 
 
Nevertheless, close co-operation with personnel from other establishments remained 
paramount to the development programme and on 9 July Wing Commander Howard, Liaison 
Officer Bomber Command, visited A.F.E.E. in connection with the modification of bomber 
aircraft for parachute purposes. This was followed on the 21st by a visit from Flight Lieutenant 
Armstrong of P.1 (Discipline) No. 21 Group to discuss the Form 765 (C) procedure, the 
return of forced landings and flying accidents documentation.  
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By August 1942 A.F.E.E. was required to undertake performance tests on the Hamilcar 
glider and Group Captain Harvey held a conference at Newmarket on 2 August following full 
load trials of the aircraft undertaken by General Aircraft Ltd. Consequently, on 6 August, four 
members of the Development Squadron proceeded on detachment to Newmarket to conduct 
service trials. 43 The functionality of the Hamilcar was soon under evaluation and on 18 
August a conference was held at Newmarket to discuss the procedure for the jettisoning of 
the Hamilcar undercarriage and the following day full load tests were undertaken. 44 
 
Following this conference it was decided to fit parachutes to the undercarriage 
components of operational Hamilcar gliders. The modification was completed on 3 
September and the first tests of this installation were conducted at Newmarket the next day. 
On 8 September the final service trial tests were completed at Newmarket but the Hamilcar 
was damaged owing to the collapse of the undercarriage during take-off. 45 Hamilcar D.R. 
851 arrived at R.A.F. Snaith on 21 September and proceeded to R.A.F. Riccall,  46  and on 
23 September Colonel Green of the American Mission accompanied Flight Lieutenant 
Kronfeld on a test flight. A second prototype, D.P. 210, arrived at Riccall from Newmarket on 
29 September. 47  
Ministry Bureaucracy 
 
Subsequent to Sir Robert Renwick’s visit A.F.E.E. took the opportunity on 2 May 1942 
to approach M.A.P. for the further professional resources in support of the technical 
development programme (See Appendix 9). The demand of the flight test programme 
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required the additional staff resource in Technical Development Section 1. However, 
Grinsted (D.D.R.D.T.) recommended that the two Technical Assistant II positions sought 
should be resourced from elsewhere within M.A.P. and transferred from either the Aircraft & 
Armament Experimental Establishment (A. & A.E.E.) 48 or Marine Aircraft Experimental 
Establishment (M.A.E.E.) 49 for the purpose. 50  
 
It was accepted that the additional technical assistants could be found from new 
entrants who would not necessarily require aircraft experience. However, A.F.E.E. required 
that further resources be seconded from other research Establishments in the short-term for 
the progression of immediate research priorities. As Grinsted recommended: 
 
I think that for proper progress it will be necessary to arrange for at least 
two men, preferably of Technical Officer standing, thoroughly experienced 
in aircraft performance testing to be transferred if only on temporary loan 
from R.A.E. It will take some time to find the five additional T.A.IIIs and it is 
essential that A.F.E.E. should have immediate assistance to enable all the 
important work to proceed. 51 
 
The provision of additional technical staff of sufficient qualification and experience was at a 
premium and consequently there was competition between the various M.A.P. 
Establishments to present a case for the procurement of expertise. Mr Rowe, Director of 
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Technical Development (D.T.D.), believed that A.F.E.E. had used the visit of Renwick to 
their advantage: 
 
A.F.E.E. have obviously obtained the impression that priorities on Airborne 
Forces have been raised since the appointment of Sir Robert Renwick as 
general coordinator; hence they took the opportunity of his visit on 24.4.42 
to raise questions of staffing etc., required to make headway at the higher 
rate. I think this action is justifiable in the circumstances, but I have written 
to the C.O. asking him to ensure that he puts his requests for staff through 
the normal channels in future. 52  
 
Despite the gentle reminder to Group Captain Harvey with regards to procurement protocol 
Rowe recommended to C.R.D. that the new establishment should be approved. However, Air 
Marshal Sorley’s adjutant responded on 28 May with modifications that included the deletion 
of the five technical assistant posts and the re-grading of the four technical officer positions 
to Flight Lieutenants. Sorley requested that M.A.P. ‘take the necessary action to establish 
these posts’ 53 and that he be informed when this had been completed so that posting action 
with the Air Ministry could be instituted.   
 
Although C.R.D. approved the establishment with amendments the provision for a 
section to undertake live drops in the trial of parachute installations had not been progressed 
and D.D.R.D.T was forced to write on behalf of A.F.E.E. on 9 June 1942 regarding the 
urgency of the matter: 
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The establishment of the R.A.F. personnel required, and in particular, 
parachute jumpers is now much more urgent, in view of the proposed 
move of the A.F.E.E. from Ringway to Sherburn-in-Elmet which is 
due to take place very shortly, in fact, the advance parties are already 
in Sherburn I believe.  May urgent action, therefore, be taken on this 
particular matter of establishing a section for parachute dropping 
personnel and arrangements made which will ensure that the actual 
men posted for this duty are not retained too long on dangerous 
duties of this description. 54 
 
Grinsted not only recognised the need to ensure that provision for this element of the 
technical programme was made but also that the experimental work was inherently 
dangerous. Therefore he proposed a system of frequent replacements of trained men from 
the Parachute Training School to mitigate the risks involved. 55 
 
However, the general opinion within M.A.P. was that further information was required 
from Harvey with regard to the exact employment of the additional personnel before the 
request could be approved; somewhat ironic considering Harvey had previously requested 
further information regarding the tactical requirements of the entire enterprise. Consequently, 
M.A.P. sent a letter to Harvey that requested clarification of his requirements for this function 
and the situation continued to be debated internally. 
 
Although A.F.E.E. had successfully developed into a semi-autonomous research 
institution and was in the process of transferring to its own R.A.F. station it was thus not 
immune from bureaucratic red tape and there was no guarantee that the staff required would 
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be made available. Indeed, Grinsted made the following comments on 10 June 1942 in an 
internal memorandum that was copied to A.F.E.E.     
 
We would ask that your request for two sergeant parachute training 
instructors should be held back pending reply. We feel that instructors will 
be wasted on this type of duty and what we need are Army personnel 
trained in parachute jumping and the number we require is 12 as previously 
stated. I believe it is true that army Officers and other personnel are 
already shown on the A.F.E.E. Establishment, therefore, no difficulty 
should be found in establishing a number of parachute troops. 56 
 
It was certainly true that Army personnel were present on the A.F.E.E. staff as it was crucial 
that the end-user was involved in all stages of the development process to ensure 
operational requirements were achieved. Major Redwood was the senior Army Liaison 
Officer attached to A.F.E.E. and at the time of writing he was employed in procuring various 
Army stores and weaponry for the purpose of experimentation. 57  
 
M.A.P. was also unhappy with the terminology of the A.F.E.E. request for additional 
resources and Grinsted concluded that the correct term for ‘parachute repairers’, as stated in 
the original request, should be ‘Fabric Workers’ as the Ministry had found the former term 
misleading. 58 Grinsted also referred to the need for further information in regard to the 
request for six Aircraft Hands to perform general duties although he was relatively well 
informed as to the nature of their proposed employment: 
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We are aware that there is a good deal of unskilled work arising in 
connection with these experimental drops, not only in dummy drops but in 
live drops as well. In the latter case, it is essential that the parachute be left 
lying in precisely the position in which it drops and therefore at some later 
stage there is unskilled work involved in collecting these parachutes. 59 
 
Harvey submitted a further explanation of his personnel requirements which were 
subsequently approved by M.A.P. on 15 July 1942. However, Grinsted had to write directly to 
C.R.D.  on 23 September because the issue had still not been resolved and had 
consequently resulted in a direct impact upon the development programme: 
 
Our work on parachute development has definitely suffered of late, delay 
having occurred on most important tests. In our view it is definitely 
necessary to include such personnel in our own establishment. 60 
 
The issue was finally resolved on 24 September when the C.R.D. approved the additional 
posts but it had taken some five months of justification and review, all of which added 
pressure and delay to the technical programme. 61 The pedantic nature of the process 
certainly does not indicate that the A.F.E.E. and its research were afforded any form of 
preferential treatment.    
 
Although research was undoubtedly essential, the dedication of the A.F.E.E. to 
experimentation, which caused subsequent delay to production and deployment, provoked 
antagonism between the Establishment and the Army. Despite the intensive development 
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programme, reorganisation, relocation, the progress achieved by the Establishment was not 
considered satisfactory by Major-General Browning. 62 The following section will examine the 
nature of Browning’s criticism and determine whether fault lay with the management of the 
research programme by A.F.E.E. or a more deep routed problem of insufficient strategic 
direction.  
Attack on A.F.E.E. by Major-General Browning 
 
Major-General Browning first visited the Establishment in November 1941 63  but 
developed concerns with regard to the productivity and capacity of the A.F.E.E. to conduct 
the necessary research and development required for the further development of airborne 
warfare. Browning outlined his misgivings in a dated 26 September 1942 to Colonel 
Llewellin, then Minister of Aircraft Production. The principal criticism was that the A.F.E.E. 
personnel were slow to carry out experiments and once completed, their conclusions were 
often erroneous:  
 
They have been consistently behind their programme (and far behind it). 
They take a long time to carry out any experiment or trial which has been 
ordered by M.A.P., and on completion of this extended trial they are often 
proved to be inaccurate. This has been proved by the Airborne Division and 
38 Wing 64 by local trials which, quite unofficial I own, have been carried out 
owing to the abysmal slowness and lack of enterprise of A.F.E.E. 65 
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Frost’s analogy of Browning as the ‘most famous Adjutant’ 66 Sandhurst ever had suggests 
that he might not have been accustomed to the necessary flexibility of present at a research 
establishment or the limited resources available. Indeed he complained that:    
 
I have definite proof that aircrews, and others connected with the trials, are 
invariably half-an-hour to an hour late starting their work, they leave off 
work when they feel like it, and the whole thing is run on lackadaisical and 
slipshod lines. 67 
 
Browning also accused the A.F.E.E. of obstructiveness through its claims that certain 
procedures were not operationally feasible when they had been continuously demonstrated 
on exercises and had ‘become an accepted method in airborne affairs.’ 68  
 
Browning listed some examples of what he believed to be incorrect conclusions 
drawn from recent experimentation. The first concerned the number of men that could be 
dropped from a Wellington bomber. A.F.E.E. had recommended the maximum number was 8 
whilst the airborne division had ‘consistently dropped 10’, 69 which Browning argued was the 
‘operational normality’; a rather ostentatious claim as the Wellington was never used 
operationally for the deployment of airborne forces. 
 
Browning also accused the A.F.E.E. of negligence concerning the capability of the 
Whitley: 
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Trials with the Whitley V and Horsa have been going on under M.A.P., both 
by A.F.E.E. and Airspeeds for the last six months. It was not until the Heavy 
Glider Conversion Unit was started at Brize Norton for converting glider 
pilots from Hotspur to the Horsa, that it was discovered that the Whitley 
was a totally unsuitable tug for operational use. 70 
 
He had identified the key issue of aircraft provision, as had Keyes in July 1940, 71 but laid the 
blame at entirely the wrong door. The A.F.E.E., and its predecessors, could only make the 
best they could with the limited resources available; the fact remained that airborne forces 
were certainly not deemed a strategic priority in terms of the provision of existing aircraft 
suitable for their purposes. 
 
Browning was further dissatisfied with the speed at which experimentation and 
technological solutions were supplied by A.F.E.E. in response to War Office Operational 
Requirements. Particular reference was made to the dropping of weaponry by parachute 
which included the 3.7 Howitzer, 6 Pounder and 2 Pounder Anti-Tank guns and 20mm 
Hispano Cannon, although the specific Operational Requirements do not appear to have 
been recorded. 72 
 
This was an urgent requirement put in months ago. Little action, so far as I 
can find out, has been taken, and the failure in the respect is having 
increasingly regrettable effects in connection with proposed operations. 73   
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Similar criticism was directed at research into the feasibility of the Albemarle as a glider tug. 
Browning argued that 38 Wing had managed to acquire one aircraft and complete the trials in 
two days and justified the distortion of roles and responsibilities thus:  
 
We fully realise that it is not the function of 38 Wing to carry out 
experiments, but with a war on our hands these answers must be 
produced. 74 
 
In fact, Browning applied to the Air Ministry for the creation of a technical development flight 
at 38 Wing in order to undertake essential trials on work that A.F.E.E. had supposedly failed 
to produce. 75 His list of complaints closed with the following paragraph: 
 
I would emphasise that there is plenty of enthusiasm about for Airborne 
Forces, mostly in the Army, less in the R.A.F., and a great deal in M.A.P., 
except, apparently, in A.F.E.E. 76 
 
Browning’s criticisms were, in many respects, justified but complaining about the A.F.E.E. 
was not going to solve the underlying strategic shortcomings that ultimately caused 
disruption to the development programme. 
 
The accusations instigated a series of correspondence from a variety of stakeholders 
involved in the technical development of the airborne force. Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald 
Weeks, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, sent a letter to Air Marshal F.J. Linnell 
(C.R.D.), at Ministry of Aircraft Production on 30 September 1942: 
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Gale [Major-General Sir R.N. Gale: War Office Specialist Director Airborne] 
has told me of the letter Browning has addressed to the Minister of Aircraft 
Production. He has also told me of your wish that no action should be taken 
in connection with this letter. 77 
 
Weeks believed that great progress had been made towards solving the technical problems 
connected with airborne forces and commented that ‘the concrete evidence of the great 
advance that has been made in the last twelve months would, I am sure, dumbfound most 
critics.’ 78 The empathy expressed in the last paragraph of Weeks’ letter was appreciated by 
Air Marshal Linnell who responded on 30 September: 
 
I should like many things to be going at double the speed in the 
development line but the very magnitude of the programme has been one 
of the difficulties. However, I hope that we have cleared off the worst of our 
troubles now and the fact that the Unit is at last established in its own 
Station should make things easier for the future. 79 
 
The correspondence does suggest that senior officers were sympathetic to the technical 
difficulties involved in the creation of the new technology and that, although Browning’s 
frustration at the pace of development was recognised, his actions were not necessarily 
supported. However, the criticisms did result in an official investigation by Air Commodore 
McEntecart, Deputy Controller Research and Development (D.C.R.D.), and Group Captain 
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Vernon, Deputy Director of Technical Development (D.D.T.D.) into the points raised by 
Browning. 80 
Response to Major-General Browning’s Criticism 
 
Browning failed to appreciate that R.A.F. Sherburn-in-Elmet required extensive 
structural modification which had commenced immediately from the time of the A.F.E.E. 
occupation and was not completed until December 1942. Despite the simplification and 
standardisation of temporary construction then employed by the Design Branches of the Air 
Ministry to expedite production, shortage of materials and labour delayed progress. 81 
 
Due to these difficulties the flying programme was redistributed between Sherburn, 
Ringway, Ricknall and Snaith whilst the construction of new runways and associated 
buildings was taking place. At the time of Browning’s criticisms the infrastructure was not in 
place for the entire Establishment to be accommodated on station and a large proportion 
remained on detachment at Ringway which further complicated the research programme. 82  
 
Consequently, the investigation concluded that it was considered that maximum effort 
was being made on the reconstruction and the work of the Establishment was being carried 
out as efficiently as conditions allowed. 83 Similarly, morale and discipline at the 
Establishment did not appear to reflect the criticism in Browning’s letter. McEntecart and 
Vernon concluded that: 
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The morale of the Station is considered to be good, particularly so under 
the present difficult circumstances. There is enthusiasm for the work and a 
healthy keenness displayed by the Commanding Officer and the heads of 
the Flying and Technical Sections. It is difficult accurately to assess this 
owing to the Unit being dispersed with detachments to so many widely 
separated centres, but it is considered from what was seen at Sherburn 
that it would be comparable with that at other Experimental Establishments, 
and is satisfactory. 84 
 
The report also recognised the substantial reorganisation that had been undertaken since 
formation on 16 February 1942. The restructure included the addition of new senior staff, 
both service and civilian, and it was believed that these appointments would return 
substantial efficiencies once construction work was completed. 85  
 
However, despite the fact that the investigation did not reveal any substantial matters 
of concern certain recommendations were made. The most significant of which was a 
change in Commanding Officer, although it was clearly stated that this was no reflection 
upon the performance of Group Captain Harvey: 
 
It is now recommended that a change in Commanding Officer would be 
desirable. In this respect it is, however, strongly emphasised that this 
recommendation is based mainly on the fact that the present Commanding 
Officer has been in charge of this Unit since its formation, and should now 
be given a change. It is in no way associated with the comments in Major- 
General Browning’s letter. 86 
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The replacement of such a senior member of personnel who had been involved with the 
development of the airborne capability from the outset and pushed for the formulation of 
strategic policy 87 can only have been detrimental to the success of the research programme. 
Despite the denial, it would appear that the decision to replace Harvey was made simply for 
political reasons to placate Browning.  
Technical Points 
 
The investigation also addressed various technical issues. With regards to the issue of 
the number of men that could be carried and dropped from the Wellington there would 
appear to have been inconsistencies in the Army requirements. It was concluded that eight 
was the maximum number of men that could be carried and dropped after the comfort of 
troops and the range of the aircraft were taken into consideration. 88 However, the Army 
amended this requirement to increase the maximum number of paratroops to ten and 
although this had been demonstrated to be feasible at 38 Wing it had not been approved by 
A.F.E.E. as suitable under operational conditions. It was concluded that the increased 
capacity was acceptable ‘if longer sticks, cramped accommodation, and shorter range can be 
accepted as operational normalities.’ 89 
 
The issue of the unsuitability of the Whitley V as a tug aircraft for the Horsa glider was 
more fundamental than simply a failure by A.F.E.E. to notify the Heavy Glider Conversion 
Unit and the limitations of the aircraft had been extensively documented. 90 The problem of 
obtaining suitable aircraft capable of conversion to the airborne role remained throughout the 
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course of the war but became particularly prominent once the larger gliders entered service.  
The problems experienced at R.A.F. Brize Norton were summarised as follows: 
 
The main trouble at Brize Norton is attributable to the fact that the size of 
the aerodrome is less than two thirds of the distance required to meet the 
conditions laid down in the clearance. This has been aggravated by the 
Unit flying with a heavier Whitley load than the one specified in the 
clearance. Subsequent to release high oil temperatures were experienced 
when towing the Horsa at full load during the summer. Improved oil cooling 
was achieved by modification, and Flying Training Command confirmed on 
the 21 September that as a result their difficulties have been considerably 
reduced. 91 
 
Other methods were recorded as being under urgent consideration to ‘still further to improve 
the Whitley V’s performance as a tug, as well as improving the glider.’ 92 Despite Browning’s 
frustration there was little more that could be achieved by the way of experimentation with 
that particular aircraft type. The first Horsa prototype was not actually delivered to A.F.E.E. 
until March 1942 and on the 8th of the month the aircraft crashed due to the port engine of the 
Whitley towing tug catching alight. 93 The reality had little to do with the performance of the 
A.F.E.E. but with the fact that the Whitley was not capable as an operational tug and it was 
recorded that ‘repeated efforts through the Airborne Forces Committee have been made to 
obtain more powerful tugs, but none were available.’ 94  
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With regards to the carriage and deployment by parachute of Heavy Equipment, 
A.F.E.E. maintained that it had only been asked for advice as to the practicability of carriage 
and dropping of this equipment and that, contrary to Browning’s insistence, there had never 
been an operational requirement issued for this function. 95 Indeed, ‘it was considered that 
this could best be done between M.A.P. and the various contractors, the A.F.E.E. not being 
called upon to carry out practical tests.’ 96 The report also included the following paragraph 
with regards to the Heavy Equipment to which Browning referred: 
 
On 24 September Air Staff informed us that they had no commitment for 
transporting such specialised items of military equipment, and did not 
consider diverting technical capacity justified until it was clear that it was 
proved necessary. 97 
 
Nevertheless, every effort was being made to realise the practicality of the request and Major 
Redwood, attached to M.A.P. in an Army liaison capacity, was in the process of trying to 
obtain drawings and the Army equipment listed. 
  
However, the equipment arrived in various stages with the 6 lb. gun being delivered 
at the end of August 1942 and other parts later. The 3.7 Howitzer or 20 mm. Hispano 
Cannon for example had not been made available for experimentation at the time of 
Browning’s letter. 98 But once equipment was available for the purpose of experimentation 
thorough evaluation was undertaken and, with regard to the dropping the 75mm Pack 
Howitzer M1, extensive analysis was conducted between 1943 and 1944. 99  
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The points raised regarding the Albemarle could not be considered in isolation of the 
wider recurrent theme that aircraft were utilised for purposes for which they had not originally 
been designed and that the production of gliders had preceded strategic developments. The 
initial request concerning the Albemarle was that investigations be conducted into its 
suitability as a paratroop aircraft rather than as a glider tug. However, the first reports into 
paratrooping from the aircraft were not issued until 1943 100 and 1944. 101  
 
Meanwhile, in August 1942, emphasis was placed on the necessity for its clearance 
as a glider tug aircraft but owing to various technical troubles an example was not available 
for tests until 6 September. 102 By the end of October 1942 investigations were nearly 
complete but despite better performances being achieved through the application of different 
flying techniques the type could not be given full clearance as a tug due to the fact that 
cylinder temperatures remained in excess by 15° - 25° ‘of the permissible engine  
limitations.’ 103  
 
The fact that the Albemarle/Horsa combination had been flown by 38 Wing was not 
satisfactory technical evidence of its suitability as an operational aircraft. The performance 
evaluation conducted by A.F.E.E. calibrated for all climatic conditions and 38 Wing had no 
way of correcting to standard conditions or means of measuring engine cylinder 
temperatures. Consequently, although flight in the autumn might have easily been achieved 
it did not guarantee that a similar flight could be conducted under operational conditions on 
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the hottest day of summer. The report summarised the importance of comprehensive flight 
trials as thus:  
 
It is considered that the writer of the letter fails to appreciate fully all that is 
involved in testing and acquiring data to enable an aircraft to be given full 
clearance for operational use. Such clearance has got to cover the full 
range of temperatures between summer and winter, and without reducing 
the results obtained on one particular flight to cover this range a complete 
clearance such as is expected from an Experimental Establishment cannot 
be given. 104 
 
It would appear from the correspondence and subsequent investigation that Browning’s 
criticism of A.F.E.E. was largely unfounded. However, apart from the sympathy conveyed by 
Lieutenant-General Weeks, the majority of the responses were generated by R.A.F. 
personnel who might naturally be defensive of any criticism of their service.  
 
Although it is clear that Browning did not fully appreciate the complexities of the 
technical programme there was some truth in his closing observations that the R.A.F. 
appeared to lack enthusiasm for airborne forces. 105 This was particularly evident in the 
difficulties experienced by Air Marshal Linnell in the acquisition of estate and aircraft from the 
Air Ministry for the purpose of glider development. It was an ironic situation, particularly as 
the technical development of gliders had been instigated upon Air Ministry  
recommendations. 106 
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The following comments from Linnell dated 5 August 1942 to Director of Operations, 
Air Ministry, on the use of Hartford Bridge Aerodrome for Glider Development clearly 
demonstrated the tension and frustration between the key stakeholders and justified 
Browning’s accusation with regards to lack of cooperation from the R.A.F.:  
 
From the correspondence on this and other similar matters where I have 
been forced to seek further accommodation from the Air Ministry for glider 
development, one cannot escape the idea that a feeling prevails in the Air 
Ministry and outside in the R.A.F. that this type of activity is being 
undertaken by the M.A.P. more as a matter of pure research than as an 
urgent operational development. It would help me greatly if you would 
correct this impression whenever it comes to your notice. 107 
 
The inference that the work of M.A.P., and thus A.F.E.E., was more of a theoretical 
orientation rather than a strategic operational requirement is not too dissimilar to Browning’s 
constant insistence that 38 Wing had solved practical problems far more quickly than the 
dedicated experimental establishment. However, despite Linnell’s connection to M.A.P. he 
displayed a certain sympathy with the Air Ministry’s position:  
 
Nobody would be more thankful than I to see the last of glider development 
and to be able to direct the very great development effort engaged thereon, 
into other channels. But we have a definite and pressing commitment to the 
Air Staff to complete the development programme which will enable the 
Airborne Force to be fully prepared by a date in 1943. I am asking for 
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nothing more than the bare minimum to enable us to complete this 
programme. 108 
 
The correspondence does not suggest that the development of airborne forces was a 
strategic priority but rather supports the evidence that technological development was 
politically driven. Despite the allocation of an airfield for the purpose of technical 
development there remained inadequate resource allocation in terms of aircraft and 
specialist personnel to pursue the application of the technology. 
Acquisition of Aircraft and the Competition for Resources 
 
The procurement of aircraft, particularly for the purpose of glider towing, remained a 
constant impediment to the development of airborne forces and the issue regarding the 
Albemarle highlighted the circumstances in which the A.F.E.E. had to operate. 109 As with the 
necessary utilisation of the Hawker Hector and Bristol Bombay by the C.L.S. and C.L.E. 110 
the introduction of the Albemarle into R.A.F. service as a glider tug simply continued the 
British tradition of using obsolete aircraft types to fill the gap in airborne forces provision.  
 
With regards to equipment, notwithstanding the constraints of weight and size when 
transported by air, the General Staff had control over procurement and development in line 
with operational requirements. Such control, however, did not apply with regard to the 
provision of aircraft for either training or operational purposes. 111 The Air Ministry produced 
guidelines in 1940 relating to aircraft provision that set the precedent for all future 
development. It was made clear that aircraft would only undertake parachute dropping duties 
as a secondary role and those types provided for training should also be available for 
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operational duties to avoid unnecessary familiarisation training. 112 The function of glider 
towing had then yet to be considered. This would explain the initial dependence upon the 
Whitley and Greenacre has argued that it was issued even though it was obviously 
unsuitable for the purpose: 
 
It was admitted that the Whitley was technically far from ideal. The 
paratroops had to jump through a hole in the floor, a difficult and sometimes 
dangerous procedure. The best method of exiting an aircraft was through 
large doors in the side of the fuselage, as preferred by the Germans with 
their Junkers 52. 113 
    
However, although the Whitley was not suited to the airborne role at least it had initially been 
utilised in the bombing function for which it was originally designed. This was not the case 
with the Albemarle.  
 
The Albemarle A.W.41 was the victim of a series of complex changes to specification 
and consequent modifications that ensured the aircraft had become technologically obsolete 
long before it entered service. The contract was originally awarded to the Bristol Aeroplane 
Company in 1938 for the production of a bomber aircraft but responsibility was transferred to 
Armstrong Whitworth after the specification was changed to that of a reconnaissance 
bomber. 114 There were striking similarities between the production technique of the 
Albemarle and that employed on assault gliders in that it was designed to be produced by a 
wide variety of non-aviation specialist subcontractors using limited materials. Oliver Tapper 
notes that: 
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As an insurance against a possible shortage of exotic alloys and the 
devastation of British aircraft factories; the A.W.41 was to be built mainly of 
wood and steel, and was to be extensively sub-contracted to a variety of 
firms whose skills would not be fully employed on other war work. 115 
 
Although the principle was logical it resulted in a complex supply chain that was dependent 
upon the productivity of over one thousand sub-contractors scattered across the United 
Kingdom and this severely delayed production.  
 
Meanwhile, in a contemporary article the construction technique was deemed to 
contain ‘considerable ingenuity’ 116 and the procurement process was also thought 
innovative: 
 
It is an interesting aspect of production methods that the Albemarle is 
completely sub-contracted to firms ranging from furniture makers to 
manufacturers of hairdressing equipment, and, the machine being split up 
into a number of major sections, all that is done finally is to assemble these 
sections into the complete aircraft. 117    
 
The procurement and manufacturing processes utilised in the production of the Albemarle 
and assault gliders were indeed similar but the implications for the former were inhibitive to 
performance.  
 
Consequently, by the time solutions to the manufacturing techniques had been 
implemented and the aircraft was produced in numbers it was effectively redundant in its 
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intended function. George Peden defends the aircraft industry and blames the procurement 
process for such obsolescence:    
 
British warplanes did not always fulfil their potential or the Air Staff’s hope, 
but problems tended to arise from a mismatch of strategic or tactical 
doctrine with technical possibilities rather than with shortcomings of British 
aircraft design. 118 
 
In terms of the Albemarle the war-time administration was clearly aware of the difficulties. On 
5 January 1942 the Minister of Supply (J.T.C. Moore-Brabazon), the Secretary of State for 
Air (Sinclair) and the Minister of Aircraft Production (Beaverbrook) presented a Joint 
Memorandum to the War Cabinet concerning the Albemarle.  
 
The report concluded that, despite the delay, if the current contract for 500 airframes 
was cancelled then the government would have committed to ‘expenditure in excess of 7¾ 
million pounds for no ultimate output.’ 119 Consequently, the memorandum recommended 
that the current order for 500 aircraft should be completed as Albemarle deliveries would 
play a useful part in alleviating aircraft shortages and the first 200 aircraft would be employed 
as advanced trainers for Bomber Command. The following 300 aircraft could be employed 
as special transport/glider-tugs: 
 
At a later date, Albemarle deliveries in this form would be a welcome 
contribution to aircraft supply, as without them it would be a matter of great 
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difficulty to provide the aircraft needed for the transport and airborne forces 
role. 120 
 
Hence the future association of the Albemarle with airborne forces, despite its recognised 
deficiencies, was assured and there was little that the A.F.E.E. could produce to improve 
both tactical and operational effectiveness apart from creating safe operating procedures 
that were invariably below the expectations of the end-user.  
 
Tapper argued that the production of the Albemarle did prove that ‘extensive sub-
contracting by firms entirely ignorant of aircraft construction could, given time, be made to 
work effectively’ 121 and this was certainly the contemporary opinion:   
 
All in all the Albemarle, although officially classified as a second-line 
aircraft, appears to be a very good although unorthodox job, and when it is 
considered that well over 1,000 sub-contractors are engaged in its 
manufacture and there is no parent factory in the true sense of the term – 
only an assembly base – then those many people who have been 
concerned in its production deserve a very real measure of appreciation. 122 
 
However, such a technique was problematic in terms of meeting strategic military demand 
within the context of the war-time economy due to logistics and the supply of component 
parts. Should the principle have been applied holistically to the process of aircraft 
manufacture and procurement then it would have undoubtedly failed to meet production 
targets with disastrous strategic consequences.  
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In the Official History of the control of material Hurstfield concludes that ‘an allocation 
system can function fairly smoothly as long as some coherent plan is followed.’ 123 If a 
strategic requirement was clearly identified then the flexibility of the procurement system was 
crucial to successful production. However, without a clear strategic concept the limitations of 
the multiple sub-contract procurement system chosen for the production of gliders were 
obvious. If glider manufacture, and the subsequent development of airborne warfare had 
been a strategic priority from the outset it would have been unlikely that such a procurement 
method would have been adopted.  
 
Despite initial support for multiple sub-contract manufacturing techniques, aviation 
journalists eventually became critical of the Albemarle and its associated procurement 
process. The following extract, entitled ‘Dumbo of British Aircraft’, was published in The 
Times on 27 January 1944: 
 
There is now in substantial production in England an aeroplane which 
those engaged in making it have nicknamed ‘Dumbo’ after the unwanted 
baby elephant of film fame. The Albemarle is the first British operational 
type of aircraft to be fitted with a tricycle undercarriage. It was designed at 
a time when the authorities expected a scarcity of light alloys and other 
specialized aircraft materials and when there was anxiety as to the 
adequacy of skilled aircraft manufacturing facilities. For those reasons 
wood and steel were used almost exclusively. Production is largely 
undertaken by sub-contracting firms, such as furniture manufacturers and 
shop fitters. 124 
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Edgerton argues that the failure of the Whitley in the 1930s as a bomber aircraft condemned 
Armstrong Whitworth to the role of an aviation specialist sub-contractor during the war and 
the company’s reputation as a respected design firm consequently suffered. 125 Certainly the 
association of Armstrong Whitworth aircraft with airborne forces proved an unfortunate 
coincidence.  
 
The poor performance of the Albemarle was also of increasing concern to the 
government and the controversy surrounding the aircraft continued throughout 1942. During 
a meeting of the War Cabinet on 11 September the future production of this aircraft was, 
once again, very much in the balance. The Committee on National Expenditure (C.N.E.) had 
submitted a report on the Albemarle to the Prime Minister. The C.N.E. considered its findings 
to be so damning that it had agreed that the evaluation should not be published on the 
grounds that it would be ‘prejudicial to the public interest.’ 126 The minutes of the War 
Cabinet meeting included the following extract: 
 
The Select Committee had reached the view that the money expended on 
the production of this aircraft had largely been wasted, and that its 
production should be stopped as soon as possible. 127 
 
Consequently, it was in the interests of the Air Ministry and M.A.P. to utilise the Albemarle to 
save embarrassment and the airborne forces were desperate for aircraft. But despite its poor 
performance A.F.E.E. encountered competition for procurement of the aircraft type.  
 
At a War Cabinet meeting on 14 September 1942, the Minister of Production, Oliver 
Lyttelton, reported that the Soviet Union had requested transport aircraft from the British 
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government. 128 Although Lyttelton had regretfully informed the Soviet Ambassador, M. 
Maisky, that there were no transport aircraft in production in the United Kingdom and only 
one type under large scale production in the United States (the C-47 Dakota), he promised 
to investigate the feasibility of converting other aircraft for the purpose of transport: 
 
On enquiry he had found that there were 45 Albemarles available in 
maintenance units which in about 4 weeks could be converted to carry 20 
men apiece. If further machines of this type were taken from production, we 
could supply to Russia 20 Albemarles a month up to a total of 250. 129 
 
The supply of transport aircraft, albeit converted Albemarles, to Russia in preference over 
British airborne forces not only resulted in continued Albemarle production but also further 
delay to the airborne forces programme. This further indicated that it was not a strategic 
priority. 
  
The situation was not destined to improve and a survey into munitions production, 
conducted by Lyttelton, concluded that of the 23,671 aircraft produced in the United 
Kingdom in 1942 not one was a transport type. 130 The problem with producing a bespoke 
airborne design was not only the time in which a new type could be brought into service but 
also, more crucially, ‘the loss in current output arising from alterations to tooling and falling 
labour productivity on unfamiliar operations’. 131 The policy that invariably remained one of 
continuous modification to existing types in order to minimise disruption to established 
production. Such a justification for the limitations to the flexibility of mass production was 
fundamentally detrimental to the development of airborne warfare.  
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With extensive alterations the Whitley and Albemarle could be converted for 
operational use by airborne forces but even so the numbers produced in 1942 were only 540 
and 165 respectively. 132 The reduction in the production of the Whitley was due to the fact 
that it had been superseded by the large four-engine bomber types. Under the inter-war 
expansion Scheme F it had been envisaged that the Whitley was simply a stop-gap 
production type that would be obsolete by 1939 when it was to be replaced by larger bomber 
versions such as the Vickers Wellington and Handley Page Hampden. 133 Then, after the 
entry of the U.S.A. into the war, the bulk of R.A.F. transport aircraft were provided by the 
United States and the table below displays the figures for the 1942 and 1943  
agreements. 134 
 
Transport Type 1942 Agreements 1942 Deliveries 1943 Agreements 
Argus C-61 126 114 - 
Dakota C-47, 53 10 12 600 
Lodestar C-60 22 31 - 
 
Table 5: Transport Aircraft deliveries under Lend-Lease Agreement 
Source: T.N.A., CAB 66/36/9, Munitions Production July-December 1942, by Oliver Lyttleton, 21 
April 1943  
 
Alongside this, the British were planning to put into production a transport aircraft 
based upon the Avro Lancaster, the York, and this was represented in the aircraft production 
schedule for 1943. However, although the York entered service with the R.A.F. in 1944 it 
was not suitable for use either in the parachute or glider towing role. British airborne 
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operations were destined to remain dependent upon the supply of the Douglas Dakota and 
by the end of the war the R.A.F. had received approximately one-fifth, some 2,000 aircraft, of 
the total production under the Lend Lease agreement. 135  
 
Meanwhile, in May 1942 Churchill presided over a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff and 
stressed the importance of maintain the adequate aircraft supply or risk severely damaging 
the morale of the airborne troops who had seen little active service since training 
commenced in 1940. 136 The Prime Minister was told that such a reallocation of resources 
would reduce the bombing effort and the general consensus was that the situation could only 
be rectified through the Lend-Lease programme. 137 The following table clearly illustrates the 
British deficiency in the production of transport aircraft in comparison to the United States. 
The 92 transport aircraft scheduled for production by the British in 1943 were all Avro Yorks. 
 
1942 (Actual Deliveries) Transport Aircraft 
United States United Kingdom Total UK as Percentage of Total 
1,980 - 1,980 - 
1943 (Programmes) Transport Aircraft 
United States United Kingdom Total UK as Percentage of Total 
8,315 92 8,407 1% 
 
Table 6: Comparison between British & American Transport Aircraft Production 
Source: T.N.A., CAB 66/36/9, Munitions Production July-December 1942, by Oliver Lyttleton, 21 
April 1943 
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The report from which these figures were taken fully acknowledged that the ‘big 
American programme for transport aircraft has no material counterpart in the United 
Kingdom’ 138  and in February 1943 the topic of transport aircraft production was debated in 
the House of Lords. Lord Strabolgi made the following observations on the problems of 
production:  
 
With regard to the question of transport planes, may I just make this 
observation? There is a shortage of certain raw materials and finished 
materials needed for the construction of combat planes. That is bound to 
be the case with the enormous programme of construction in this country, 
in the United States, in Canada, and in Australia, and now that India has 
joined in making aeroplanes. There is bound, therefore, to be a shortage of 
material, but you can make your commercial aircraft, your transport planes, 
of materials not required for the combat planes. You can make them, for 
example, of low carbon steel, of which there is a great plenitude both here 
and on the other side of the Atlantic, and you can make them of wood. 139 
 
Strabolgi’s suggestions were in fact remarkably similar to those principles upon which the 
Albemarle had been manufactured. But the fact remained that the development of an 
airborne force without any foresight into the production of the aircraft necessary for its 
deployment was a failure in strategic planning and ensured that the British would always be 
reliant upon American assistance.  
 
However, in October 1942 a further significant event occurred that curtailed the 
development of British airborne forces. Churchill put pressure on the Secretary of State for 
Air to increase the operational bomber squadrons based in the United Kingdom from 32 to 
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50 by the end of the year. In a report entitled the ‘Strength of Bomber Command’ 140 Sir 
Archibald Sinclair concluded that this was only possible if other commitments were 
temporarily and significantly reduced.  
 
With regard to airborne forces Sinclair argued that ‘to carry out the 50 squadron plan 
the flow of heavy and medium bombers to the Airborne Forces must be suspended over the 
next two months. This will mean that the Airborne Division must curtail its training 
programme and live for a time on its existing resources.’ 141 The Prime Minster agreed with 
Sinclair’s proposal and made the following response on 16 October: 
 
I agree that the development of the Airborne Division may be retarded for 
two months within the limits you suggest; but it will certainly have to be 
expanded and pressed forward in the spring, as it may have a great 
strategic and political role to play in the summer of 1943. 142 
 
It would appear that, even on the rare occasions when A.F.E.E. was able to source an 
aircraft capable of conducting performance trials, more important strategic developments 
took priority.  However, Sinclair also warned that the diversion of aircraft from Bomber 
Command, however obsolete, would have an adverse effect on training: 
 
The Airborne Forces constitute a heavy commitment for medium bombers, 
which though obsolescent, are suitable for operational bomber training. 
Over 100 medium bombers are already so employed, and during the next 
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two months about 100 additional bombers will be needed to provide for 
further expansion and wastage. 143 
 
The result for the A.F.E.E. was inevitable. In October 1942 three Halifax aircraft, supplied to 
A.F.E.E. for the purpose of conducting experiments into the suitability of the type for 
paratrooping and glider towing, were removed to 38 Wing upon order of the Air Ministry. 
Investigation into the suitability of the Halifax for troop operations was conducted between 
November 1942 and August 1944 as and when aircraft were available. 144  
 
On 28 October 1942 Linnell wrote to the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Charles Portal, explaining the implications of limited aircraft availability upon the 
development programme and requested the support of the Air Ministry should further 
criticism result from the subsequent delay: 
 
The loss of these aircraft will inevitably cause a set-back in the very full 
programme which we are striving to complete for the Airborne Forces. We 
are constantly being pressed to hasten the answers to the outstanding 
problems. 145 
 
Portal sent the following response: 
 
The operation for which the Halifaxes are required was approved by the 
Chiefs of Staff and you cannot reasonably be criticised for resulting delays. 
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If you are, you will certainly have the full support of the Air Staff in 
explaining them. 146   
 
 Ironically, the operation to which Portal referred was likely the first allied glider-borne 
deployment of the War, Operation Freshman. However, Browning’s accusations, and the 
associated correspondence, do suggest that the relationship between the key stakeholders 
was not always harmonious. Phillip Meilinger argues that inter-service tension was never far 
from the surface and originated in the inter-war period during when the competition for 
resources resulted in the competition amongst the three services to maintain autonomy: 
 
When funds are slashed there is a tendency for inter-service rivalries to 
flare as each service scrambles for its share of a severely shrinking budget. 
Post war Britain was no exception to this tendency. In a sense, the RAF's 
independent status was partly a millstone around its neck. In the inter-war 
period it found itself constantly on the defensive against the other services 
and the Treasury, who saw it as a frail and youthful little brother easily 
bullied. 147 
 
Naturally, this made the development of an operational doctrine for an airborne force more 
complicated. Not only was it dependent upon the close co-operation and shared resources of 
both the army and R.A.F. but Bond & Murray have suggested it also had to overcome an 
ambivalent attitude towards the introduction of new technology: 
 
There was a conspicuous lack of drive toward inter-arm and inter-service 
co-operation in the 1930s. The resulting ill effects became all too apparent 
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in Norway and the western desert. Even in the area of combined operations 
(the use of air, sea, and ground to make a landing on enemy-held territory), 
where the British excelled in the Second World War, the record is less 
impressive. 148 
  
 Throughout 1942 the Air Ministry had defended the strategic bombing policy in light 
of War Office demands for further resources for the deployment of airborne troops. In reality 
the Air Ministry was in favour of maintaining a small airborne force but believed that the 
resource requirement for large-scale airborne operations would be better utilised to 
‘substantially increase the size of the [bomber] attack on Germany.’ 149 Invariably, the priority 
of the bombing policy prevailed but even though there were not enough aircraft to satisfy 
both requirements Churchill still insisted upon the development of an airborne capability. 
    
Interference from the Air Ministry was not the only cause of delay to the research 
programme. Throughout October 1942 poor visibility and low cloud interrupted test work at 
Sherburn and there were only two dated entries in the Operation Records Book.  But despite 
the poor conditions tug tests were carried out on the Albemarle, Wellington III 150 and Whitley 
V. Trials on the Douglas Dakota C-47, including the dropping of various carriers 151 and 
containers, 152 were also concluded for the first time. 153 Nevertheless, the weather conditions 
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at the airfield were inevitably restrictive and may well explain the Air Ministry’s willingness to 
allocate Sherburn to the A.F.E.E. as it was unsuitable for operational use.   
Operation Freshman 
 
It is worth briefly examining Operation Freshman because its failure substantiated the 
argument presented by A.F.E.E. that without sufficient testing and the acquisition of 
performance data the operational and tactical effectiveness of any aircraft was compromised. 
The objective was the destruction of the Norsk Hydro Electric Plant in Norway which was the 
only considerable source of ‘heavy water’ 154 in Europe (a crucial ingredient in the 
development of atomic weapons). 155  
 
German scientists were amongst the first to recognise the significance of this 
substance in atomic weapons research. Early in 1940 a leading German industrialist had 
approached Norsk-Hydro with an interest in purchasing their entire stock of heavy water and 
produced a contract for increased output and regular supply. The other material crucial to 
the production of atomic weapons was uranium oxide, which the Germans possessed in 
abundance after the occupation of Belgium. At the time of their surrender in May 1940 the 
Belgians had the largest stock of this material in Europe. 156  
 
Access to the hydro electric facility was particularly restricted. The plant was 
surrounded by mountains and located roughly sixty miles due west from Oslo and eighty 
miles from the coast. 157 Due to the difficult location of the plant it was decided that it would 
be impossible to destroy it through conventional bombing, or through the landing of sea-
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borne troops and too risky to drop parachutists over the mountainous terrain without high 
casualties being sustained and alerting the enemy. Consequently, it was decided to deliver a 
team that consisted of 34 Royal Engineers from the 1st Airborne Division to the objective by 
means of two Horsa gliders, utilising their silent approach and thus retaining the element of 
surprise. The decision to utilise the Horsa glider could have been due to the urgency 
attached to the operation but it would appear somewhat cavalier to trust in the success of an 
untested technology. Nevertheless, the temptation to deploy glider-borne infantry may have 
proved too great.   
 
The operation was conducted under the guidance of Combined Operations which 
requested three Handley Page Halifax bombers from the Ministry of Aircraft Production in 
September 1942, as alluded to by Portal. 158 The initial request to supply aircraft was refused 
and it required pressure from the Chief of Staff Committee to persuade the Air Ministry to 
provide two aircraft for the operation. 159 
 
Ultimately, due to weather restrictions over Scandinavia in the winter months, the 
operation was implemented with haste. On 19 November the force departed from Skitten 
airfield in Scotland en route to southern Norway. It soon became apparent to the tug crews 
that the promise of good weather over Scandinavia and a full moon to aid the location of the 
target was not forthcoming. In an attempt to escape the thick cloud above, one of the 
combinations flew below the cloud base to aid navigation. It is not known exactly what 
happened but the Halifax (W7801) struck the side of a mountain, killing the crew, whilst the 
Horsa (HS114) made a forced landing that killed the pilots and injured several of the 
occupants. The other combination was more fortunate and approached the Norwegian 
coastline at 10,000 feet where, as promised, the weather finally began to improve. 
                                               
158
 T.N.A. AVIA 10/135, Letter to Air Marshal Linnell, by Air Chief Marshal Portal, 28 October 1942. 
159
 Wiggan, Operation Freshman, pp. 25-26. 
213 
 
Unfortunately, the Rebecca/Eureka navigation device that was to guide the combination to 
the target area was unserviceable, making locating the hydro plant impossible.  
 
The Rebecca airborne transceiver and Eureka ground based transponder was a 
short-range radio navigation system that was capable of calculating the co-ordinates of a 
particular location. The technology originated from research into Air Inception techniques for 
night-fighters. The system was developed between 1940 and 1942 by Robert Hanbury 
Brown and John Pringle of the Telecommunications Research Establishment. 160 This 
establishment had previously collaborated with the Central Landing Establishment on the 
development of inter-communication between glider and the tug aircraft. 161  
 
Pringle recognised that Air Inception (A.I.) transceiver technology could be beneficial 
for airborne forces use and began experimentation with Hanbury by ‘placing a transponder 
at an agreed spot and arranging for an A.I. equipped aircraft to release a smoke signal within 
a few yards of the hidden beacon.’ 162 The technique was successfully demonstrated and the 
Rebecca/Eureka was developed for the Special Operation Executive. 163 Operation 
Freshman was the first operational deployment of the device and, although unsuccessful, 
following further refinement the system proved critical to the success of future British 
airborne operations. Freshman was a clear example of the benefits of operational research 
and that the application of new technology had the potential to significantly improve 
operational effectiveness.       
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However, unable to locate the target in deteriorating weather conditions, Squadron 
Leader Wilkinson was forced to turn for home with the Horsa still in tow. 164 Whilst crossing 
the coast the combination was further hampered by heavy cloud and icing conditions which 
resulted in the two aircraft parting, probably due to the tow rope icing and consequently 
breaking. The second glider, Horsa (DP 349), crashed a short distance from its counterpart 
and all the survivors were captured and became prisoners of the Gestapo. The failure of the 
operation, and the loss of a tug aircraft and crew, was not the greatest advertisement for the 
utilisation of glider-borne infantry and further supported A.F.E.E. in its claim that intensive 
experimentation and trial were necessary prior to the operational deployment of new 
technologies. For the personnel that actually survived the crash landings, however, the worst 
was still to come. 
  
On 18 October 1942 Hitler issued a Fuehrer Befehl to all German commanders that 
accused Germany’s enemies of conducting warfare using methods outside the international 
agreements of the Geneva Convention:  
 
For some considerable time, our enemies have been using methods of 
prosecuting war which are outside the internationally agreed terms of the 
Geneva Convention. Members of the so-called Commandos are behaving in a 
particularly brutal and underhand manner; it has been established that they 
themselves are, in some cases, recruiting convicted criminals who have been 
released in enemy territories. It has emerged from intercepted orders, that they 
are instructed, not only to shackle prisoners, but to kill, without hesitation, even 
unarmed prisoners, at any time when they believe that, as prisoners, they 
would constitute an obstacle to the furtherance of their objective, or might 
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prove any other kind of encumbrance. Finally, orders have been found, in 
which the killing of prisoners is a fundamental requirement. 165 
 
In order to counteract the ‘brutal and underhand manner’ Hitler authorized the execution of 
all captured members of the special forces regardless of whether they were caught in 
uniform or armed. Consequently, the 23 survivors of Operation Freshman were executed in 
accordance with the following order: 
 
I order therefore: From hence forth, all those belonging to so-called Commando 
operations, either in Europe or in Africa, in enemy engagement with German 
Troops, even if they have the outward appearance of uniformed soldiers or 
fighting units, with or without weapons, either in battle or taking flight, should be 
wiped out, down to the last man. It is, in this case, quite immaterial whether 
they approach their operations by sea and air, or whether they arrive by 
parachute. Even when these individuals appear to be preparing to give 
themselves up, when they are discovered, they are, without exception, to be 
shown no mercy. In each instance, a detailed report on the incident is to be 
made available to the Supreme Commander, for publication in Armed Forces 
dispatches. 166 
 
The outcome of the operation exemplified the difficulties of effecting successful glider-borne 
operations and is evidence that the enthusiasm of the airborne forces to become operational 
was not sufficiently tempered by proven technological capability. More detailed research, 
development and training were required before the entire airborne contingent could become 
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an effective operational force. However, the Fuehrer Befehl does confirm that the 
psychological effect of potential airborne operations did have an impact upon the enemy. 167  
 
 
Figure 5: In 1945 members of 1st Airborne Division stationed in Norway oversaw the 
exhumation of those members of Operation Freshman executed by the Germans The five 
bodies above were the survivors from Horsa DP349 and were reinterred at the Commonwealth 
War Graves plot at Vestre Gravlund near Oslo 
 
Source: Image Courtesy of Glider Pilot Regiment Association Midland Branch 
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Further Delays 
 
As during Operation Freshman, poor weather conditions were also experienced in 
England. This resulted in limited flight trials by A.F.E.E. in November 1942 but some 
experimentation with supply dropping from the Douglas C-47 was possible. 168 However, the 
Operation Records book entries for December were almost exclusively focused upon 
meteorological conditions, all of which were unfavourable for the purposes of experimental 
flying. There were a total of 8 non-flying days due to rain and low cloud and the weather was 
so poor throughout the duration of the month that tests were recorded as ‘attempted’ rather 
than ‘carried out’. Consequently, the research and development programme was severely 
disrupted. 169 
 
However, despite continued poor weather and a further period of five consecutive none 
flying days between 16 and 21 January 1943 the month proved an intensive period of trials 
of glider and tug combinations and experimentation into the dropping of men and equipment 
from a variety of aircraft. One of the most significant trials undertaken was a tugging test of a 
Halifax and Hamilcar combination 170 that included an unsuccessful dive test of a Hamilcar at 
full load from 10,000 feet. It was recorded that upon landing the nose door opened and was 
consequently ripped off which caused damage to the wings and fuselage. 171 Despite the set-
back the further availability of Halifax aircraft to A.F.E.E. following the withdrawal of 3 aircraft 
the previous October was a positive development. 
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In the meantime, in January 1943, following the failure of Operation Freshman, a public 
relations exercise was organised at Bulford Camp 172 to demonstrate the effectiveness and 
safety of the assault glider. 173 The audience consisted of senior military personnel and 
members of parliament who were all invited to join an air experience flight in two Horsa 
gliders. Unfortunately, the demonstration ended in disaster when both gliders crashed upon 
landing. Lawrence Wright, of the Glider Pilot Regiment, witnessed the incident and noted the 
following in his memoirs:  
 
The first pilot, perhaps distracted by the bunch of top officers breathing 
down his neck, misjudged the moment; landing in an uphill swerve, he 
wiped off first his nose-wheel, then the skid, then most of the floor of the 
glider, leaving a trail of firewood, bowler hats and brief-cases. 174 
 
The second pilot crashed onto the slope of Bulford Down in less spectacular fashion which 
nevertheless ended with some shaken politicians. Fortunately, the only casualties were Ellen 
Wilkinson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Home Security, who suffered a broken 
ankle and General Browning whom Wright recalled, ‘wore a sling awhile.’ 175 Despite the 
disaster technical investigations continued and it was rumoured that far from opposing the 
future development of the airborne force the politicians were ‘inordinately proud of their 
share in the hazards of war, and dined out for weeks on the story.’ 176 
 
The recording of incidents such as that experienced with the Hamilcar above 
demonstrated the importance of the work undertaken by the A.F.E.E. in ensuring that such 
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occurrences were minimized. On 1 February Hengist glider and Whitley tug combination 
trials were undertaken 177 but on 4 February the Hengist was damaged due to the bifurcation 
of the tow rope. On the same day a Horsa was also damaged when it overshot the runway 
whilst carrying out a skid landing. Consequently, by 9 February all Establishment gliders 
were reported unserviceable. 178 
 
On February 12 the O.R.B. recorded extreme weather conditions that resulted in a 
hangar door being blown off and damage to a hangar roof. However, despite the conditions 
Horsa DP.493 was successfully ferried by air from No. 9 Maintenance Unit (M.U.) located at 
R.A.F. Cosford in Shropshire and a second Horsa, DG. 782, was also collected from the 
same location some two weeks later. The relationship between A.F.E.E. and No.9 
Maintenance Unit is worth exploring in some detail in order to put the production, assembly 
and distribution processes of the Horsa, and indeed all British military gliders, into context 
and define the relationships that existed between stakeholders. But we need first to outline 
the manufacturing process.  
Manufacturing Techniques: The Horsa Glider 
 
The manufacturing techniques and processes utilised by the British in the production 
of wooden airframes during World War Two employed the application of some of the world’s 
first advanced composite materials. 179 The technological knowledge transfer between 
material science and the woodworking industries cannot be underestimated and resulted in 
the application of new materials, processes and factory organization in the post-war period. 
For the purpose of this examination technological advances in manufacturing techniques will 
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be confined to the context of the Horsa glider but the processes and technology were also 
employed in the production of other glider types utilised by British airborne forces.  
 
Plywood had been used extensively in the production of aircraft during World War I but 
its application as a structural material involved many disadvantages, mainly due to the 
limitations of the adhesives then available. These glues were almost exclusively 
manufactured from animal or vegetable material and thus were not durable over long periods 
of time. They also encouraged parasitic growth which was difficult to detect and caused 
weaknesses within the aircraft structure. 180 Consequently, the limitations in material science 
resulted in the aircraft industry investigating alternative methods of construction principally in 
metal. This had already commenced late in World War I when aircraft grade timber became 
scarce. 
  
Peter Fearon has suggested that the British government was aware of the limitations 
of wooden construction and consequently the Air Ministry specified all-metal airframes in 
tender documentation for military machines in the inter-war period:  
 
One of the prime reasons for this emphasis was that in a future war Britain 
could not depend on the necessary imports of timber for the airframe 
industry to expand rapidly. Other advantages in using metal were not hard 
to find. Such aircraft were easier to store, they were more robust in use and 
less prone to deterioration, particularly in the tropics, a great advantage in 
an economy-minded age. 181 
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As late as 1937, in an article entitled ‘All-Metal Construction’ published in a popular 
contemporary journal, Marcus Langley maintained that only metal could be used in the 
construction of large airframes: 
 
It would scarcely be possible, for example, to contain within the thickness of 
the wing sufficient material to withstand the heavy loads on it unless that 
material were a strong metal capable of carrying high stresses. Although 
this argument does not hold for small machines, the medium and large-
sized aircraft can be built with a lower weight in metal than in wood. The 
dividing line occurs where a weight of about 5,000lb. is reached. 182 
 
However, Peden presents the counter-argument that the preference of metal construction by 
the Air Ministry was detrimental to technological development:   
 
The move from wood to metal did not necessarily represent progress: the 
bias of American aircraft designers in favour of metal precluded promising 
projects involving wood, such as the de Havilland Mosquito of the Second 
World War, which drew upon the firm’s experience of using wood in the 
1930s. 183 
 
Although Peden used the Mosquito as the basis for his argument the technological 
contribution of the glider programme to manufacturing techniques should not be 
underestimated.  
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Indeed, in little over three years after Langley’s article the technology of wooden 
construction had advanced to the extent which allowed Airspeed to design the Horsa with a 
wingspan of 88ft. and a fully loaded weight of 15,250lb. Such design was made possible by 
the development of synthetic resin adhesives. The new materials and developments in 
bonding techniques immediately preceding and during the Second World War allowed for 
the manufacture of plywood and other laminates of greatly improved structural qualities that 
were suitable for use in aviation.  
 
The primary chemical advancement in adhesive technology, a significant 
development that resulted in Air Ministry policy towards the manufacture of wooden 
airframes being relaxed, 184  was the production of synthetic resins which were classified into 
two distinct groups; thermo-setting and thermo-plastic. Both processes required the 
application of heat and high-pressures in order to form a permanent bond between 
composite materials, thus a strong laminated material could be formed. The primary 
difference between the two adhesives was that thermo-setting resins, once set, were 
permanently fixed and thus could not be manipulated to liquefy or flux again, whereas 
thermo-plastics did not experience any chemical change and could be reheated and 
subsequently engineered into a desired shape and maintained that form once reset. 185 
 
With the technological progression in the production of wooden airframes established 
attention can now be turned to their application in the manufacture of the Horsa glider. The 
design of the Horsa not only had to incorporate the requirements of the armed forces but 
also the production capabilities of the woodworking industries to ensure mass-production 
was achieved as quickly and efficiently as possible. Hence all aspects of design, 
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manufacture, and the materials employed were intrinsically linked and can be considered in 
terms of Operational Research, as identified by Crowther and Whiddington, which was not 
simply confined to the analysis of operational deployment but also applied to production. 186 
 
In terms of the Horsa glider, scientific application was evident in both design and 
production. The cylindrical form of the fuselage avoided the complexities of double 
curvatures and the need for moulding the plywood skin which allowed sheets to be wrapped 
around the structure with minimum preparation. 187 The responsibility for developing the 
production techniques was through collaboration between the Airspeed production office and 
furniture manufacturer Harris Lebus; the latter of which devised a variety of ingenious 
methods of manufacture. 188 Unfortunately, no archival record exists of the development 
undertaken by the firm but the production techniques were printed in contemporary 
publications.    
 
Ultimately, following the finalisation of the production process, work was extensively 
sub-contracted, principally to furniture and automotive firms. The primary advantages of sub-
contracts have been already explored and this offered the opportunity for increased 
production. However, they were also more difficult to manage as they were one stage further 
removed from the relationship between M.A.P and the principal contractor, Airspeed. The 
Official History identified two principal types of contract, both of which were employed in the 
production of the Horsa: 
 
Sub-contracts fell into two broad categories, those for the supply to a main 
contractor of materials or specialised components or the performance of a 
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particular process in manufacture; and those by which a main contractor 
sub-let part of an order for which he had not sufficient capacity immediately 
available. 189  
 
For ease of production all component Horsa parts were machined to practically finished size 
before being stored and then issued to each assembly department as and when required. 
The airframe was further divided for ease of production; for example the circular cross-
section of the fuselage was sub-divided into six separate sections which could be 
manufactured independently as individual assemblies termed barrels. Goff notes:  
 
These sections became to be known as barrel and the method of building as 
barrel construction. The barrel conception suggested rotation and led to the 
design of revolving fixtures for the assembly of each section. 190 
 
The component parts in each barrel were principally bulkheads and frames manufactured 
from laminated spruce. These were formed into jigs following the application of adhesives 
and clamped together to provide the necessary high-pressure bond. An electrical heating 
system, invented by the organic chemist Dr. Norman Adrian De Bruyne, then reduced the 
curing time of the thermo-setting resins from hours to minutes thus accelerating production. 
A metal strip was introduced to the jig which was connected to a transformer, completing a 
circuit which heated the entire assembly to the required temperature. 191 
 
The adhesives mainly employed in the manufacture of Horsa bulkheads and frames 
were Beetle Cement and Gordon Aerolite. The latter was also developed by Dr. De Bruyne 
and had been approved for use in aircraft manufacture by the Air Ministry in 1937. Although 
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the sale of Gordon Aerolite was initially slow the furniture industry quickly recognised its 
qualities and it ‘was the first synthetic structural composite material to be seriously used in 
the construction of aircraft.’  192 Ultimately the product qualities proved so successful that the 
R.A.E. reported in 1940 that it could become a viable substitute for Duralumin fasteners. 193  
 
Once the necessary components had been manufactured each barrel was assembled 
on a rotatable fixture that allowed workers to remain at floor level throughout the process. 
After the basic structure of frames and bulkheads had been assembled the skin could be 
applied via rotating the entire barrel. The skin consisted of preassembled sheets of Birch 
plywood bonded together in a large heated press and then the entire panel was glued onto 
the structural framework using Beetle Cement.  
 
The skin was laid diagonally in order to mitigate excess torsion throughout the fuselage 
when subjected to heavy strains. 194 The quality of the plywood was rigorously tested and 
manufactured in accordance with two separate British Standard Specifications, for either 
stressed or unstressed parts, to ensure that it was suitable for aviation use. The specification 
was detailed as follows in a 1946 publication:  
 
Plywood built with Birch veneers which are of even texture and straight 
grain is essential for all stressed parts; knotty, curly grained wood must not 
be used, as such wood is likely to crack along the annual rings when 
subjected to strain. The inner core and gluing is finally tested by passing 
                                               
192
 A. J. Kinloch,’ Norman Adrian De Bruyne: 8 November 1904-7 March 1997’, Biographical Memoirs 
of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 46, Nov. 2000, pp. 126-143, p.134.  
193
 Duralumin was the principal metal alloy employed in stressed skin airframe manufacture. 
Fasteners were solid rivets applied by means of a pneumatic drill and snap process which closed 
between separate components.     
194
 A. Wood & T. Linn, Plywoods: The Development, Manufacture and Application (London, 1946), pp. 
404-405.  
226 
 
thin sheets of plywood over a specifically constructed box housing lights of 
high intensity. By so doing the course of the grain is easily followed and any 
defects can be spotted by the inspector. 195 
 
Due to the scale of the completed barrel it was not practicable to utilise the electronic method 
of curing the thermo-resin and thus large clamps were wrapped around the entire structure 
until the adhesive had set. However, considerable time was saved in the production process 
by the application of the rotating fixture and the 1943 supplement produced in The Aeroplane 
stated that the scheme had ‘proved very successful and considerable savings in man-hours 
have been achieved as a result.’ 196      
 
Another example of close collaboration between design and production was evident in 
the process by which the completed barrels were connected together to form a complete 
fuselage section. The technique required each section to overlap towards the tail of the glider 
and thus alleviated the need for traditional complicated scarfed joints. The method was 
described in The Aeroplane as: 
 
One of the most important factors in making possible the barrel system of 
production. This arrangement, in fact, was a notable example of the co-
operation and understanding established between design and production 
staffs before manufacture commenced. 197  
 
The joint was formed by expanding the aft section of each barrel with a special expander 
operated by a series of bulkhead mounted cams. Once expanded the skin of the leading 
barrel could be located over the one immediately behind and fixed with adhesive. The two 
                                               
195
 Ibid,p. 404.   
196
 Goff, ‘The Horsa Glider – Part I.’, p. 7.  
197
 Ibid.  
227 
 
sections were then clamped together with a steel band until the adhesive had set. The entire 
fuselage was thus constructed via the technique and supported on trolleys to ease assembly.  
 
Although the close co-operation between designers and manufacturers undoubtedly 
resulted in the efficient flow system by which component parts and airframe sections for the 
Horsa were produced, modifications were inevitable and had to be retrospectively introduced 
into the production process. One such example occurred in the requirement for the structure 
beneath the fuselage floor to be sprayed with cellulose dope prior to final assembly; the 
entire airframe required this treatment as a preservative against the growth of organic 
material. The process of sending each section to the main dope shop would have severely 
compromised the efficiency of the production line and thus an alternative solution had to be 
sought. 198 
 
In order to accommodate this requirement each fuselage section was effectively turned 
into a self-contained spray booth on the shop floor through the introduction of a fan that 
distributed the dope evenly throughout the internal structure thus allowing production to 
continue unimpaired. 199 The final process involved the covering of the entire structure with 
madapolam, 200 which was doped in order to form a tight fit that waterproofed the structure 
and generally protected the airframe from the elements. However, by May 1942 the Ministry 
of Supply experienced problems meeting the demand for cotton as many fabric workers had 
been recruited into munitions factories and M.A.P. for work in aviation. Consequently, M.A.P. 
had to relinquish 50 specialist workers per month from April 1943 to the Ministry of Labour in 
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order to maintain supply; even when building aircraft from non-essential materials shortages 
were experienced. 201           
 
The production of the Horsa wing and tail units required a different methodology to that 
employing in the manufacture of the fuselage bulkheads because they contained more 
numerous components of widely varied size. The primary components in the Horsa wing and 
tail assembly were spars, constructed from laminated spruce, attached to which were a 
series of ribs of various sizes which determined the aerofoil of the wing. The outer wing 
panels, although large, were of relatively simple design and single spar construction. As Goff 
describes,  
 
Forward of the main spar, the position of which is roughly at one-third of the 
chord from the leading edge, the wing is covered with plywood skin. 
Structurally this portion is the main section of the wing and forms a torsion 
box of D section. Aft of the main spar the wing structure consists of light, 
lattice-type trailing ribs extending to the aileron and flap spar. Of this 
portion, only the aileron shroud and a corresponding chord-wise portion of 
the upper surface are covered with plywood skin. 202 
 
Where required, the plywood skin was manufactured and installed as previously described 
but in order to reduce weight the intermediate section between the main spar and the trailing 
edge of the wing was fabric covered and doped directly onto the wing ribs and associated 
structure. 203   
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 However, despite the obvious success of the design and the associated technological 
knowledge transfer between multitudes of interdependent industries, the intensity of the 
programme caused disruption in the assembly and distribution spheres. On 4 September 
1942 the issue of the Horsa Spares Schedule was discussed by the Airborne Forces 
Committee. Certain members raised concerns about ‘the serious delays which had taken 
place in completion of the spares schedule’ 204 and requested that help could be given to 
Airspeed: 
 
The possibility of obtaining assistance was discussed, but it was AGREED 
that draftsmen could be transferred only at the expense of more urgent 
work, and, although the meeting recognised the difficulties experienced in 
using an abbreviated schedule, it was AGREED that no alternative was 
open. 205 
 
The spares schedule was crucial not only for repair but also for essential modifications as 
required through performance evaluation by A.F.E.E. The shortage of specialist personnel 
was an obvious problem that was not only experienced by M.A.P. but also at contractor level 
and consequently required close cooperation with both the Ministry of Labour and the 
Treasury to ensure that all elements of the programme operated as efficiently as possible.  
 
Despite the technological ingenuity evident at both the design and production phases, 
the availability of parts was restricted through the complexity of the supply chain and the 
absence of strategic coordination, particularly in terms of tug aircraft provision. 
Consequently, there was a detrimental effect upon the assembly and distribution of 
completed gliders and unnecessary effort expended that could have been applied effectively 
elsewhere.  
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Glider Manufacture, Assembly and Distribution 
 
As previously stated the manufacture of glider components was the responsibility of a 
wide range of non-aviation specialist sub-contractors working on behalf of M.A.P.  These 
included motor vehicle companies such as Austin Motors Limited which manufactured 368 
Horsa fuselage sections and 798 centre fuselage sections between 1942 and 1945 at the 
Castle Bromwich Factory in Birmingham 206 and Morris Motors at Cowley which 
manufactured numerous glider components. 207 The L.M.S. Railway works at Derby were 
also employed in wing manufacture, 208 further emphasising the diversity of the supply chain.   
 
However, component manufacturers were not responsible for the assembly of the 
finished aircraft and thus a complex supply chain was required in order to complete the 
transaction between manufacturer and supplier in the first instance, and supplier to end-user 
in the second. Thus contractors supplied components to M.A.P. who then managed the 
assembly process before operational issue to the services. The complexity of the supply 
chain was further exacerbated when the reluctance of contractors to commit to large capital 
expenditure, as experienced with Phillips & Powis during prototype development, 209 was 
transferred to the production sphere. 
 
The initial order for 400 Horsa gliders was actually placed by the Chief of the Air Staff 
and Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Major-General Nye, in February 1941 and the 
Air Ministry ordered a further 200 aircraft for investigation into their suitability as bomb 
carriers, all of which were to be delivered in the summer of 1942. However, the Air Ministry 
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later cancelled the additional 200 aircraft and the reduction in the order resulted in a review 
of the delivery date. Consequently, M.A.P. informed the Air Ministry that due to the 
decreased production the aircraft could not be expected until February 1943 due to revision 
of sub-contractor involvement and programme. 210  
 
The reason for the delay was that any ‘greater delivery would involve an increased 
jigging programme out of all proportion to the size of the total order.’ 211 Ultimately, following 
a meeting between Harris Lebus and the Director General of Aircraft Production on 27 July 
1941, neither M.A.P. nor the manufacturer considered the expenditure of any further capital 
required for rapid production to be justified unless the Air Ministry could assure them that the 
provision for additional production capacity would be exploited at some future date. 212 It 
would appear that despite the commitment to research and development there were still 
considerable difficulties in achieving operational deployment primarily because production 
commenced prior to the establishment of strategic policy and resource availability.  
 
The absence of a defined concept made it difficult for the Air Ministry to give any 
certainty with regard to future production and resulted in a compromise in which M.A.P. 
promised that 300 Horsa aircraft could be delivered by July 1942 as long as the order was 
restored to the original figure of 600. 213 Ironically, even whist the new target was being 
negotiated the Air Ministry realised that it did not have anywhere near enough suitable 
aircraft available to act as tugs.  
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Air Chief Marshal, Sir Wilfred Freeman, Vice Chief of the Air Staff (V.C.A.S.) wrote to 
Major-General Nye on the 27 November 1941 to explain why the original order had been 
reduced. It is interesting to note that Freeman had previously occupied the position of Air 
Member for Research and Development and coordinated the rearmament of the R.A.F. prior 
to the responsibility being passed over to M.A.P. Consequently, Freeman was well placed to 
assess the reality of the glider programme and quantified the investment by stating that 
‘some idea of the total labour involved is gained from the fact that the cost of the order for 
Horsas in Great Britain alone’ 214 was in excess of 3¼ million pounds. The note explained 
that the decision to reduce the order to 400 was based upon ‘the number required to 
transport a Brigade Group’ and the necessity for ‘400 Wellingtons or similar type aircraft to 
pull them.’ 215 Although Freeman conceded that there could feasibly be two trips, even then 
200 tugs would be required, and at the time of writing there were only 100 aircraft available 
that were capable of towing a Horsa glider. 216  
 
The War Office had not actually defined the number of gliders for production above 
those required for each operation but an approximation was calculated on 19 February 1941 
based upon three airborne operations per year. Consequently, gliders were required in 
thousands rather than hundreds but production targets for the corresponding number of tug 
aircraft remained unresolved. 217        
 
The deficiency of tug aircraft, coupled with the inability to reconcile the strategic 
reality with the political aspiration, severely compromised the tactical and operational 
effectiveness of British airborne forces. The most acute example was the number of lifts 
required to deliver sufficient troop numbers during Operation Market Garden in which the 
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enemy were able to isolate and neutralise small groups of airborne troops before 
reinforcements could arrive. 218    
 
However, the increased order of Horsas also had implications for both logistics and 
storage because there was no immediate idea of when the gliders would be used. The final 
assembly of Hotspur, Horsa and Hamilcar glider components was the responsibility of R.A.F. 
Aircraft Storage Units. A.S.U.s were created during the rearmament period to manage the 
storage and distribution of aircraft and components produced in the factory supply chain. 
Scott and Hughes summarise the principal responsibilities of the units as: 
 
Stores for reserve aircraft in transit from factory to squadron, but they also 
served as stores for obsolescent aircraft in transit to training squadrons or 
elsewhere, and as assembly shops for operational equipment. 219  
 
With regard to assault gliders the units were further responsible for all aspects of assembly 
and initially nine units were considered sufficient but this was later reduced to three and 
numbers 6, 9 and 15 Maintenance Units were allocated the task and set a production target 
of no less than 50 Horsa gliders per month. 220   
 
It is important to deduce the significance of the decision to allocate the task of 
assembly to such units and consider the strategic consequences. In a War Cabinet meeting 
on 6 September 1940 Beaverbrook argued that the Ministry of Supply should prioritise the 
construction of 50 new airfields for the purpose of A.S.U. accommodation. 221 Yet following 
Beaverbrook’s request for prioritisation the Minister of Supply pointed out that the grant of 
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special priority ‘would necessarily operate to some extent to defer the completion of other 
essential works, for example, filling factories’, 222 another task considered a priority by M.A.P. 
Allocation of limited resources was critical and compromise was crucial to success but it also 
meant that there was little room for any extravagance not directly associated with strategic 
necessity. Indeed the diversion of resources to facilitate the development and deployment of 
the British airborne capability was a regular phenomenon but the airborne forces did not 
always benefit. A report concerning R.A.F. manpower requirements for 1944 suggested that 
the reallocation of bomber squadrons to the airborne forces would reduce the projected 
expansion of heavy bomber squadrons and this resulted in the curtailment of aircraft 
provision to the airborne troops. 223       
Figure 6 : Completed Centre Fuselage Section at Longbridge 
Source: Image Courtesy of the British Motor Industry Heritage Trust 
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To return to the assembly of the assault glider, the processes involved remain little 
recorded and it is worth exploring the work of 9 M.U., R.A.F. Cosford, in some detail in order 
to put the scale of the exercise into context. Final assembly of the Horsa commenced at 
R.A.F. Cosford in May 1942 and on 30 July the following was recorded in the Operation 
Records Book: 
 
The first Horsa glider produced by the unit was towed away be a Halifax. It is 
understood that this glider was among the first produced by Horsa Holding Units 
and satisfaction was felt that its teething troubles had been quickly and 
satisfactorily overcome due to the good work put in by the glider erection staff. 224 
 
 Although the teething troubles were not detailed it can be assumed that the nature of 
assembly would have required significant practice before maximum efficiency was achieved.  
 
On 26 August Wing Commander Russell, HQ 41 Group, 225 visited the unit regarding 
the glider programme and reported satisfaction with the progress in output. 226 From 
September 1942 the Cosford glider programme focused entirely upon full-time Horsa 
production and by October 30 gliders were raised to the ‘ready for air test’ state. On 18 
November it was recorded that Horsa DP.499 was ready for operational use. This was the 
fiftieth Horsa produced by the Unit. 227   
 
However, just as the logistics of assembly and storage were becoming effective a 
revision in the total number of gliders required, probably instigated following Sinclair’s report 
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on the strength of Bomber Command, 228 had the potential to cause serious disruption at 
associated A.S.U.s. The Airborne Forces Committee meeting on 20 November 1942 opened 
with the news that a proposal was being considered by the Chiefs of Staff to substantially 
reduce the Horsa programme. In essence the decision was to either continue the production 
until an agreed number of aircraft had been produced and then close the programme down 
altogether, or slow down production and regulate the flow of deliveries form the contractors: 
 
In the course of the general discussion the second alternative was 
favoured. Wing Commander Patton (Overseer, Airspeed) said that by 
slowing down production it would be possible to incorporate the maximum 
number of modifications on the production line. 229 
 
Any change in the production programme had consequences upon both assembly and 
storage arrangements for completed gliders. It was desired that 41 Group should continue to 
assemble the Horsa but Wing Commander Russell pointed out that accommodation was 
becoming increasingly limited and ‘it would be necessary to rely upon hangar 
accommodation erected at airfields.’ 230  
 
The initial theory was that the gliders would be rapidly required and would thus not 
need under-cover storage. However, by November 1942 production was such that the 
disassembly of main planes was necessary to accommodate hangar storage to avoid 
deterioration to airframes through exposure to the elements. 231 The lack of an identified 
operation in which the accumulated materiel could be deployed had significant logistical 
implications.     
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Fear of a reduction of the airborne forces programme may well explain the hurried 
addition of parachutists to the North African Campaign. However, British airborne 
deployment during Operation Torch in November 1942 was not only hampered by limited 
aircraft provision, but also by a lack of appreciation by senior military personnel of airborne 
forces’ capability. The parachutists of the British 3rd Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant-
Colonel Pine-Coffin, were deployed with complete disregard of the strategic and tactical 
limitations of such forces. 
  
The objective, issued to the 1st Battalion for 14 November 1942, was to pick a drop 
zone near Beja and push east until the enemy was found. 232 Once located the parachutists 
were to stay with the enemy. John Weeks succinctly described the foolhardiness of such a 
mission objective: 
 
This was a remarkable battle plan as it had no clear objective and 
committed the battalion to the most dangerous type of warfare that can face 
airborne units, namely a lone battle in strange country with no follow-up 
force and little hope of resupply. 233  
     
Fortunately for the battalion the mission was postponed due to bad weather and did not take 
place until 16 November allowing the parachutists to link up quickly with advancing ground 
forces. The use of lightly armed parachutists in such an operation was undoubtedly an 
unnecessary risk of an expensive asset, but may not have been entirely the result of 
understanding on behalf of senior officers.  
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A recurrent theme throughout the Second World War was that of sustaining morale 
amongst the highly trained and motivated men of the airborne forces. 234 Once out in theatre 
it is likely that proponents of airborne warfare, such as Browning, would have been eager for 
airborne forces to have been at the forefront of the fighting in order to raise the profile of the 
force. The commitment of parachutists to battle in a seemingly pointless mission appears to 
reflect a political, rather than a military, agenda that was certainly present at the time. 
 
The final allied airborne action in North Africa commenced on 29 November. 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost’s 2nd Battalion was dropped onto Depienne airfield with the 
objective of destroying aircraft based at Ouda, some twenty miles away. 235 The distance 
Frost’s men were expected to cover on foot, before potentially having to engage the enemy 
in combat, and then achieve their objective, was remarkable and once again highlighted the 
lack of strategy and complete disregard of tactical and operational limitations. Despite the 
detailed research and technological development the correct application of the airborne 
capability remained misunderstood.   
 
Back in Britain, the revised Horsa programme prevailed but manufacture steadily 
increased as the war progressed and the Minister of Aircraft Production confirmed a 
production target of 706 Horsas in 1943 and 120 Hamilcars.  236  On 2 December 1942 a 
conference was held on glider production at HQ No. 41 Group.  The programme was 
discussed in detail and it was decided to confine it to just two units, of which Cosford was 
one. 237  
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As assembly output increased so did the requirement for air tests and the ferrying of 
gliders to other units. In order to maximise the efficient delivery of completed airframes a 
Glider Tug Flight was formed on 21 April 1943 under order of the Air Ministry. 238  This flight 
was comprised of 14 Whitley aircraft tasks with the transport of Horsa gliders to numerous 
Maintenance Units and their associated A.S.U.s for storage pending operational use  
(See Table 7.).  
 
Unit RAF Station County 
20 M.U. RAF Aston Down Gloucestershire 
39 M.U. RAF Colerne Wiltshire 
48 M.U. RAF Hawarden Cheshire 
29 M.U. RAF High Ercall Shropshire 
10 M.U. 239 RAF Hullavington Wiltshire 
5 M.U. RAF Kemble Gloucestershire 
51 M.U. RAF Lichfield Staffordshire 
8 M.U. RAF Little 
Rissington 
Gloucestershire 
No. 3 Aircraft 
Preparation Unit 
RAF Llandow Glamorganshire 
19 & 32 M.U. RAF St Athan Glamorganshire 
27 M.U. RAF Shawbury Shropshire 
15 M.U. RAF Wroughton Wiltshire  
 
Table 7: List of RAF Maintenance Units Utilised for Horsa Glider Storage 
Source: Author 
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Unfortunately, the entries in the Cosford O.R.B. are poorly detailed between 
December 1942 and March 1944 but improved substantially from this date onwards which 
allows for a detailed analysis of Horsa production at the unit. It was recorded for the first time 
on 30 April that the Horsa production target was not reached due to lack of components, 240 
although the official history claimed that there were no Horsa glider shortages from June 
1942 onwards. 241  
 
Indeed, component shortages became a recurrent theme throughout 1944 but a 
steady output of aircraft was still maintained. Devons argues that the management of 
component supply was the most difficult aspect of aircraft manufacture and this was 
particularly relevant to the sub-contract procurement processes employed in the 
manufacture of assault gliders: 
 
 One of the most difficult tasks in aircraft production was to ensure that the 
plans for the production of these components fitted in with the plans for the 
output of complete aircraft and the need for spares. 242 
 
However, although some production delay was experienced in the Horsa programme it was 
minimal in comparison with that of the Hamilcar.   
 
General Aircraft promised that 50 Hamilcar gliders would be delivered by the end of 
1941 but total production only reached that number in 1944. Consequently, in the autumn of 
1942 M.A.P. had become so concerned at the production rate that it appointed an Industrial 
Panel comprising three non-aviation specialist executives to carry out an investigation at 
General Aircraft Limited.  The Industrial Panel issued its report on 24 September 1942 and 
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concluded that G.A.L. had severely underestimated its own capacity to deliver the contract 
and original production figures were widely ambitious. 243 
 
Inadequacy amongst G.A.L. senior management also meant that the main sub-
contractors responsible for component manufacture of the aircraft, principally The 
Birmingham Railway Carriage and Wagon Company and the Cooperative Wholesale 
Society, could not achieve production targets through lack of materials and fixings. On 28 
July 1942 M.A.P. set up the Hamilcar Production Group 244 which effectively assumed 
control of the sub-contractor framework. The capability of General Aircraft was also 
scrutinised by the Select Committee on National Expenditure which was desperate to obtain 
a copy of the report prepared by the members of the Industrial Panel. 245 Nevertheless, 
despite the additional administrative resource, the poor performance of the parent company 
remained restrictive and only 344 Hamilcars had been produced by the time production 
ended in 1946.   
 
By the end of 1944 some military strategists were beginning to believe that the assault 
glider would have little operational use post-war, particularly after the technological 
development of the helicopter. Air Vice-Marshal Collier, however, believed that they could 
but utilised in special airborne operations but only when the destruction of more valuable 
aircraft types could be negated:     
 
Gliders have a strong claim to employment and survival for special airborne 
operations. Even if helicopters could be developed capable of landing and 
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rising vertically, it might still be found more economical to use gliders at points 
where enemy action could be expected to cause the destruction of the majority 
of craft affecting the landing. On the other hand the glider is less economical 
than the powered aircraft for normal air supply operations, provided that 
powered aircraft are available which can carry the same bulky equipment as 
gliders. Eventually it may be found that development of the parachute or of the 
rotor may enable us to land bulky equipment and numbers of troops by means 
of parachute and rotor. Developments of this sort would constitute a threat to 
the survival of the glider. 246 
 
On 1 August 1945 the Glider Tug Flight was disbanded at R.A.F. Cosford 247 from which 
point the remaining gliders produced were destined for Long Term Storage. But despite the 
cessation of production the Unit’s association with gliders continued well into the 1950s.    
 
The O.R.B. recorded on 30 November 1945 that 49 Horsa gliders had been prepared 
for storage and 17 Hadrian gliders had also been accepted. The British association with the 
American WACO CG-4A, renamed the Hadrian in British service, was first recorded at 
A.F.E.E. on 21 February 1943 when flight trials were conducted with the Whitley. 248 In 
December 1945 a further 10 Horsa and 10 Hadrian gliders were received at Cosford. 249  
In November 1945 policy dictated that the majority of airframes were stored in the open and 
consequently damage was sustained to 19 gliders on the night of 29/30 January 1945 during 
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high winds. The remaining Hadrian gliders were eventually scrapped by civilian engineers 
from Airspeed Ltd. on 31 October 1946. 250  
 
Throughout 1946 there were numerous occasions when Horsa gliders were once again 
listed on monthly production targets, presumably for trial at A.F.E.E. Most notably 16 Horsa I 
and 19 Horsa II gliders were produced between July and September 1946 although there is no 
evidence as to whether they were delivered. 251 The future application of gliders was raised in 
parliament in February 1947 and questions were asked as to whether they had been 
considered for use by the Air Training Corps or been privately sold and broken up for 
materials. The Secretary of State for Air, Mr Noel-Baker, made the following reply as to the 
number of gliders that had been scrapped: 
 
Since the end of the war, 1,295 gliders belonging to the Royal Air Force 
have been declared surplus to our needs, and 982 have been scrapped 
on the authority of the Ministry of Supply. 252 
Noel-Baker also confirmed that a further 300 had been bought on the private market for use 
as gliders but that the sale for raw materials had proved difficult as they contained ‘very hard 
laminated plywood which takes a great deal of labour to break down and is almost 
unsalable, even as firewood.’ 253  
Nevertheless, in 1949 it was recorded that numerous modifications were undertaken 
at Cosford to Horsa airframes and these may well have been utilised in numerous A.F.E.E. 
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investigations into the suitability of the Vickers Valletta as an Horsa tug 254 and similar 
experimentation conducted into the performance of the Handley Page Hastings. 255 On 30 
April 1950 4 Horsa Mk.II aircraft were sent to an unknown destination presumably for 
technical purposes, although by then the A.F.E.E. had been amalgamated by A. & A.E.E. 256  
 
On 30 June 1950 information was received that 121 gliders were to be downgraded 
to Non-Effective Airframe status. Consequently, these airframes were disposed of by 
burning, a task that was recorded as ‘practically complete’ on 31 January 1951.257 The final 
reference to the aircraft type was on 31 October 1954 when 15 Horsa airframes were 
collected by a private purchaser, presumably for materials. 258  
 
Despite the disposals the Horsa did make an unlikely contribution to the technical 
development of the De Havilland Comet, the world’s first jet-powered airliner. Aubrey 
Jackson summarises the importance of the Horsa in the development of the aircraft flight 
deck: 
 
Four-crew occupied the flight deck in the nose, the all-weather visibility 
from which had been carefully determined by means of flight trials with a 
repeatedly modified Airspeed Horsa towed by a Halifax. 259 
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The Comet also incorporated a tricycle undercarriage after the operational advantages of the 
design had been proven on both the Horsa and the Albemarle, both unlikely technological 
contributors to British jet-engine aircraft technology.  In a 1952 article in Flight Magazine it 
was stated that a mock-up of the proposed Comet cockpit was fitted to a Horsa because the 
fuselage diameter was the same dimension as the rear bulkhead of the nose: 
 
Frequently the company’s chief test pilot, John Cunningham, was to be 
found during the winter of 1946-47 at the control of the Horsa while the pilot 
of the tug scoured the sky for rain storms. 260  
 
Although the military application of the airborne glider had undoubtedly reached its 
technological zenith in 1940s the Horsa was still able to make a small contribution to the 
future development of British aviation technology. 
A.F.E.E. March 1943 – December 1945 
 
Despite the work of 9 M.U. at R.A.F. Cosford on the Horsa, in reality the A.F.E.E. 
were still in the very early stages of performance trials with the aircraft in March 1943. 
Weather conditions at Sherburn-in-Elmet continued to obstruct the flying programme and 
winds gusting to 30 miles per hour across the runway were recorded on 2 March that 
rendered two Albemarle tugs unserviceable following performance evaluation trials. 261 By 3 
March all Horsa aircraft were deemed unserviceable and a replacement glider was collected 
from R.A.F. Cosford the following day but weather conditions were such that all flying was 
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abandoned later in the month due to winds in excess of 50 miles per hour gusting across the 
runway. 262  
 
A significant change in senior management took place on 6 March 1943 following the 
recommendations made in the report submitted by Air Commodore McEntecart and Group 
Captain Vernon on 1 October 1942. 263 Group Captain Ubee was posted to the 
Establishment and assumed command on 11 March 1943. In February 1943 contractors 
from Slingsby began to undertake trials at Sherburn-in-Elmet with the Hengist and Whitley 
tug. On 18 March tests revealed that the glider centre of gravity was some five inches 
beyond the aft limit and it was not until 28 March that representatives of the firm attempted 
further trials following modifications.  
 
However, trials had to be abandoned on 2 April due to the recurrence of the fault. 264 
Despite continued efforts and experimentation the Hengist force landed at Acaster on 4 April 
and was damaged after a similar incident at Sherburn the following day.  Trials 
recommenced with Hengist 676 towed by a Whitley on 9 April although the future of the 
aircraft type was already under question as it was far behind the Horsa programme and was 
ultimately deemed incapable of satisfying the tactical and operational requirements of the 
airborne force. 265  
 
One notable visit was conducted on March 24 when Major-General Lee, General 
Officer Commanding-in-Chief 101st American Airborne Division, visited the Station 
accompanied by Group Captain Vernon, Deputy Director Technical Development at M.A.P., 
in connection with experimental work. This was an example of allied co-operation in the 
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development of new technologies. In fact, Anglo-American knowledge transfer had already 
been initiated in relation to the construction of wooden aircraft due to a mutual dependence 
upon material sources. The majority of the timber employed in the construction of British 
wooden aircraft was only available in significant quantities from either the United States or 
Canada, principally fir, spruce and birch. Home sourced timber was mainly utilised in mining 
due to labour shortages of skilled woodsmen which prevented exploitation of material. 266   
 
On July 2 1943 the British Air Commission in Washington extended an invitation, on 
behalf of M.A.P., to the U.S. Department of Agriculture for representatives of the Forest 
Products Laboratory to visit England. The exchange was for the purpose of ‘strengthening 
the present collaboration between our two countries on researches into the uses of timber in 
aircraft construction’ and a report entitled ‘The Use of Wood for Aircraft in the United 
Kingdom’ was published in June 1944: 267  
 
Ministry of Aircraft production officials most effectively arranged for 
interviews, conferences, travel, and visits to and with practically all of the 
United Kingdom governmental, industrial, and scientific operators and 
personnel concerned with wood aircraft and wood propellers. All in all, 
approximately 25 industrial operations were visited, and 73 industrial 
representatives, both technical and managerial, were interviewed. 
Of the United Kingdom government, 10 technical and research 
organizations were visited and 47 technical and scientific personnel 
interviewed. 268 
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The specific aspect of interest in relation to A.F.E.E. was that the U.S. delegation conducted 
a visit to General Aircraft Limited to analyse the techniques utilised in the construction of the 
Hamilcar.  
 
The most significant aspect of this evaluation was that the Hamilcar had been 
designed by means of mathematics alone and although A.F.E.E. was responsible for 
performance tests and modifications the aircraft had undergone little or no prototype trial 
before issue to the Establishment: 
 
General Aircraft Ltd. designed the Hamilcar glider completely by 
mathematical methods and no actual tests were made, although a half-
sized prototype was constructed to check flying characteristics. The full-
sized glider was then built and flown without being statically tested. In the 
design all the fundamental data available were employed, including much 
from the Forest Products Laboratory.269 
 
Although the report recognised that the manufacturing techniques were the most effective 
then available it did consider the Hamilcar to be ‘slightly above the best size for an all-wood 
construction from the point of view of maximum strength for the weight.’ 270 Nevertheless, the 
Hamilcar design proved technically successful, notwithstanding the production 
complications. 271 The report conceded that General Aircraft and DeHavilland, the latter of 
which was then working on the Mosquito and in ownership of Airspeed, were the ‘two most 
forward looking companies’ 272 then designing in wood and that they set an example of what 
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could be achieved through a scientific understanding of the properties of timber and 
experience in its application. 
Research Programme 
  
The weather conditions were poor early 1943 273 but dropping tests with panniers 
from the Horsa glider were completed. 274 Fortunately, the weather then improved 
considerably and resulted in a period of intensive flying activity of different glider/tug 
combinations. Experimental work continued throughout July and included dummy and live 
parachute drops from the Horsa glider. 275 Air Marshal Babington, Air Officer Commanding 
Flying Training Command, Air Vice Marshal Jones, Controller of Research & Development, 
and Group Captain Vernon, Director of Technical Development at the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production, visited the Station on 12 July to see for themselves the work of the 
Establishment.  
 
However, on 19 July M.A.P. reported to the Treasury that the pressure of the 
experimental programme had resulted in delays and consequently a re-assessment of 
A.F.E.E. staffing had been undertaken. Additional resources were requested because, due 
to the demand for aircraft, it had been discovered that modifications had not been 
adequately tested before they were issued for service use: 
 
One of the prime causes of the delays has been due to the fact that flight 
trials have taken place without the latest up to date modifications being 
incorporated in the towing aircraft; furthermore, independent checking 
action at Headquarters has revealed that aircraft have been passed for 
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issue to the Service on which modifications have been made and to which 
essential equipment has been added which have resulted in an 
impracticable or unsafe centre of gravity. 276 
 
It could be construed from previous correspondence between M.A.P. and the Treasury that 
this was yet another attempt to secure additional A.F.E.E. resources. However, entries in the 
O.R.B. certainly suggested a high level of activity when the weather permitted and service 
pressures were evident as witnessed in General Browning’s observations. 277 M.A.P. 
continued to detail the exact nature of the failures at A.F.E.E. as justification for urgent 
additional senior scientific support: 
 
These failures are attributable to the over loading of the staff employed at 
A.F.E.E. in T.D.S. 1 and T.D.S. 2 Sections which deal respectively with 
tug and glider performance, and there is a need for a senior and 
experienced officer to be employed to ensure that such modifications to 
aircraft which have a bearing on the work carried out at A.F.E.E. are 
incorporated in the aircraft before the flight tests are made. 278 
 
The dangers associated with the issue of aircraft for service use which had not undergone 
adequate flight trials and scientific analysis were obvious and consequently attracted little 
scrutiny from Treasury officials.  
 
A hand written note dated 27 July contained in the relevant National Archive file 
agreed to this request: 
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This is yet another case where we cannot afford to quibble about a post in 
view of the urgency with which certain defects must be put right. But here 
again the job, as such, should not last very long and we should ask for 
review in say 6 months’ time. 279 
 
Consequently, formal approval for the creation of an additional Senior Technical Officer was 
granted on 30 July. 280  
 
 Cooperation may well have been due to the fact that in July 1943, despite the 
lack of research and evaluation of the technology; British airborne forces were deployed in 
Sicily during Operation Husky. The 1st Air Landing Brigade was tasked with the capture of 
the Ponte Grande Bridge which spanned the canal at the entrance to the sea port of 
Syracuse. Once secured the Brigade was then expected to capture and secure the entire 
port in anticipation of the arrival of the seaborne forces. 281 Some 2,000 men from the 
Brigade embarked from North Africa on the evening of 9 July in Horsa and WACO CG-4A 
assault gliders towed by Dakotas from 51 Wing USAAF and a small detachment of aircraft 
from 38 Wing RAF. However, adverse weather conditions and inexperienced American tug 
crews severely compromised operational effectiveness. 282 Many gliders were dropped too 
short and landed in the sea which resulted in many troops being drowned.   
 
The indiscipline and inexperience of the American tug pilots was again prevalent on 
13 July when a large British airborne force was tasked with the capture of the Primosole 
Bridge. Under the command of Brigadier Lathbury, 1,856 men of the 1st Airborne Division 
were flown by night from North Africa in 113 parachute aircraft and 16 gliders. As they 
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approached the coast they were engaged by anti-aircraft fire which resulted in the aircrews 
becoming scattered and confused. The result was that only 295 officers and men, some 16% 
of the original force allocated to the task, were dropped accurately enough to carry out the 
operation. 283 The strategic ineffectiveness of the British to provide adequate tug aircraft in 
accordance with the glider programme resulted in a dependency upon poor quality American 
assistance that the technical programme was incapable of resolving.    
 
The dangers associated with an intensive experimental flying programme, coupled 
with major redevelopment of the Station, resulted in numerous accidents and subsequent 
delay. On 28 July 1943 a contractor’s lorry carrying out resurfacing works collided with a 
Short Stirling during resurfacing works: ‘The lorry belonging to Cawood, Wharton & 
Company was badly damaged; the driver, Mr. Stiano, received a four inch laceration of scalp 
which necessitated the insertion of eight stiches.’ 284 A further accident occurred on 11 
August that involved a Hudson aircraft, piloted by the Station Commander, Group Captain 
Ubee, crashing in a field some 2 miles from Sherburn-in-Elmet. The crew were all rescued 
but treated for injuries, and Group Captain Colquhoun was posted to A.F.E.E. to take 
command of the Station whilst Ubee recovered. 285 Although it is unclear what activity the 
aircraft was involved in, extensive air tests were conducted with the type throughout 1943 
including experimentation to determine its suitability as a tug for the Horsa, 286 Hadrian 
(WACO CG-4A), 287 and twin towing of the Hotspur. 288 The technical programme could not 
keep pace with the desire to engage the forces on operations.  
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 Weather remained favourable throughout September and experimental work, 
predominantly with glider towing and container dropping, continued with the addition of the 
Vickers Warwick 289 which was trialled as a glider tug. 290 Interestingly, trials were still 
continuing with the Slingsby Hengist towed by a Whitley tug even though by this late stage it 
was obvious that the glider was both unsuitable and production unachievable for operational 
use. Such experimentation with a redundant type would appear somewhat indulgent 
following the previous assertion of the pressure of the research programme. On 20 
September a successful test was carried out with a Hamilcar and Stirling tug combination 291 
but due to strong winds the trials was recorded as ‘shaky’. 292  
 
Unfortunately, flying accidents remained frequent and on 20 December a Court of 
Inquiry convened to investigate and report on a flying accident a few days earlier involving 
another A.F.E.E. Hudson. The aircraft crashed on the south west corner of the aerodrome 
and the three occupants, Flight Lieutenant Palmer, Lieutenant Murphy R.A.M.C. and 
Corporal Mason were all thrown from the aircraft. All patients were transferred to York 
Military Hospital but Corporal Mason’s injuries, a compound fracture of the skull, proved fatal 
and he died at 20.15 hours. On 30 December 1943 a further Court of Inquiry was convened 
to investigate and report on a flying accident which occurred three days earlier involving the 
death of Private Daly. On 23 February 1944 Mr Walker, a civilian employee of the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production, sustained multiple injuries during experimental flying and was admitted 
to the Station Sick Quarters. 293 Numerous experimental flights were recorded in the O.R.B. 
for the day of Mr Walker’s crash. Despite the conditions being noted as ‘showery all day with 
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heavy cloud,’ it is likely that the injuries were sustained during towing tests between either a 
Horsa and Halifax or Albemarle and Horsa tug combination. 294  
 
Meanwhile, M.A.P. submitted a short report on 14 January 1944 to the Treasury in 
relation to the additional Senior Technical Officer approved on 19 July the previous year. The 
report requested the extension of the position: 
 
We have carefully considered the position in the light of prevailing 
circumstances and are satisfied that there is still a need for a senior and 
experienced officer to be employed on this work. 295 
 
The post was subsequently extended on 24 January by the Treasury on the same terms as it 
was previously granted. 296 
 
Senior Officers continued to visit the Station to inspect its work and on 9 April 1944 
Brigadier Davies, Deputy Director Air, Brigadier Flavell, Commandant Airborne 
Establishment, Lieutenant Colonel Franlyn, War Office, and Lieutenant Colonel Deakin, 
Airborne Forces Development Centre, arrived to observe the experimental dropping of a 
Tractor Unit and 6 – Pounder Gun combination by Halifax. 297 The tests had first been 
conducted by A.F.E.E. on the 22 and 23 November 1943. 298 The A.F.E.E. also received 
numerous scientific visitors. Mr Coombes and Dr Woods of the Department of the Council of 
Scientific and Industrial Research, Australian Government, were in attendance on 13 July 
1944.   
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Despite the repetitive nature of the research and evaluation programme some 
interesting technological experimentation took place. For example, air tests were conducted 
with the Whitley for the first time 26 July 1944 to determine the practicability of twin towing 
the Horsa glider. 299 Although the Whitley V had already been proved underpowered as an 
operational tug it would appear ambitious to have attempted such an experiment. However, 
the combination was tested throughout the rest of the month and one can assume that the 
technique would only have been employed for the purpose of ferrying empty aircraft.  
 
Throughout 1944 more heavy-bombers became available for experimental purposes 
as production increased and in August flight trials were predominantly conducted with a 
Lancaster and Hamilcar combination. 300 The O.R.B. detailed a variety of heavy bomber 
types attached to A.F.E.E., including the Lancaster, Halifax  301 and Short Stirling. 302 
Experiments were also conducted on 26 July with a Whitley pick-up of a Hotspur glider and 
further ‘successful’ tests of the technique were conducted on 22 August. 303 The method by 
which pick-up was achieved involved the erection of a scaffold in front of the glider with the 
tow rope draped across the top. The modified tug could fly low over the apparatus and 
snatch the tow rope with an arrestor hook, similar to those used by naval aircraft for landing 
on aircraft carriers. This technique was used by the British during the Burma campaign to 
evacuate wounded via CG-4A and extensively by the Americans to retrieve gliders from 
Holland following Operation Market Garden. 304 
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Glider towing and live paratroop equipment descents were the principal activities at 
A.F.E.E. throughout the remainder of 1944 and into early 1945. However, further disruption 
occurred with the relocation of A.F.E.E. to R.A.F. Beaulieu in Hampshire in January 1944. 
The weather conditions in Yorkshire had proved particularly unfavourable for experimental 
flying and relocation was inevitable if the programme was to provide rapid and effective 
technical solutions.  
 
Once in Hampshire the most significant addition to the technical programme was the 
responsibility for helicopter development and flight tests commenced in September 1945.  
Helicopter air-log tests were undertaken in October 1945, although the type was not 
recorded. But observation tests were undertaken with a captured German machine, although 
no reference to the type or manufacturer was noted.  305 However, a report was submitted in 
1946 that detailed flight tests of a captured German Foche-Achgelis FA-223. 306 The design 
was originally intended as a substitute to E-boats in mine laying attacks. 307 and in 1940 
became the first helicopter in the world to obtain production status. 308 Rotary wing aircraft 
development and testing thus became a substantial part of the A.F.E.E. programme and 
understanding German technology was an important aspect of analysis.  
    
M.A.P. & Treasury Correspondence (August 1944 – June 1945) 
 
On 30 August 1944 M.A.P. sent the Treasury a further report regarding the Senior 
Technical Officer position that had been sanctioned on 30 July 1943 and subsequently 
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extended on 14 January 1944. 309 Once again, M.A.P. argued that there was little prospect 
of the disappearance of the position for the duration of the war but it did suggest that the 
post could potentially be down-graded, presumably to allow A.F.E.E. control of the staff 
complement under delegated authority: 
 
We have now reviewed the duties of this post and are satisfied that there is 
still need for a senior and experienced officer to be employed on this work. 
There are no prospects of a decline in the amount of work during the war 
with Germany and Japan. 310 
 
The Treasury formally agreed to a six month extension on 6 September 1944 but added that 
‘we hope that at the end of that period it will be possible for you to downgrade this post.’ 311  
 
Additional scientific staff were needed in order to meet the demands of the 
experimental programme. After the relocation of A.F.E.E. to R.A.F. Beaulieu in December 
1944 Mr Reffell, a representative of M.A.P., visited the Establishment in April 1945 to assess 
a proposal for these recruits. He submitted a summary to the Treasury on 28 April 1945 with 
the recommendation that a Principal Technical Officer be appointed: 
 
The new man will be required to act as Chief Engineer and Deputy to the 
Chief Technical Officer and to superintend the work of certain sections. The 
work of A.F.E.E. is very varied and extensive including Gliders and towing 
apparatus, transport work (including the transport of troops and 
equipment), parachutes (both man carrying and supplies dropping), the 
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design of containers for supplies dropping and, latterly, performance testing 
of rotary wing aircraft. 312 
 
Despite the war in Europe drawing to a close the pressure on the A.F.E.E. to continue 
experimental work was not in decline.  
 
 In fact, the responsibility for conducting performance trails on the rotary wing aircraft 
undoubtedly added considerable pressure on the existing programme, not least because the 
technology was almost entirely untested despite previous experimentation with Rotachutes. 
Mr W.G. Jennings, Chief Technical Officer at A.F.E.E. from August 1942, noted the following 
with regards to the technicalities of Helicopter performance testing in 1945: 313  
 
It was appreciated that before acceptance tests could be carried out it 
would be necessary to establish a suitable testing technique, both from the 
performance and handling aspects, since the required functions and the 
method of flight of a helicopter are appreciably different from those 
associated with fixed wing aircraft. 314 
 
A.F.E.E. was allocated American Sikorsky R.4 for the purpose of developing a technique for 
the testing of prototype helicopters. The R.4, named the Hoverfly by the British, was 
designed in 1941 and entered production in 1943, principally for deployment in the anti-
submarine campaign. Consequently, ‘all the practical knowledge and experience’ 315 in 
Britain with regard to helicopter performance was initially based on this aircraft. 
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The majority of research and development was conducted at A.F.E.E. with full reports 
published in 1946. 316 Reffell alluded to the importance of the rotary wing programme and its 
inherent complexities in a request to the Treasury for additional resources: 
 
This is entirely new work so far as A.F.E.E. are concerned and promises to 
be considerable in scope. At the moment they have 3 specimens of the 
new Sikorsky Helicopter which are to be subject to performance and 
handling trials. As this is the first time that a Helicopter has been fully 
performance tested a great deal of work requires to be done including the 
development of special instruments for recording purposes. None of the 
aircraft instruments, airspeed indicators, altimeters and drift indicators are 
suitable in their present form because they do not respond to changes at 
the bottom of the range; for example, the airspeed indicator shows no 
reading at all until a speed of the order of 20 or 30 miles per hour is 
reached. 317 
 
However, in addition to the Sikorsky Helicopters already delivered to A.F.E.E. the Cierva 
Company was also building two prototypes for the M.A.P. and the Bristol Aircraft Company 
was engaged in design work on a British type. Consequently, the rotary wing aspect of the 
A.F.E.E. programme was set to increase and M.A.P. believed that a separate specialist 
section was necessary to conduct the programme of works. 318  
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The M.A.P. request for further additional resource was understandably carefully 
considered by the Treasury and the relevant file contains a considered internal letter written 
on 10 May 1945 that analysed the position. In the period between Reffell’s request and the 
Treasury response the war in Europe had concluded with the unconditional surrender of 
Germany on 7 May. 319 Although the Treasury acknowledged that this could be used as a 
justification for a reduction in the size of A.F.E.E., it also recognised the importance of the 
work undertaken by the Establishment and the on-going conflict in the Far East:    
 
The consequential increase in the scale of operations against Japan is 
bound, I suggest, to lead to a corresponding addition in the load of A.F.E.E. 
By its very nature the Establishment is likely to be quasi-permanent, though 
not at its present strength perhaps, and the creation of a new sub-section 
to deal with helicopter work seems sound in principle and reasonable in 
effect, particularly having regard to the nature of the terrain to be 
conquered, or rather won back, in the Far East. 320 
 
Reference to the potential technical capability of the helicopter and its military application 
was quite surprising and would suggest that the Treasury was well informed with regard to its 
technical development, although the potential for helicopter operations was debated well into 
the 1950s. The Treasury consented to the new post on 15 May 1945 but included the 
condition that the Principal Technical Officer was approved ‘subject to your being able to 
offset the addition by the surrender of a P.T.O. post elsewhere’ 321 within the M.A.P.  
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The prospect of losing a P.T.O. position elsewhere prompted Reffell to stress that the 
specialist nature of the A.F.E.E. made it impossible to economise through the reduction in 
strength of other Experimental Establishments. His response on 29 May included the 
following explanation:  
 
I can see no prospect in the immediate future of offering up a P.T.O. post 
to offset the addition; indeed, I have a number of proposals involving 
further posts at this level. The work of the A.F.E.E. is, in general, unrelated 
to that of any other establishment or directorate and the work which the 
new P.T.O. would undertake does not therefore afford any relief  
elsewhere. 322 
 
The Treasury responded on 1 June 1945 and reluctantly accepted that the post was an 
addition. However, disappointment was expressed and Reffell was reminded that the 
situation regarding delegated authority on establishments would be subject to Treasury 
Circular 9/45 323 and that the ‘major problems of the dimensions of M.A.P.’ 324 would soon be 
considered more comprehensively as a separate issue.  
 
Although the future of the Establishment was not certain in June 1945 the 
technological development of the helicopter was a critical work stream that required detailed 
investigation and had the potential to realise strategic advantages in the post-war era. The 
development of airborne forces, prior to the arrival of the Hoverfly at A.F.E.E., had primarily 
been confined to the modification of existing technology, particularly redundant aircraft, and 
the design of assault gliders to satisfy the requirements of an ambiguous and frequently 
changing strategic vision. However, the post-war technical policy was an opportunity to re-
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position the future development of the British airborne capability and provide an aircraft with 
the capability to deliver both troops and equipment with maximum tactical and operational 
effectiveness.     
Future Technical Policy: 1945  
 
The surrender of Japan on 2 September 1945, coupled with the Treasury Review, 
resulted in an assessment by M.A.P. of the future technical policy of A.F.E.E. which 
commenced with a summary of the current experimental programme on 26 September 1945. 
The report argued that before any drastic decision was taken on the future of the 
Establishment both the Air Staff and War Office would need to be consulted because the 
majority of the future and current works had been requested directly by them. 325 However, 
the report recognised that the division of work between A.F.E.E. and R.A.E. could well be 
rationalised to achieve some of the efficiencies to which the Treasury had previously alluded.  
 
For example, with regard to the dropping of heavy equipment the R.A.E. was 
responsible for all prototype parachute canopy design and liaison between the Ministry of 
Supply and associated contractor frameworks. Once airworthiness had been established the 
parachute was then passed to A.F.E.E. for technological development in order to assess 
suitability against tactical and operational requirements prior to service issue. It was 
suggested that all such development works could be undertaken by A.F.E.E. with 
consequent economy in flying hours and personnel, both flying and technical. 326 
  
A similar arrangement existed with regard to parachute development and the same 
argument was presented for concentration of future research at A.F.E.E. In fact, the ‘ad hoc’ 
arrangement by which research was conducted at the Establishment during the war, 
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determined by the need for a rapid answer to Airborne Forces’ problems, meant that 
A.F.E.E. was capable of dealing with a broad range of technological enquiries. Helicopter 
development notwithstanding, the Establishment was also well placed to deal with most 
aircraft types: 
 
With regard to transport aircraft it is suggested that since these types will 
follow in their main outline well tried aerodynamic features, it should be 
agreed that A.F.E.E. should take on all flight testing acceptance tests. 327   
 
The conduct of such work at A.F.E.E. had the additional advantage that the aircraft could 
also be proved for such roles as paratrooping, supply dropping and pick-up and glider towing 
all at the same Establishment with further economies in flying hours. 328 The potential for 
saving through the amalgamation of functions conducted by the two Establishments was 
obviously worthy of exploration but the specialist aspect of the A.F.E.E. workload was 
primarily concerned with the technological development of Airborne Forces.  
 
Although it was appreciated by A.F.E.E. that the future of the British airborne 
capability had yet to be determined it did stress that further development was required to 
maximise the military effectiveness of the existing technology: 
 
Although, at present, there is no indication of what the future Army Policy 
will be in respect of airborne forces, there are indications that for some 
years to come (say five years) we will still be concerned with gliders and 
towing thereof. In this field there is room for considerable improvement in 
towing technique and instrumentation for cloud and night flying. In addition 
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we are still concerned about the snatch loads which come on to the rope 
and its elimination. 329 
 
The five year prediction was fairly accurate as A.F.E.E. was disbanded on 14 September 
1950 and the staff and equipment were relocated to A. & A.E.E. at Boscombe Down with the 
helicopter research re-allocated to R.A.F. Andover.   
 
Although rotary wing aircraft hid the potential to offer a new strategic dimension to 
airborne operations, the short-term and long-term tests schedule submitted with the A.F.E.E. 
report in September 1945 show that the technical programme was predominantly a 
perpetuation of exploring efficiencies in existing technology. The short-term programme (See 
Appendix 10) primarily consisted of numerous tests into the capabilities of different aircraft 
as glider tugs and parachute aircraft, such as the Handley Page Hastings and Avro York, 330 
heavy equipment dropping, and the development of glider pick-up installations. 331 The 
exceptions included an examination of the Hamilcar X, 332 the powered high-capacity cargo 
glider, and flight tests of variants of the Sikorsky helicopter. 333 The long-term test schedule 
(See Appendix 11) was predominantly dedicated to maximising the effectiveness of existing 
glider and parachute technology. 
 
However, the continued investment in glider technology, despite the arrival of the 
helicopter, was not necessarily as outdated as it might first appear. The development of the 
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British airborne capability was still a relatively new technology in September 1945 and the 
assault glider technique was less than five years old. During the war there had been little 
time or capacity to concentrate on perfecting the technique of glider warfare due to service 
demands to solve other immediate problems and respond to operational requirements. 334 
Furthermore, although the development of rotary wing aircraft had commenced, and its 
future potential had been recognised, the technology was very much in its infancy and the 
glider remained the only delivery mechanism capable of delivering well equipped troops 
behind enemy lines. 335  
 
In his post-war report on the Establishment the Chief Technical Officer, Mr Jennings, 
made the following comment with regards to the A.F.E.E. connection with helicopter 
development:  
 
There is a strong link between Airborne Forces requirements and 
helicopters since it is possible that, in the future, some of these 
requirements may best be met by a helicopter; and aircraft of this type may 
prove invaluable for lifting, transporting, and putting down at a particular 
spot a heavy item of military equipment such as a gun or tank. 336 
 
However, Horsa gliders remained on the strength and maintenance schedules of No.9 
Maintenance Unit as late as 1954. 337   
 
The technological remit of the A.F.E.E. was fundamentally unique and multi-
disciplined within the M.A.P. hierarchy. Consequently, the Establishment was responsible for 
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providing technical solutions for a variety of stakeholders, including the R.A.F. and the Army.  
In fact the A.F.E.E. was briefly a tri-service research institution when it collaborated with the 
Fleet Air Arm on the application of rotary wing aircraft for utilisation at sea in 1945. 338   
 
 
Figure 7: Sikorsky Hoverfly Mark I A.F.E.E. before transfer to the Admiralty in 1949 
Source: Imperial War Museum (Catalogue Number: ATP 14253C) 
 
The importance of A.F.E.E. to more than one Service was reiterated in a 
recommendation on the future of the Establishment by the Assistant Director Research & 
Design (Airborne) on 25 October 1945. The minute was submitted to the M.A.P. Controller of 
Research and Development and detailed two main reasons why the Establishment should 
be retained: 
 
(a) If the work is undertaken at an aerodrome where other M.A.P. test work 
is proceeding, such as Boscombe Down, serious difficulties will arise as 
other flying must cease in the vicinity when any glider towing, supply 
dropping or parachuting test work is required.  
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(b)  In addition to serving the R.A.F. in the development of its equipment 
we also have a similar responsibility to the Army. If we merge their work 
into an Establishment primarily undertaking acceptance tests etc. for 
the R.A.F. in will be a disservice to the Army. 339   
 
The role of A.F.E.E. collaboration with the R.A.F. and Army in pursuit of shared technological 
objectives should not be underestimated and became a significant factor in the argument for 
its post-war retention as an autonomous research facility. Consequently, the minute included 
a list of potential future additional responsibilities: performance testing of military transport 
types, routine statistical parachute tests as, at present, undertaken at Henlow, and full-scale 
tests in conjunction with R.A.E. of airborne equipment developed by that Establishment 340   
 
Following a visit by Air Marshal Sir Alec Coryton, C.R.D., and Mr Woodburn, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Aircraft Production, on 15 November 1945 the 
A.F.E.E. absorbed the above responsibilities, notwithstanding those concerned with the 
performance testing of helicopters, into their varied and specialist research programme until 
they were finally disbanded in 1950. 341    
Conclusion 
  
 A.F.E.E. and its predecessors were fundamental to the technical development of the 
British airborne capability, and consequently justified in their role regardless of the strategic 
deficiencies inherent in the concept and doctrine. The Establishment had a diverse portfolio 
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and, despite initial criticism, 342 the complexities of the research programme were invariably 
successfully conducted in challenging circumstances. But, despite the creation of an 
autonomous research Establishment dedicated to the technological development of airborne 
warfare, the provision of material resource and continued ambiguity of strategic policy 
ultimately proved restrictive.  
 
 The deficiency in suitable aircraft was the most inhibiting factor from the perspective 
of technological development. This was evident through the amount of research programme 
time dedicated to the trial of a multitude of aircraft throughout the life of the Establishment. 
The programme was essentially confined to modification of whatever type was available at 
any particular moment in time. Had the airborne force been considered a strategic priority 
the allocation of more suitable aircraft may well been undertaken and have accelerated the 
large-scale deployment of the force prior to 1944. However, the airborne troops were 
dependent upon aircraft totally unsuitable for purpose and, despite extensive technical 
modification, performance could not be adequately improved. 
 
 This was particularly evident in terms of the glider programme whereby the 
momentum of technical development ultimately stagnated through the unavailability of 
suitable tug aircraft. The disconnection between aircraft availability and operational 
requirements 343 was beyond the capability of the A.F.E.E. to resolve, although the 
organisation provided technical solutions as far as was scientifically possible within the 
confines of resource availability. Ultimately, the production of assault gliders and training of 
parachutists before detailed technological investigation into the method of delivery had been 
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conducted remained an insurmountable obstacle and resulted in an often abortive research 
programme involving numerous aircraft types.      
  
 The continuation of research into the assault after the war was conducted 
simultaneously with the development of the helicopter in order to ensure that some tactical 
capability was retained during the technological progression. Although the limitations of the 
existing technology were well documented, ultimately the maintenance of a continued 
psychological threat of an airborne operation upon an enemy may well have been 
considered as important as the actual offensive capability.        
270 
 
Conclusion 
 
In little over five years Britain had developed a substantial airborne resource that 
comprised two divisions and associated specialist equipment. The programme required 
extensive scientific investigation and subsequent technical development to achieve viability 
but this was ultimately restricted due to the availability of suitable resources.    
  
The first requirement of technological development, as argued by Millet and Murray, 
was to achieve political support as explored in chapter one. This permitted the establishment 
of an efficient, centrally organised working relationship between wide varieties of 
stakeholders that ranged from government ministries to independent non-specialist 
manufacturers. Without such co-operation the relevant progression in the fields of science 
and technology could not have been exploited for the development and production of new 
weapons and techniques of military deployment. Hacker has argued that the relationship 
between technology and the armed forces requires further substantial historical examination 
in order to fully understand technological development and its application to the battlefield: 
 
Technological innovation has historically answered more to military purpose 
than commonly allowed, ingenious weapons having held Western 
imaginations in thrall since the Middle Ages. Unfortunately, guides to the 
history of technology tend to obscure the links by making ‘military 
technology’ a residual category: fortifications dis- appear into architecture, 
battleships and bombers into transportation, explosives into chemical 
technology. 344 
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Professor R.V. Jones believed that World War Two created greater solidarity between 
scientists and military personnel which produced the blueprint for Operational Research 
whereby both parties benefitted from shared intelligence in the production of new technology 
and efficiencies in existing weaponry:      
 
The threat was so urgent that traditional barriers, particularly between 
scientists and serving officers, were breached as the two sides worked 
jointly in their efforts to devise new weapons and techniques with which to 
counter the common enemy. 345 
 
However, this did not necessarily mean that the benefits of such resources were dedicated to 
the identification and discovery of the most effective weapons and techniques as identified 
through strategic military requirements.  
 
Without the tenacity of Churchill, and subsequent support from his closest political 
and scientific colleagues, the technological investment in the development of an independent 
British airborne capability may well have remained limited to small-scale investigation. But in 
hindsight, this resulted in the realisation of a personal ambition rather than a strategic military 
vision.     
 
Indeed, with regard to British airborne capability, and the allocation of scarce 
resources, it would be difficult to suggest that the new technology made a definitive strategic 
contribution to overall national military effectiveness in offensive operations. Murray rightly 
argues that Churchill’s management of the central government administration was tight and 
that he ‘hammered his advisors and the system into effectively allocating and utilizing 
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available resources.’ 346 Yet it also provided the opportunity for strategic interference without 
a full appreciation of the technological and consequent strategic limitations. Mary Kaldor 
believes that the British military establishment wanted more powerful existing weapons, 
rather than its replacement by new technology, thus reinforcing the argument that strategic 
development of airborne warfare was politically, rather than militarily, driven. 347  
 
What an analysis of the technological development of airborne warfare demonstrates 
was that strategic effectiveness, the second component of successful technological 
development as identified by Millet and Murray, was prohibitive. 348 Strategic doctrine 
concerning the capability of British airborne forces remained confused throughout the 
course of the conflict and this was consequently detrimental to operational effectiveness.  
Buckingham argues that the lack of clarity contained in Churchill’s initial minute in 1940 
regarding development ‘arose directly from his habit of framing broad concepts in dramatic 
language and leaving the details for others.’ 349 Unfortunately, ‘others’ did not flesh out his 
vision with sufficient clear mindedness.  
 
The ambiguity contained in the airborne doctrine had implications for the tactical 
effectiveness of the new resource and, consequently, all associated technological 
investigation. Tactical effectiveness is defined as ‘the specific techniques used by combat 
units to fight engagements in order to secure operational objectives.’ 350 These techniques 
include the mechanism for the movement of forces, the provision of destructive firepower and 
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the logistical support directly required. With reference to airborne forces, extensive 
technological development was required to provide the capability for troop movement, but the 
issue of adequate destructive firepower was never fully resolved, and the logistical resources 
in terms of aircraft were never available without compromising the effectiveness of other 
forces in theatre through disruption to the supply chain. 
   
Consequently, investment in airborne technology cannot be easily reconciled with the 
problematic economic and strategic situation which confronted the British in the summer of 
1940 and beyond. The combination of the structure of central government, and key 
personalities therein, allowed for the development of a capability without a clear policy or 
evidence of a strategic military requirement beyond the broad objective of defeat of 
Germany. This probably explains why the British airborne capability was invariably under 
resourced, as evidenced throughout chapters three and four, and technological development 
was continuously restricted.  
 
The combination of the inability to allocate suitable aircraft, inadequate research 
facilities and treasury bureaucracy culminated in an airborne weapon that was incapable of 
autonomous operation. 351 In fact, following an Air Ministry conference on 9 September 1940 
on the deployment of Airborne Forces, Ismay provided the following conclusions for Churchill 
that recognised the limitations: 
 
As I see it, the fundamental obstacle to going large on airborne troops is 
that we cannot at present afford to divert either bomber pilots, or large 
numbers of bombing aircraft (whether for towing gliders, or for dropping 
parachutists) from their primary role. 352 
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The A.F.E.E. and its predecessors undoubtedly achieved considerable success in the 
modification of existing military equipment for airborne application, and learnt quickly through 
the utilisation of Operational Research techniques, but in reality the majority of the work was 
both low-tech and time consuming.  
 
Where innovative development was required, particularly in terms of glider 
development, the relevant technological research was largely successful and crucial to future 
operational effectiveness. Unfortunately, the failure to solve the problem of the availability of 
suitable tug aircraft at the inception of the programme resulted in extensive delays to 
operational deployment and subsequent military effectiveness that could not be mitigated 
through the technological resources available to the A.F.E.E. Even when the problems of the 
glider production programme had begun to be resolved the shortage of tug aircraft remained 
restrictive. Indeed, on 21 March 1942 Air Chief Marshal Freeman wrote to the Chief of the Air 
Staff regarding the availability of suitable aircraft for use by the airborne forces: ‘we are badly 
behindhand, or at least M.A.P. are, in the modification of bombers for towing gliders and for 
dropping parachute troops.’ 353  
 
Ironically, even after the arrival of the helicopter at A.F.E.E, an aircraft design with the 
potential to fulfil every aspect of the airborne forces requirements, technological development 
remained focused upon the improvement of already obsolete hardware which suggests that 
the British remained fixated with the airborne method despite the inherent technological and 
strategic disadvantages.   
 
The evidence suggests that the technological development of British airborne forces 
can be examined in two distinct phases. Between 1940 and 1943, technological limitations in 
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aircraft design and availability were restrictive to the development of a substantial airborne 
capability. However, following the introduction of significant numbers of American transport 
aircraft under the lend lease agreement, 354 the potential for large-scale deployment rapidly 
increased from 1944 onwards. Unfortunately, by the time sufficient numbers of aircraft 
became available the deployment of airborne forces had become increasingly detrimental to 
conventional offensive infantry operations and threatened to compromise holistic allied 
tactical and operational effectiveness. The inter-war scientific debate regarding the 
improvement in efficiency of established technology over new technology would appear to 
have been correct in terms of the British airborne experience. 
  
Evidence that the airborne capability compromised more orthodox operations 
increased following the rapid collapse of German forces in France in 1944 which put 
immense pressure upon the allied supply system and resulted in a prioritised allocation of 
resources. Transport aircraft became critical in the supply role and were used to relieve the 
pressure on the ports and consequently increased the logistical capabilities of the units 
fighting on the front line. The Air Ministry Official Monograph concluded that an ‘enigma’ 
existed between the creation of the airborne technology and the opportunity for its 
application: 
 
Probably the main drawback to the launching of a large scale airborne 
operation is the fact that, both for training purposes and when airborne 
forces are being maintained at readiness for sudden demands, large 
numbers of transport aircraft may be tied up when they might be better 
employed elsewhere. 355 
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Airborne operations required the diversion of transport aircraft and, regardless of the 
developments in airborne technology by the A.F.E.E. and its predecessors, that investment 
wasted without the diversion of considerable additional airpower resources.  
 
General Eisenhower recalled in his memoirs that the planning of such an Allied 
airborne operation near Tournai in 1944 caused significant disruption to the supply chain in 
Normandy:     
 
Withdrawal of air transport in preparation for it caused a six-day suspension of 
air supply to the advancing armies that cost them 5,000 tons of supplies. In 
petrol that would have been equivalent to 1½ million gallons – enough to have 
carried two armies to the Rhine without pausing, while the enemy were still in 
chaos. 356  
 
The scepticism of senior military commanders to deploy airborne operations was 
understandable, particularly when scarce resources could leave front line troops vulnerable 
to a counter-offensive. In fact on 26 July 1944 General Taylor, commander of the U.S. 101st 
Airborne Division, suggested that approximately six weeks would be necessary for the 
preparation of an effective airborne operation. 357 Consequently, planned airborne assaults 
were often cancelled due to the successful capture of prospective targets by conventional 
ground forces. This would suggest that Professor Hill’s assertion that British war production 
would have been more effectively concentrated upon the improvement of existing weapons 
rather than the development of new and unproven technologies, to be correct. 358 The 
effective restriction of the fighting capabilities of mechanised front line units in order to 
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prepare for the launch of an airborne operation would not have been logical, particularly if the 
application of the new technology could not guarantee success.  
 
However, it would be wrong to suggest that such a culmination of misdirection was 
exclusive in the development of airborne forces. Meilinger has argued that the R.A.F. had 
also suffered from a similar disconnection between the available technology and the 
prescribed military doctrine of the service. During the confused and reactive nature of the 
inter-war period expansion schemes, implemented to counter the growing threat of the 
Luftwaffe, the primary function of the force had suffered neglect:  
 
As a consequence, despite twenty years of doctrine that emphasized the 
primacy of offensive airpower, the RAF was woefully unprepared to conduct 
such operations once war broke out. It was one of the first great shocks of 
the war to discover that Bomber Command was too small, too poorly 
equipped, and too ill-trained to carry out the role scripted for it. Not for the 
first or last time in air warfare the technology had failed to keep pace with 
the doctrine devised to employ it. 359 
   
The implications of such a disconnect for British airborne forces culminated in the launch, 
and subsequent catastrophic failure, of Operation Market Garden in which the British 1st 
Airborne Division was practically annihilated. Astonishingly only seven days were required 
from the order to instigate the planning phase of Market Garden on 10 September 1944 to 
the actual launch seven days later.  
 
Historians have previously attributed this condensed gestation and implementation 
period to the fact that a series of airborne operations had been planned and subsequently 
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cancelled since the Normandy invasion. In the case of the 1st Airborne Division it had been in 
readiness to support the 6th Airborne Division in Normandy ever since 6 June. As 
Middlebrook notes: ‘since then, no less than fifteen further operations had been planned but 
then cancelled, usually because ground forces reached the landing area first.’  360  The fact 
that numerous airborne operations had been repeatedly planned and cancelled was not 
necessarily beneficial. In fact the continuous cancellations, rather than improving the 
efficiency of planning staffs, may well have had a negative effect on the outcome of the 
operation. In the repetitiveness of briefings, loading of aircraft, and subsequent stand-downs 
would have been utterly demoralising and some troops began to talk of a ‘1st Stillborn 
Division.’ 361 
 
Nevertheless, what became clear at Arnhem was that despite the technological 
investment in the British airborne capability the resource requirements generally outweighed 
operational effectiveness on the battlefield. The technology was not capable of producing a 
method of delivery that could be quickly and efficiently implemented, particularly in the case 
of glider-borne forces, and despite continual technological efficiencies it was impossible to 
improve the speed of deployment without severely compromising operational outcome.   
 
If the British did in fact realise they were incapable of producing the resources 
required for the successful deployment of airborne forces, particularly with regards to the 
provision of suitable transport aircraft, then it would suggest that investment in the technique 
was continued for purposes other than battlefield success or simply to placate Churchill 
particularly in the post D-Day period. An important factor was the need to ensure that enemy 
troops were withdrawn from the front line to guard strategic targets against the threat of a 
potential airborne operation. The Air Ministry Official Monograph stated that the 
psychological effect of airborne forces upon an enemy had a ‘moral impact out of all 
                                               
360
 M. Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944 (London, 1995), p. 6. 
361
 Buckingham, Arnhem 1944, p. 67. 
279 
 
proportion to the size of force employed.’ 362 Consequently, the British airborne capability had 
a psychological quality that could well have outweighed the importance of the application of 
the technology on the battlefield.  
 
Indeed, Buckingham suggests that Churchill’s demand for an airborne capability 
was a direct result of the Dunkirk evacuations and was just as important in providing a 
‘psychological safety valve.’ 363 This would certainly appear correct with regard to the British 
experience. In fact the instigation of airborne operations for the purpose of damaging 
enemy morale and paradoxically raising morale was actually referenced in Airborne 
Operations Pamphlet No.1 which, rather tellingly, was not actually published by the War 
Office until 1944: 
 
The use of airborne forces behind the enemy forward troops may cause the 
latter to think that some disaster has occurred and thus reduce their powers 
of resistance. It creates alarm on the lines of communication and may force 
commanders of reserves into unsound action. If hostile communications 
centres can be captured, under favourable circumstances it may be 
possible to plunge the enemy into extreme confusion. 364 
 
Although the pamphlet closed with ‘the extent of the morale effect varies with the discipline 
of the enemy, the efficiency of his communications and the moment which the airborne 
troops are used’, 365 this did provide a convenient, if un-measurable, performance indicator 
that could be used as a justification should an operation not achieve the desired outcome, 
such as with the glorification of the defeat of the 1 British Airborne Division at Arnhem.   
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 Clearly, the technological development of a British airborne capability was incapable 
of achieving maximum military effectiveness alone. But the political determination was 
never equated into a realistic strategic direction which ultimately compromised the tactical 
and operational effectiveness of the airborne forces through a lack of fundamental resource 
allocation. The lack of consensus on strategy, which created ambiguity within the doctrine 
and concept, resulted in misguided technological investment that although largely 
successful in terms of scientific analysis, remained difficult to reconcile with the economic 
and military realities faced by Britain throughout the conflict and the immediate post-war 
period.  
 
 There remains much research to be undertaken on the importance of military 
technology in a wartime context. Edgerton has identified that military aviation has often 
been considered a civilian development: 
 
Remarkably after the Second World War standard reference sources on the 
history of twentieth-century technology still treated, and treat, aviation 
under transportation, and military aviation within the larger context of 
civilian aviation. 366 
 
He has also suggested that accounts of twentieth century British scientific accomplishments 
have concentrated on national civilian bodies with ‘science’ in their title, the Department for 
Scientific and Industrial Research for example. 367 This examination of the A.F.E.E. and the 
development of glider for purely military function certainly challenges such historiographical 
anomalies. 
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Ultimately, the development of a British airborne capability was politically driven 
rather than the result of a demonstrable strategic military requirement. Consequently, the 
parameters for technological development remained highly variable and the A.F.E.E. 
achieved credible results in very difficult conditions. But this had little influence upon the 
holistic military effectiveness of the British forces during World War Two or indeed during 
the post-war period.    
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Appendix 2: Ministry of Aircraft Production Organisation (July 1941) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Scott & Hughes, Administration of War Production (H.M.S.O., 1955) 
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Appendix 3: Central Landing School Structure 1 October 1940 
 
Headquarters Personnel 
Commandant Group Captain Harvey 
S.A.S.O. Wing Commander Norman 
Squadron Leader Admin.  Squadron Leader Newnham 
Intelligence  Flight Lieutenant Hodges 
Parachute Training Squadron Personnel 
Officer Commanding Squadron Leader Strange 
Chief Instructor Squadron Leader Benham 
Chief Flying Instructor Flight Lieutenant Fielden 
Flying Duties Flight Lieutenant Romanoff 
Flying Officer McMonnies 
Pilot Officer Cutler 
Pilot Officer O’Neill 
Development Unit Personnel 
Officer Commanding Wing Commander Buxton 
Parachute Duties Flight Lieutenant Williams 
Flying Duties Flying Officer Davie 
Glider Training Squadron Personnel 
Officer Commanding Flying Officer Hervey 
Flying Duties Flying Officer Davies 
Flying Officer Wilkinson  
 
Source: T.N.A., AIR 29/513, A.F.E.E. O.R.B. Appendices 1940-1942, 1 October 1940 
304 
 
Appendix 4: Establishment No. WAR/AC/116A 1940 
 
Personnel (Officers) Rank  & Quantity 
Officer Commanding Wing Commander 
Adjutant Flying Officer 
Engineer Flight Lieutenant 
Flying Flight Lieutenant (1) 
Flying Officer (3) 
Principal Technical Officer Civilian 
Senior Technical Officer Civilian 
Technical Officers Civilian (4) 
Airframes Engines 
Heyford (1) Kestrel (II) 
Whitely (1) Merlin (2) 
Hector (3) Dagger (3) 
Tiger Moth (1) Gipsy (1) 
Avro (2) Lynx (2) 
Gliders  
Miscellaneous (6) 
Troop Carriers (6) 
Wellesley (1) 
 
Mechanical Transport  
Towing Cars (3) 
Motorcycle (1)  
 
 
Source: T.N.A., AIR 29/513, A.F.E.E. O.R.B. Appendices 1940-1942, 22 October 1940 
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Appendix 5: Delegates at Air Ministry Conference 16 April 1941 
 
Air Ministry: 
 
Air Commodore R.D. Mansell: Director of Operational Requirements (D.O.R.) 
Group Captain F.A. Norton: Deputy Director Technical Development (D.D.T.D.) 
 
War Office: 
 
Major D.C. Curme: Operational Requirements (A.M.) & Staff Duties (W.O.) 
Squadron Leader R.M. Colebrook: Defence Ministers Committee (D.M.C.) 
 
Ministry of Aircraft Production: 
 
Mr H. Grinsted: Deputy Director Research & Development Technical (D.D.R.D.T.)  
Dr H. Roxbee Cox: Deputy Director Scientific Research  (D.D.S.R.1) 
 
Source: T.N.A., AIR 29/513, A.F.E.E. O.R.B. Appendices 1940-1942, 16 April 1941 
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Appendix 6: Situation into Research Regarding Glider Tugs 
 
Glider Type Glider Tug Situation as of 28 August 1941 
G.A.L. Hamilcar  Short Stirling The firm had been asked to investigate necessary 
modification but a Test Installation (T.I.) had not been 
requested. 
 Handley Page Halifax II T.I. and incorporation in production aircraft requested and 
design was in progress. It was estimated that production 
aircraft (from the 151
st
 onwards) would be fitted with 
equipment as standard from March 1942. 
 Avro Lancaster T.I. and incorporation in production aircraft was requested 
but design work could not commence until October due to 
existing work in the design department.  
 Avro Manchester Only an investigation had been requested and as the 
production of the aircraft had been completed (superseded 
by the Lancaster) the aircraft was practically ruled out as a 
tug. 
Airspeed Horsa Armstrong Whitworth 
Whitley 
T.I. only had been requested. One aircraft (P.5104) had 
been specially modified for experimental purposes.  
Slingsby Hengist Vickers Wellington T.I. and incorporation into production aircraft had been 
requested with the T.I. completed by 1 October. Vickers 
unable to confirm when production aircraft would next be 
available. 
 Armstrong Whitworth 
Albemarle 
Firm requested to investigate necessary modifications. 
 Handley Page Halifax One machine (L.7244) modified for experimental use.  
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G.A.L. Hotspur Hawker Hector Malcolm Aviation was in the process of converting 25 
machines, a further 75 were available if required.  
 Westland Lysander C.L.E. had completed a test installation and Westland’s 
were considering the design. 
 Curtiss Tomahawk D.O.R. had requested performance data for assessment.  
 
Source: T.N.A., AIR 29/513, Report 1/41, 8 September 1941  
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Appendix 7: Glider Training Schools 
 
Flying training for the glider pilots was the responsibility of R.A.F. Elementary Flight 
Training Schools where students qualified on trainers such as the De Havilland Tiger Moth 
before converting to gliders. The increase in glider capability resulted in an increased 
demand for tug aircraft and crews and on 15 January 1942 the Army Cooperation Command 
of the R.A.F. formed No. 38 (Airborne Forces) Wing specifically detailed to provide aircraft 
for facilitating training and operations. During the same month 297 Squadron was formed at 
R.A.F. Netheravon on Salisbury Plain in Wiltshire and was equipped with Whitley Mark V 
Rolls-Royce Merlin engined aircraft for parachute training. The squadron was then moved to 
R.A.F. Hurn near Bournemouth on 5 June 1941. 296 Squadron was formed at Ringway from 
the old glider exercise squadron and was equipped with Hawker Hectors and Hawker Harts 
for the purpose of glider towing. 296 (Glider Towing) Squadron did not receive Whitleys until 
it moved to Netheravon in June, after the departure of 297. 1  
 
No. 1 G.T.S. School had remained at R.A.F. Thame when the training was divided 
into two separate establishments in December 1941. However, by early summer of 1942 
No.1 Glider Training School was in desperate need of a larger airfield to meet its training 
requirements, and after careful deliberation by Flying Training Command, R.A.F. Croughton, 
in Northamptonshire, was selected. On 19 July 1942 No.1 Glider Training School (G.T.S.) 
began relocating from Buckinghamshire and was fully operational the following month. 2 On 
the same day that No.1 G.T.S. commenced its move to Broughton from R.A.F. Thame, 
Headquarters Flying Training Command, based near Reading in Berkshire, issued a 
pamphlet entitled ‘Notes on Glider Training’ and a flying syllabus for all trainee pilots. The 
booklet opened with the following welcoming message for all new recruits: 
                                               
1
 Wood, History of the World’s Glider Forces pp.38-39.  
2
 Ibid.  
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1) The function of the Glider Training School is to produce pilots with sufficient 
knowledge and skill to handle gliders efficiently on the ground and in the air 
2) In order that full use may be made of the equipment and space available, 
great importance should be attached to the ground organization and to the 
co-ordination of the tug pilot, glider pilot and ground crew 
3) Good ground organization, coupled with a high standard of flying discipline, 
will enable a maximum numbers of tows to operate without interference or 
delay. 3 
   
The insistence upon good ground organisation in order to enable a maximum number of 
tows is a good indication of just how tight the training schedule for new recruits was. The 
timetable could not afford obstructions on the runway caused by indiscipline as this would 
cause substantial delays in the training programme. The pamphlet issued by Flying Training 
Command constantly stressed the importance of keeping schedule and losing as little time 
as possible in take-off, landings and retrieving the gliders ready for the next tow: 
 
In order to avoid misunderstanding and loss of time, the different members of 
the ground crew should be given numbers according to their duties and should 
wear different coloured armlets or some similar distinguishing feature. When 
Tow Masters take over a fresh detachment, there will then be no 
misunderstanding as to the duties being carried out by each member of the 
detachment. Efficient team work is a matter of the greatest importance, and 
members of the ground crew should be familiar with each other’s duties and 
with the recognized signals. 4    
 
                                               
3
 A.G.T.A. 2009.16, Notes on Glider Training, 19 July 1942. 
4
 Ibid. 
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The training schedule was particularly labour intensive for R.A.F. personnel and each tow 
line (for each individual glider and tug combination) required a ground crew comprised of at 
least five men: 
 
i) N.C.O. i/c ground crews 
ii) Rigger of the Tug, who acts as relay signaller 
iii) Rigger of gliders 
iv) Two or more A.C.H.s  
v) Tractor Driver  5 
 
The flying syllabus was split into a series of day and night flying exercises, both dual and 
solo, which each student had to pass in order to gain their wings. The training syllabus was 
extremely intensive and only when an instructor was confident in a pupil’s ability could he 
commence onto exercise number 10, practice flights made with ‘live loads’. A live load 
literally meant using passengers in order to simulate the experience of combat flying and the 
flying syllabus included the following stipulations: 
 
Exercise 10.  
Carrying of Full Live Load – Dual and Solo 
Provided that the C.O. or C.I. considers the pupil is competent, the pupil may 
carry a full live load, subject to his completing: 
i) Successful dual and live load flights 
ii) Not less than 34 successful solo flights in the Hotspur 
iii) At least 4 solo flights with full ballast loads. 6     
 
                                               
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
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Once completed the pupil could then commence cross-country flights before moving onto 
night flying exercises. The flying syllabus notes contained the following advice on cross-
country exercises in order to remind the pilot that even whilst on tow it was important to 
retain some idea of geographical location. 
 
Although map reading is generally considered impracticable when flying solo in 
a glider on tow an intelligent interest must nevertheless be taken by glider pilots 
in the route made good when flying cross country. 7  
 
Once competent the pupil would undertake a series of solo cross-country flights. The two 
hours cross country-flight, listed below was the final exercise before qualification and was a 
solo formation flight with full live load: 
 
Croughton-Leighton Buzzard   23 miles    
Leighton Buzzard – Market Harborough 40 miles 
Market Harborough – Kidlington (land)  47 miles 
Kidlington – Cricklade    27 miles 
Cricklade – Alcester    39 miles 
Alcester – Croughton     33 miles 
      Total 209 miles 8 
                                               
7
 Ibid. 
The suggestion that map reading whilst on tow was impracticable is due to the fact that this stage of 
the flight required maximum concentration from the glider pilot in order to maintain a smooth flight 
path behind the tug, if a glider pilot got into difficulty whilst on tow the weight of the glider was more 
than capable of flipping the tug aircraft. 
8
 Ibid. 
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Appendix 8: Decorations & Awards for Operation Biting 
 
Distinguished Service Cross 
Acting Commander F.A.N. Cook R.A.N. 
Temporary Lieutenant D.J. Quick R.N.V.R. 
Temporary Lieutenant (Engineer Branch) C.W.J. Coles R.N.V.R. 
 
Distinguished Service Medal 
Able Seaman J.T. Bland 
Stocker 1sr Class C.W. Hurst 
‘In recognition of gallant and distinguished services in successful Combined 
Operations against the enemy at Bruneval:’ 
 
Military Cross 
Second Lieutenant E.B.C. Charteris, K.O.S.B. (attached Airborne Division) 
(Wentworth Surrey) 
Captain (Temporary Major) J.D. Frost, Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) (attached 
Airborne Division) (Nowshere India) 
 
Military Medal 
Corporal (Acting Sergeant) G. McKenzie, Black Watch (W. Highland Regiment) 
(attached Airborne Division) (Crieff, Perthshire) 
Sergeant D. Grieve, Seaforth Highlanders (Rosshire Buffs, Duke of Albany’s) 
(attached Airborne Division) (Glasgow) 9  
                                               
9
 ‘Daring in Combined Operations’, The Times, 16 May 1942, p.2 
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Appendix 9: Additional Staff Requested by A.F.E.E. Following a Visit by Sir 
Robert Renwick 
 
Technical Development Section 1: 
Flight Testing of Tugs & Gliders and the Development Work of Gliders 
Technical Assistant II (T.A.II x2) 
Technical Assistant III (T.A.III x5) 
Technical Development Section 2: 
Parachute Installations and the Transport & Dropping of Equipment in Aircraft 
Technical Officers or Flight Lieutenants (T.O. x4) 
Technical Assistant II or Flying Officer/Pilot Officers (T.A.II x4) 
For a Section to Undertake Live Drops in the Trial of Parachute Installations 
Parachute Troops (x12) 
Sergeant Parachute Packer (x1) 
Corporal Parachute Packer (x1) 
Corporal Aircraft Hand (x1) 
Parachute Packers (x3) 
Parachute Repairers (x2)  
Aircraft Hands (A.C.H.S. x6) 
For Flight Records, Technical Records & General Clerical Duties 
Temporary Male Clerk for Flight Records (x1) 
Temporary Female Clerks for Technical Records and General Clerical Duties (x2) 
Additional Staff 
General Duties Observer Sergeant (G.D. x4) 
For duties in aircraft undertaking flights where navigation and general assistance to the pilot in the 
towing aircraft is necessary.  
 
Source: T.N.A., AVIA 15/1130, Minute following Renwick’s Visit to M.A.P., 5 May 1942 
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Appendix 10: A.F.E.E. Short-Term Test Programme September 1945  
 
Short-Term Tests Remarks 
Flight Test of TX.3/43 Specification TX.3/43 was issued in 1943 for a 
two seat training glider. The contract was 
awarded to General Aircraft who built two 
prototypes of the G.A.L. 55. The work was 
recorded as not yet started but it is interesting to 
note that work on the aircraft was being 
continued at such a late stage and the prototype 
was actually air tested in December 1945. 
10
 
Flight Tests of Hamilcar X The Hamilcar X was produced following the issue 
of O.R. 160 and was a powered version of the 
cargo glider built to Air Ministry Specification 
X.4/44 The work is recorded as being well in 
hand and the first entry in the O.R.B. was 
recorded on 3 November 1945. 
11
   
Test of Hastings as a Glider Tug 
Test of York as a Glider Tug 
The Hastings and York were transport variants of 
the Halifax and Lancaster respectively. Work had 
not yet started when the report was submitted.  
Test of Miles Martinet as a Glider Tug The Martinet was a single seat monoplane trainer 
and thus only capable of towing a Hotspur. The 
Hotspur remained the principal training glider and 
this is probably why the G.A.L. 55 was never put 
into production. Work had not yet started.  
Flight Tests of Rotakite The advance in helicopter design had effectively 
made the Rotakite variant technologically 
redundant and few tests had been recorded.  
Anson Mail Pick-up Installation Tests 
Auster Light Mail Pick-up Installation Tests 
The capability for aircraft to pick-up cargo mid-
flight had obvious benefits and work was well in 
hand.  
Dakota Live Pick-up Installation Tests 
Dakota Cable Laying Installation Tests 
Live pick-up of stationary gliders had first been 
attempted by A.F.E.E. in April 1943. The 
advantage being the recovery of gliders after 
operational use. Cable-laying from aircraft was 
much more efficient, if not technologically 
                                               
10
 T.N.A., AIR 29/514, A.F.E.E. O.R.B. June 1944 - December 1945, December 1945. 
11
 T.N.A., AIR 29/514, A.F.E.E. O.R.B. June 1944 - December 1945, 3 November 1945. 
315 
 
challenging, that conducting the operation by 
hand.  
Test of York for Paratrooping 
Test of Hastings for Paratrooping 
The Hastings replaced the Avro York when it 
came into service in 1948 and consequently 
became a key paratroop aircraft. The fact that 
preparations were underway into its suitability for 
paratrooping in 1945 proves the A.F.E.E. 
assertion that they were best placed to deal with 
all aspects of flight performance tests transport 
aircraft.  
Dropping of Heavy Equipment: This included a 
wide variety of items including tractors, assault 
boats, trailers and motorcycles 
Much of the work was well in hand and unique to 
A.F.E.E.  
Test of Halifax for Troop Carrying 
Test of York for Troop Carrying 
Test of Hastings for Troop Carrying 
The lack of a purpose built troop carrying aircraft 
meant that existing types required modification 
and such investigations naturally fell to A.F.E.E. 
although no works had commenced.  
Flight Test of R-4B Helicopter 
Flight Tests of R-6 Helicopter  
Helicopter performance testing became a major 
part of the A.F.E.E. function and work was well 
underway in September 1945.  
 
Source: T.N.A., AVIA 15/2253, A.F.E.E. Future Technical Policy, 22 September 1945 
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Appendix 11: A.F.E.E. Long-Term Test Programme September 1945  
 
Long-Term Tests Remarks 
Effect of Glider on Tug Stability 
Measurements of Tow Rope Forces 
Improvements in Tow Cables 
Improvements in Glider Pick-up Technique 
All of the tests were recorded as being ‘well in 
hand’ but the future application of such 
improvements remained uncertain.  
Auto Release of Parachutes 
Measure of Shock on Parachute Opening 
Development of Shock Eliminator  
The work had all started and was directly linked 
to the function of dropping of heavy equipment.  
 
Source: T.N.A., AVIA 15/2253, A.F.E.E. Future Technical Policy, 22 September 1945 
 
